



# LEADERS' CORRESPONDENCE

WITH

MR. JINNAH .

*Edited by*

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## PREFACE

To talk of India's political problem is to bring one face to face with a labyrinth of innumerable intricacies in the shape of inter-social, inter-provincial and inter-communal topics. It has been an unfortunate phenomenon that whenever this land of ours has faced any serious crisis there have often shot up in our public life a large number of schools of thought, not only conflicting in their opinions but invariably antagonistic to each other, with the result that in the midst of the tumultuous clash of interests the very problem on which the whole pivot of our public life revolved, has invariably been pushed aside and left India's millions helpless.

In an age of faction, partisanship, personal rancour, and communal animosity healthy criticisms are rarely to be found either in the press or on the public platform or in private circles. Misrepresentations, misinterpretations and vilifications are not rare. Respective groups in justification of their conflicting standpoints not only cloud the issues but do not hesitate to throw mud at each other. In such an atmosphere a dispassionate study becomes difficult.

In order to put the true facts before those in search of truth, I am presenting a collection of the correspondence which took place between *Mr. M. A. Jinnah*, President, All-India Muslim League on the one hand, and several of our contemporary leaders on the other. The correspondence speaks for itself. I have no comments to make except that I would ask the reader in the words of *Bacon* :—

—“*Read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe, and take for granted, nor to find talk and discourse but to weigh and consider.*”

Bombay,  
January, 1944.

SYED SHARIFUDDIN PEERZADA.

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## LEADERS' CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. JINNAH

From M. A. JINNAH ESQ., M.L.A., President, All-India Muslim League.

*New Delhi, November 5th, 1939.*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I wish to thank you for giving me the interview on the 4th of November as you had promised in your letter of the 28th of October wherein you stated that you will be glad at some suitable moment to endeavour further to elucidate any points that there may be in doubt as desired by the resolution of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League of the 22nd of October.

In my interview with you on the 4th of November the subject was fully discussed and now, as desired by Your Excellency, I am herewith submitting to you the following points for your consideration and early reply :—

- (1) that as soon as circumstances may permit or immediately after the war the entire problem of India's future constitution, apart from the Government of India Act, 1935, shall be examined and reconsidered *de novo* ;

- (2) that no declaration shall, either in principle or otherwise, be made or any constitution be enacted by His Majesty's Government or the Parliament without the approval and the consent of the two major communities of India, viz., the Mussalmans and the Hindus ;
- (3) that His Majesty's Government should try and meet all reasonable national demands of the Arabs in Palestine ;
- (4) that the Indian troops will not be used outside India against any Muslim power or country.

I have already, in my interview, fully explained the reasons and the grounds in support of these points over and above of what is indicated in the statement of the 18th of September and the resolution of the 22nd of October of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, copies of which have already been sent to Your Excellency.

There is one more point which was mentioned in the statement of the Working Committee of the 18th of September, viz., the question of securing justice and fairplay to the Mussalmans in the Congress-governed Provinces where even their elementary rights were being ruthlessly trampled upon ; but as the Congress Ministries have gone out of office I do not desire to say anything regarding this matter at present.

May I inform Your Excellency that I am leaving for Bombay tomorrow morning.

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH.

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To M. A. JINNAH, ESQ., M.L.A., President, All-India Muslim League.

*The Viceroy's House, New Delhi,  
November 7th, 1939.*

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Many thanks for your letter of 5th November. I fully appreciate the importance of the points which you raise and I will not fail to let you have as early a reply as practicable.

Yours sincerely,  
LINLITHGOW.

From M. A. JINNAH, ESQ., M.L.A., President, All-India Muslim League.

*Bombay, November 18th, 1939.*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

Thank you for your letter of the 7th November 1939. Since the receipt of your letter I have been pressed with inquiries from different parts of the country as to



how and where we stand. Would you, therefore, mind if I were to publish my letter to Your Excellency, dated the 5th November and your letter under reply.

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH.

To M. A. JINNAH, ESQ., M.L.A., President, All-India Muslim League.

*Viceroy's Camp,*  
*November 26th, 1939..*  
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Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Thank you for your letter of the 18th November. I quite understand your anxiety to publish your letter to me of the 5th November and my acknowledgment of it. I should welcome it if you could postpone publication for, say, another ten days, as I am anxious that the interval between publication by you and my reply (which naturally must take some little time to prepare as I have to consult His Majesty's Government) should be as short as possible. But if you feel that it is essential for you to publish without waiting so long, I can raise no objection, though I would ask you to be kind enough to let me know in advance the date you contemplate.

Yours sincerely,  
LINLTHCOW..

## TELEGRAM

From MR. JINNAH, Bombay.

To LORD LINLITHGOW, New Delhi.

*Dated the 29th November 1939.*

Hope my letter eighteenth has reached your Excellency am waiting for reply as soon as possible.

## TELEGRAM

M. A. JINNAH, ESQ.

Little Gibbs Road,  
Malabar Hill, Bombay,

*29th November, 1939.*

Many thanks for your telegram of today. I hope you will by now have received my letter of 27th November posted from Bahawalpur—VICEROY.

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To M. A. JINNAH, ESQ., M.L.A., President, All-India Muslim League.

Viceroy's Camp, India,  
*Calcutta, December 23rd, 1939.*

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I am now in a position to reply to your letter of November 5th, in which you submitted certain points

for my consideration. You will, I am sure, appreciate that more than one of your questions, if considered in the light of all the implications involved in it, would raise issues affecting other communities in India, and that this correspondence between us would not be an appropriate medium for making pronouncements on them. But I hope that my answers, limited though their scope may be by this consideration, will none-the-less serve to remove your difficulties.

2. My answer to your first question is that the declaration I made with the approval of His Majesty's Government on October 18th last does not exclude examination of any part either of the Act of 1935 or of the policy and plans on which it is based.

3. With reference to your second point, I can assure you that His Majesty's Government are not under any misapprehension as to the importance of the contentment of the Muslim community to the stability and success of any constitutional developments in India. You need therefore have no fear that the weight which your community's position in India necessarily gives their views will be understood.

4. In framing their policy for Palestine, His Majesty's Government have endeavoured to meet all

reasonable Arab demands, and they continue to be fully alive to the importance of that issue.

5. Finally you asked for an assurance that Indian troops will not be used outside India against any Muslim power or country. This question is fortunately hypothetical, since His Majesty is not at war with any Muslim power. You will appreciate, however, that it is impossible to give a guarantee in terms so wide as those of your letter, which would have the effect of limiting India's right to use its own army in its own defence in circumstances which cannot now be foreseen ; in the present situation, however, as you are aware, every precaution has been taken by His Majesty's Government at the instance of the Government of India to ensure that Muslim feeling in India on this matter is fully respected.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW.

10, Aurangzeb Road,  
*New Delhi, 6th February, 1940.*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I am herewith sending a copy of the Working Committee's resolution passed on the 3rd of February, 1940, regarding the correspondence that has passed

between Your Excellency and myself for your consideration.

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH.

To

H. E. LORD LINLITHGOW,  
Viceroy and Governor-General of India,  
New Delhi.

Passed at the meeting of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League held at Gul-i-Raana, Hardinge Avenue, New Delhi, on the 3rd and 4th of February, 1940, under the Presidentship of Mr. M. A. Jinnah.

#### RESOLUTION NO. 1 :

The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League considered the correspondence that has passed between Mr. Jinnah, the President, and His Excellency the Viceroy, ending with his final reply dated 23rd December 1939. The Committee is of the opinion that the reply of His Excellency is not satisfactory as certain important points still require further clarification and elucidation. The Committee therefore, empowers the President to place the views of the Working Committee before His Excellency and request him to reconsider the matter regarding the assurances asked for in the resolution of the Working Committee dated the 18th of

September and the 22nd of October, 1939, and thereby remove all doubts and apprehensions from the mind of Muslim India.

*New Delhi, February 23rd, 1940.*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I placed the whole correspondence that had passed between Your Excellency and myself, ending with your letter dated December 23, 1939, before the meeting of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League on February 3, 1940.

As was desired by Your Excellency in our conversation on February 6, I now beg to state briefly the views of the Working Committee, which are as follows:—

The Working Committee appreciate the clarification made by Your Excellency regarding the first point and are glad to note that the declaration made by Your Excellency, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, on October 18, 1939, does not exclude the examination of any part either of the Act of 1935 or of the policy and plans on which it is based.

As regards the second point, the Working Committee do not feel satisfied as the request made for a definite assurance has not been met, namely, that no declaration should, either in principle or otherwise, be made or any constitution be enforced by His Majesty's

Government or enacted by Parliament without the approval and consent of the Mussalmans of India. We recognise Your Excellency's assurance when you state "His Majesty's Government are not under any misapprehension as to the importance of the contentment of the Muslim community to the stability and success of any constitutional development in India. You need, therefore, have no fear that the weight which your community's position in India necessarily gives their views, will be underrated." But, I regret to say, this does not meet the point raised by the Muslim League, because it still leaves the position of the ninety million Mussalmans of India only in the region of consultation and counsel, and vests the final decision in the hands of Great Britain to determine the fate and future of Muslim India. We regret that we cannot accept this position.

As to the policy for Palestine, the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League wish to impress upon His Majesty's Government that a solution should be found to the satisfaction of the Arabs. The Committee are glad to note, as Your Excellency states, that His Majesty's Government have endeavoured to meet all reasonable Arab demands, and they continue to be fully alive to that issue. But the eyes of the Muslim world are watching the situation keenly and a definite solution should be found without delay.

With regard to the use of Indian troops against any Muslim Power or country, the Committee feel that Your Excellency has misunderstood the position. When we asked for an assurance that Indian troops will not be used outside India against any Muslim Power or country, it was not intended that they shall not be used for the defence of the country in case of an attack on, or aggression against India. While we thank Your Excellency for informing us that every precaution has been taken by His Majesty's Government, at the instance of the Government of India, to insure that Muslim feeling in India on this matter is fully respected we feel that further clarification of the position is necessary.

It is required of the Muslim League to give assurance of wholehearted co-operation and active support on behalf of the Mussalmans of India to the British Government for the purpose of prosecution of the war. The Committee are of opinion that before doing that they must feel confident that the future of the Mussalmans of India is not left in the region of uncertainty or doubtful possibility. Consequently, we do not consider it unreasonable on our part to ask for a definite assurance that no commitments will be made with regard to the future constitution of India or any interim settlement with any other party without our approval and consent. If His Majesty's Government are prepared to treat the



leadership of the Mussalmans as a responsible body, then they must be trusted, especially where the question of determining their own future is concerned.

We are constrained to state that Your Excellency is unnecessarily over-anxious about the interests of other communities. It has never been our desire unjustly to harm any community. The issues that have been raised by us are due to apprehensions that the British Government may be stampeded by other powerful organisations in the country into adopting a course or agreeing to a settlement in the matter of India's constitution which may prove not only highly detrimental to the interests of the Mussalmans but may be disastrous for them.

As regards Palestine and the use of Indian troops, our demands, as explained by me above, cannot in any way prejudice the interests of any other community. It is not possible in a letter of this kind to state fully the various reasons and details ; but, if Your Excellency so desires, I shall be very glad to place the views of the Committee before you in fuller details at an early date, whenever Your Excellency finds it convenient.

Yours sincerely,

M. A. JINNAH.

H. E. the Viceroy's letter to Mr. Jinnah,

*Dated, April 19, 1940*

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I was glad to gather from your letter of February 24, that my letter to you of December 23 had removed some of the doubts, which had been felt by the All-India Muslim League. I do not read your letter as indicating that the Working Committee of the League expects anything further from me in your points—the scope of the examination of the constitutional position to follow war and the policy in Palestine.

You ask, however, for further clarification of the position in regard to the use of Indian troops against Muslim Powers or countries, while explaining, as I note and appreciate, that you had no intention of attempting to circumscribe their use in defending India against attack or aggression. I presume that you do not expect a guarantee, which it would obviously be impossible to give, binding us in future contingencies which no one can foresee. But you need have no fear that if at any time such a contingency arose the consideration underlying your suggestion would be overlooked. Fortunately, however, so far as the present situation is concerned, His Majesty's Government are in friendly and sympathetic relations with all Muslim Powers to some of whom indeed they are bound by alliance, while with the

rest they are on terms of most cordial friendship

You represent that your second point was not felt by the Working Committee to be adequately met by the terms of my letter. You have no doubt noticed the passage in the Secretary of State's speech on April 18 in which he used these words .

“ But that does not mean that the future constitution of India is to be a constitution dictated by the Government and Parliament of this country against the wishes of the Indian people. The undertaking given by His Majesty's Government to examine the constitutional field in consultation with representatives of all parties and interests in India connotes not dictation but negotiation. Admittedly a substantial measure of agreement amongst the communities in India is essential if the vision of a united India, which has inspired the labours of so many Indians and Englishmen, is to become a reality, for I cannot believe that any Government or Parliament in this country would attempt to impose by force upon, for example, 80 million Muslim subjects of His Majesty in India, a form of constitution under which they would not live peacefully and contentedly ”

This statement, I am sure you will agree, has removed any possible doubts on this point

Yours sincerely,  
LIVLITHGOW.

reported, 'good bag today, polished off rebels,' it being borne in mind that the 'rebels' thus hanged or blown from guns were not taken in arms but villagers apprehended 'on suspicion'. During this march atrocities were committed in the burning of villages and massacre of innocent inhabitants at which Mohammad Tuglak himself would have stood ashamed, How General Havelock behaved after entering Cawnpore is written by Charles Ball as follows:—

"General Havelock began to wreak a terrible vengeance for the death of Sir Hugh Wheeler. Batch upon batch of natives mounted the scaffold. The calmness of mind and nobility of demeanour which some of the revolutionaries showed at the time of death was such as would do credit to those who martyred themselves for devotion to a principle."

Charles Ball's Indian Mutiny, vol. I. p. 388.

First the British and Sikh soldiers were ordered to plunder the city and then the business of hanging was started. The most insulting was the event of forcing the Brahmins to lick with their tongues a blood-stained spot which was suspected to be tainted with the blood of the English ladies, alleged to have been murdered by Revolutionaries. The object of this heinous act is described by one English Historian as below:—

"I know that the act of touching Feringhi blood and washing it with a sweeper's broom degrades a high caste Hindoo from his religion. Not only this but I make them do it because I know it. We could not wreak a true revenge unless we trample all their religious instincts under foot, before we hang them, so that they may not have the satisfaction of dying as Hindoos.".....Ibid.

Some outrages which were committed after the siege of Delhi by the soldiers of the company may also be mentioned.

"After the siege was over, the outrages committed by our army are simply heart-rending. A wholesale vengeance is being taken without distinction of friend and foe. As regards the looting, we have indeed surpassed Nadirshah!"

Lord Elphinstone wrote the above in his letter to Lord Lawrence.

Again Lord Montgomery Martin writes:—

"All the city people found within the walls, when our troops entered, were bayonnetted on the spot; and the number was considerable, as you may suppose, when I tell you that in some houses forty or fifty persons were hiding. These were not mutineers, but residents of the city, who trusted to our well-known mild rule for pardon. I am glad to say they were disappointed."

How Hindus and Muslims before being put to death were defiled writes Russell:—

Proceedings of the meeting of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League held on June 15, 16 and 17, 1940 at Bombay :—

Resolved : The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, while being of the opinion that further clarification contained in the letter of His Excellency the Viceroy, dated April 19, 1940, with regard to the assurances asked for by the All-India Muslim League is not satisfactory, endorses the following from the statement issued by the President, Mr. M. A. Jinnah, on May 27, 1940 :

“Up to the present moment, we have not created any difficulty nor have we embarrassed the British Government in the prosecution of the war. The provinces where the Muslim League has a dominant voice have been left free to co-operate with the British Government, pending their consideration with regard to the assurances we have asked for, and in particular that the British Government should make no declaration regarding the future constitutional problems of India and the vital issues that have been raised in that connection without our approval and consent.

“Nevertheless, without prejudice to the adjustment of the larger issues later on, we were even willing, as far back as November last, to consider the proposal of the

Viceroy to bring about an honourable and workable adjustment in the provincial field, which would have been followed up with our representatives being appointed to the Executive Council of the Central Government to the extent permissible within the framework of the present constitution and existing law. But this proposal was summarily rejected by Mr. Gandhi and the Congress.

“A similar attempt was again made by His Excellency early in February, which met with the same fate. Since then it seems that the Viceroy has been waiting for the Congress to pass its word.

“With regard to Mr. Amery’s statement and the broadcast appeal of His Excellency the Viceroy, may I say that it is up to the British Government to show trust in Muslim leadership. There are many ways of doing so—and, as confident friends seek our wholehearted co-operation, we shall not fail.”

The Working Committee looks with alarm at the growing menace of Nazi aggression which has been most ruthlessly depriving one nation after another of its liberty and freedom and regards the unprovoked attack by the Italian Government against the Allies as most unwarranted and immoral at a time when France was engaged in a brave struggle against very heavy odds.

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The grave world situation demands serious efforts on the part of every Indian for the defence of his country, and the Working Committee calls upon the Government of India to prepare the country in an organised manner to meet every eventuality. The Committee is constrained to state that the proposals for the Defence of India indicated in the statement of Their Excellencies the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief, as well as the statements of some provincial Governors, are wholly inadequate to meet the urgent requirements of the situation. The Committee, therefore, authorises its President to enter into communication with His Excellency the Viceroy with a view to exploring the possibility of devising prompt and effective measures to mobilise the country's resources for the purpose of intensifying war efforts and the defence of India.

The Committee is of the view that, unless a satisfactory basis for close co-operation is agreed upon on an All-India basis and not province-wise between the Government and the Muslim League and such other parties as are willing to undertake the responsibility for the defence of the country in the face of imminent danger, the real purpose and objective will not be served and achieved. The Working Committee is of the opinion that, in view of the immediate grave danger that is facing the country, real purpose will not be served by the

Mussalmans and others merely joining the proposed provincial and district war committees with their present scope and functions.

Mr. Jinnah's letter.

*Dated, Simla, July 1, 1940.*

Dear Mr. Laithwaite,

I am enclosing herewith a rough note of the points I discussed with him on June 27, 1940, in the course of my interview.

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH.

NOTE : That no pronouncement or statement should be made by His Majesty's Government which would, in any way, militate against the basic and fundamental principles laid down by the Lahore resolution of division of India and creating Muslim States in the North-west and Eastern zones ; and it may be stated that that ideal now has become the universal faith of Muslim India.

That His Majesty's Government must give definite and categorical assurances to the Mussalmans of India that no interim or final scheme of constitution would be adopted by the British Government without the previous approval of Muslim India.

In view of the rapid developments in Europe and grave danger that is facing India, it is fully realised

that everything should be done that is possible to intensify war efforts and mobilise all the resources of India for her defence for the purpose of maintaining internal security, peace and tranquillity, and to ward off external aggression. But this can only be achieved provided the British Government are ready and willing to associate the Muslim leadership as equal partners in the Government both at the Centre and in all the provinces. In other words, Muslim India leadership must be fully trusted as equals, and have equal share in the authority and control of the Governments, Central and Provincial.

Provisionally and during the period of the war the following steps should be taken to comply with the formula, namely, co operation with the Government with equal share in the authority of the Government.

(A) That the Executive Council of the Viceroy should be enlarged, within the framework of the present constitutional existing law, the additional number to be settled by further discussions, but *it being understood that the Muslim representation must be equal to that of the Hindus if the Congress comes in, otherwise they should have the majority of the additional members, as it is obvious that the main burden and the responsibility will be borne by the Mussalmons in that case*

(B) In the provinces where Section 93 has to operate, non official advisers should be appointed, the

number to be fixed after further discussion, and the majority of the non-official advisers should be the representatives of Mussalmans ; and where the provinces can be run by combination of parties or ' coalition ', naturally it would be for the parties concerned to adjust matters by agreement among themselves.

(C) There should be a War Council consisting of not less than fifteen members, including the President, to be presided over by His Excellency the Viceroy. I don't like the expression " War Consultative Committee." This Council should regularly meet to deal with, any review, the general situation as it may develop from time to time, and advise the Government with regard to matters in connection with the prosecution of the war generally, and in particular, the fullest development of the defence possible, and finance, and to make a thorough economic and industrial drive. In this body it will not be difficult to secure the representation and full co-operation of the Indian Princes, and as far as I can judge, they would have no difficulty in joining it. It is through this body that the association of the Princes can be secured. Here again, the representation of Muslim India must be equal to that of the Hindus if the Congress comes in, otherwise they should have the majority.

Finally, the representatives of the Mussalmans on the proposed War Council and the Executive Council

of the Governor General, and the additional non official advisers of the Governors, should be chosen by the Muslim League

H E the Viceroy's letter to Mr Jinnah

*Simla, July 6, 1940.*

Dear Mr Jinnah,

I am much obliged for the private and personal memorandum headed "tentative proposal" which you were kind enough to send me in your letter to my Private Secretary on July 1. I note the points taken in paragraph one of that memorandum, and in the first sentence of paragraph two both of which you emphasised in our recent conversation. I welcome also the amplification, as putting me in fuller possession of your mind, of that conversation represented by the balance of your letter. But certain of the points suggest that there may be some slight misapprehension, which you will, I think, agree that it would be desirable that I should clear without delay.

As regards the expansion of my Executive Council, this would, as you rightly observe in your memorandum, be within the existing constitutional scheme. In other words, any Council so expanded would co operate as a whole and as a single Government of India. It is not a case of striking a balance between the different interests

or of preserving the proportions between the important parties. As you yourself indicated in the course of our conversation, there are parties other than either Congress or the Muslim League who may fairly claim to be considered for inclusion, and there is a very definite limit of numbers to any possible expansion.

At the same time I really accept the importance, in the event of any expansion, of securing adequate representation of Muslim interests, and that is a point which I would bear in mind. There is, however, as you will see from my explanation, no question of responsibility falling in greater or less degree on any particular section. Responsibility will be that of the Governor-General-in-Council as a whole. Again, it will be clear that under the existing law and practice it must remain with the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Governor-General's Executive Council, and such persons cannot be the nominees of political parties, however important ; though it may, of course, be assumed that both the Secretary of State and the Governor-General would, in all cases, do their utmost to select persons from the various sections of the community.

I need not remind you that under law the whole responsibility for Government in section 93 provinces vests exclusively in the Governor, although a Governor can, of course, take advantage of the assistance of any

advisers he may appoint. Whether, and if so at what point and in what strength, non official advisers from political parties should be appointed in provinces under section 93 administration, in the event of an expansion of the Governor General's Council, would clearly call for consideration in the light of circumstances of each province. You will, I think, agree with me also that the importance of the community from which advisers are drawn in a particular province has a direct bearing.

Your idea for a War Council is, in my view, well worth while considering, though details would have to be worked out. Here again there are, of course, many parties to be considered other than the Muslim League or Congress.

As regards section III of your memorandum, I ought, I think, to make it clear that it would be constitutionally impossible for the choice of Muslim gentlemen to be appointed to any expanded Executive Council or as non official advisers to rest with the Muslim League. But in the contingency envisaged you need not fear that any suggestions you may put forward would not receive full consideration.

Let me in conclusion thank you again for your very clear and valuable memorandum. I realise, of course, fully that it is not merely private and personal, but that, in your own words, it embodies a tentative proposal.

I am sure that you will agree with me that it is well that there should be no misunderstanding on the important points on which I have touched above.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW.

Mr. Jinnah's letter.

*Bombay, July 17, 1940.*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I am in receipt of your letter of July 6, 1940, and thank you for it.

As regards the constitutional and legal position that you have been good enough to point out to me in connection with the expansion of the Executive Council, and also with regard to the appointment of advisers to the Governor and the position of the Governor, working under Section 93 I fully appreciate it.

I am glad that the idea of constituting a War Council, in your opinion, is well worthwhile considering. No doubt the details would have to be worked out. But I do not think there is anything in my memorandum which cannot be given effect to by way of convention and, if the Secretary of State and yourself meet us in the spirit of trust and co-operation, the legal and cons-



titutional formalities can be met and complied with. What is required is the spirit of complete understanding.

I am, however, grateful to you for your assurance in paragraph five of your letter, with regard to the choice of Muslim gentlemen to be appointed to the Executive Council or as non-official advisers, which runs as follows : " But in the contingency envisaged you need not fear that any suggestion you may put forward would not receive full consideration." On my part, I hope that I shall meet you in every reasonable way possible.

Yours sincerely,

M. A. JINNAH.

H. E. the Viceroy's letter to Mr. Jinnah *en route* to Poona.

August 5, 1940.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I have had the advantage of recent discussion with you in regard to the general political situation in India, and I have reported our conversations on that matter to His Majesty's Government, with whom also I have been in consultation as to the desirability of some further statement designed to remove misunderstandings and further to clarify their intentions in the constitutional field. I am glad to say that I have now been authorised

to make the statement of which I enclose a copy. It will be published in the morning papers of Thursday August 8, and I would ask you to treat it as entirely secret and for your personal information until then.

As you will see His Majesty's Government have authorised me to invite a certain number of representative Indians to join my Executive Council, and they have authorised me further to establish a War Advisory Council which would meet at regular intervals and which would contain representatives of the Indian States and of other interests in the national life of India as a whole. I trust sincerely that you and the organisation of which you are the President will be prepared to join with me in the Central Government and in the War Advisory Council ; and I would greatly appreciate it if you are able to let me have a reply by August 21 at the latest. I would hope to have an opportunity of conversation with you in Bombay on August 13, and I suggest that this would be a convenient opportunity to clear the ground for your formal reply. I would only add that I am anxious that the names of the expanded Executive Council should appear not later than the end of August, and those of the War Advisory Council by the middle of September at the latest and if possible earlier than that date.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW.

Letter from H E the Viceroy to Mr Jinnah

*Dated August 14, 1940*

Dear Mr Jinnah,

I think it may be convenient for you to have in writing the information on the points below which I gave you in our conversation today I informed you in that conversation first that my statement clearly safeguarded the Muslim position in relation to future constitutional development secondly, that I equally provided a basis on which the Muslims could, if they so desired, co operate at the Centre As I explained to you in our earlier conversation, I cannot yet take up the issue of the provinces but I do not contemplate non official advisers at any rate at this stage

You asked me the probable strength of the expanded Executive Council I cannot, for reasons which you will appreciate, yet indicate a precise figure, but the total strength of the Council will be likely to be in the neighbourhood of 11 If, as I trust, the Muslim League are prepared to accept my invitation, I would like you to let me have a panel of names, say four, with a view to my selecting two from it for appointment to my Council As I have already made clear to you, Sir Zafrulla Khan, if he remains in my Council, will not count against this figure It is clearly impossible until the discussions on

which I am at present engaged are complete to indicate precisely what would be the parties represented in the expanded Council.

The strength and composition of the War Advisory Council can clearly only be fixed after the expansion of the Executive Council is complete. Here, too, I should be grateful if you would be good enough to let me have a panel of names for my consideration on the assumption that there would probably be, say, five Muslim League representatives out of a total of something in the neighbourhood of 20.

As you will appreciate, I am very anxious to take very early decisions in these matters and to reach finality as regards the personnel of the expanded Executive Council and of the Advisory Council at as early a date as possible, and I hope that you will be able to assist me by letting me have a very early reply.

There is, of course, no objection whatever to your communicating the information above to your colleagues confidentially, but I should be grateful if any publicity could be avoided for the present.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW.

H E, the Viceroy's letter.

*Dated Simla, September 25, 1940*

Dear Mr Jinnah,

I duly received the resolutions of the Working-Committee of the Muslim League passed at their meetings in Bombay, on September 2

I have, I think, made the general position perfectly clear in the course of our conversation, and it is unnecessary for me to enter into further detail about it here. As regards certain specific matters, I would, however, put on record that I explained to you the constitutional reasons which make it essential that the choice of members of the Governor General's Executive Council must rest exclusively with the Governor General and the Secretary of State, with whom it must rest to tender advice in this matter to His Majesty. I appreciate, however, the difficulties which, you made it clear to me, confronted you in connection with the formation of the panel which I had earlier suggested to you, and in the light of our discussion I am content that the selection of representatives, while resting with the Governor General, should be based, in the case of the Muslim League (and, should they so desire, of the other parties to be represented in my Council) not on a panel formally submitted, but on confidential discussion between the leader of the party concerned and myself.

I have also indicated the impracticability of a final decision as to the total strength of the expanded Council or as to the allocation of portfolios (a matter which must, of course, rest entirely with the Governor-General) until the replies of all those who may be invited to serve have been received. But I have made clear to you (as I have also to the leaders of the other parties whom I have recently seen) my attitude on both those issues.

The general position of His Majesty's Government had been made clear in my statement of August 8 and in the Secretary of State's speech in the House of Commons on August 15, it is that His Majesty's Government regard the expansion of my Council and the constitution of a War Advisory Council as steps of the first importance in terms of the association of Indian public opinion with the conduct of the war by the Central Government and of the constitutional machinery of the Government of India pending the post-war investigations, the machinery for which has been indicated in my statement and in Mr. Amery's speech. His Majesty's Government sincerely trust that the Muslim League, like the other parties and interests which they have invited to join the expanded Council and to participate in the War Advisory Council, will respond to that invitation. Their collaboration in both those bodies will, of course, be entirely without prejudice to the consideration and decision after

the conclusion of the war, and on the basis already indicated in my statement, of the main constitutional issue. But His Majesty's Government trust and anticipate that they and the other parties who are represented in the expanded Council and the War Advisory Council will welcome the opportunity offered to them of influencing the cause of public affairs in the immensely important period which lies ahead, and, in so doing, will, in the working throughout the period of the war of those bodies, find a basis for that general co-operation, with full regard to the interests of all concerned, on which the post-war constitution foreshadowed in my statement and in the Secretary of State's speech can be built.

Yours sincerely,  
LINLITHGOW.

Mr. Jinnah's letter.

*New Delhi, September 26, 1940.*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I am in receipt of your letter of September 25, 1940, in reply to the resolution of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League on September 2, which was despatched to you with my covering letter of September 5.

I shall place the matter before the Committee on September 28, and let you have the reply as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH.

H. E. the Viceroy's letter.

*Dated, Simla, September 25, 1940*

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

You asked me yesterday to let you have a formal reply before you left for Delhi to the resolutions which you were kind enough to send me earlier this month, and I accordingly send you a formal letter herewith. I have given the most careful consideration since we parted last night as to whether I could devise any form of words such as you mentioned to me which would meet the purpose which you had in view. I warned you, as you will remember, that I anticipated the greatest difficulty in doing so, and I am bound to confess with regret that I have in fact after the most careful thought found it impracticable. But, knowing your mind as I do, I have endeavoured in the last paragraph of my formal letter sent herewith to do what I could to make the general position clear, and I hope that that may be of assistance to you. I trust that in the light of our talks you will now be able to let me have a definite decision once your meeting at Delhi is over, and I trust



that that decision may be a favourable one ; for matters have now reached a stage at which it is essential that a definite conclusion should be reached.

Yours sincerely,  
LINLITHGOW.

Mr. Jinnah's letter.

*Dated New Delhi, September 26, 1910.*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I thank you for your letter of September 25 and I extremely regret that you are unable to meet me on the point which I raised during the course of our conversation on the 24th, though in the course of the discussions you appreciated and recognised that it was a vital point so far as the Muslim League was concerned, namely, that in the event of any other party deciding later on to be associated with your Executive Council to assist in the prosecution of war it should be allowed to do so on terms that may be approved of and consented to by the Muslim League party, as we were entering into, so to say, a "war contract".

I thank you for your endeavour in the last paragraph of your formal letter to do what you could to make the general position clear, but, I am afraid, it does not meet the point raised by me and I cannot derive much assistance from it.

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH.

**CORRESPONDENCE:**

**MR. JINNAH & MR. GANDHI**



Mr. M. A. Jinnah sent Mr. B. G. Kher with a special message to Gandhiji about Hindu-Muslim Unity. Mr. Kher saw Gandhiji at Tithal. As a result of their conversation Gandhiji addressed the following letter to Mr. Jinnah from Tithal :

*Tithal, May 22, 1937.*

DEAR SHRI JINNAH,

Kher has given me your message. I wish I could do something but I am utterly helpless. My faith in Unity is as bright as ever : only I see no daylight out of the impenetrable darkness, and in such distress I cry out to God for light.

Yours sincerely,  
M. K. GANDHI.

Letter from Mr. Gaudhi to Mr. Jinnah.

"As I read it, the whole of your speech is a declaration of war. Only, I had hoped you would reserve poor me as a bridge between the two. I see that you want no bridge. I am sorry. It takes two to make a quarrel. You won't find me one, even if I cannot become a peace-maker.

"This is not for publication, unless you desire it. It is written in all good faith and out of an anguished heart."

Letter from Mr. Jinnah to Mr. Gandhi.

Dated Bombay, November 5, 1937.

"I am of opinion that I was fully justified in publishing your letter from Teethal last May ; I am of opinion that I was fully justified in doing so ; but your letter means something different from what I understand it to mean. Surely it was open to you to offer your explanation to the public. The letter was not marked as it is usual to do so when its publication is not desired by the writer, and my message to you was not private. Even now you do not indicate how I have misunderstood your attitude or the contents of that letter.

"I am sorry you think my speech at Lucknow is declaration of war. It is purely in self-defence. Kindly

read it again and try and understand it. Evidently you have not been following the course of events of the last twelve months.

“As to reserving you as a ‘bridge’ and ‘peace-maker’, don’t you think your complete silence for all these months has identified you with the Congress leadership, although I know that you are not even a four-anna member of that body.

“I regret to say that I find nothing definite or any constructive proposal in your letter under reply, except that it is written in all good faith and out of an anguished heart which I reciprocate.”

Letter from Mr. Gandhi to Mr. Jinnah.

Dated Segaon. February 3, 1938.

“Pandit Nehru told me yesterday that you were complaining to the Maulana Sahib about the absence of any reply from me to your letter of November 5 in reply to mine of October 19. The letter was received by me when I was pronounced by the doctors to be seriously ill in Calcutta. The letter was shown to me three days after its receipt. Had I thought it necessarily called for a reply, even though I was ill I would have sent one. I have re-read the letter. I still think that there was nothing useful that I could have said in reply.

away as State prisoners in the small hours of the 4th January, 1932.

Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan and Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru had already led the van. The rest of the Indian politicians led the rear. The Satyagrahis came forward in their thousands. In 1921 they were thirty thousand in number and that was considered a big number. In 1930-31, within a short interval of ten months, ninety thousand men, women and children were convicted and sentenced. No one knows how many were beaten, but the number can not be less than 3 or 4 times the number imprisoned. People were either beaten down into paralysis of all activity, or simply tired down by a 'cat and mouse' policy. The old game of beating prisoners was renewed. Office secrets were asked to be divulged. "Where are your papers, your books, and your lists of subscriptions and volunteers?" That was the demand of Government and young men were harassed and unutterable things were said, unspeakable punishments were planned and executed. Imagine an advocate of the High Court being subjected to the torture of his hair being plucked out one by one as a mark of Police displeasure at his not giving out his name and address.

New occasions called for new Ordinances. The United Provinces Emergency Powers Ordinance which was issued on the 14th of December, 1931, authorised the Local Government to impose collective fines on the inhabitants of a particular area which could be recovered as Land Revenue. The three Ordinances relating to the North-West Frontier Province were issued on the 24th of December, 1931. One of them ran on the lines of the U. P. Ordinance and provided against non-payment of liabilities. The other two were known as N.W.F.P. Emergency Powers Ordinance and the N. W. F. P. Unlawful Association Ordinance.

On the 4th of January, four new Ordinances were issued known as (1) the Emergency Powers Ordinance, (2) Unlawful Instigation Ordinance, (3) Unlawful Association Ordinance and (4) Prevention of Molestation and Boycott Ordinance.

The events of 1932-33 ran on much the same lines as those of 1930-31. Only, the fight was more intensive and more determined. The repression was ever so much more ruthless and the suffering was ever so much more deep.

The Government offensive started with the arrest of Gandhi and the President of the Congress, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, in the early hours of the 4th of January. The above mentioned Ordinances of 1932 were issued the same morning and extended to several Provinces. Within the next few days, they were applied to practically the whole country. Many Provincial and subordinate Committees, Ashrams, National

Schools and other National institutions were declared unlawful, and their houses, furniture and funds and other moveables seized. Most of the leading Congressmen in the country were suddenly clapped into jails. The Congress organisation was thus apparently left without leaders, without funds, and even without any local habitation. The Congressmen who had been left behind were not, in spite of this sudden and determined swoop, without resources.

Everyone took up the work wherever he happened to be. The Working Committee had decided that vacancies on it, unlike in 1930, be not filled up and Sardar Vallabhbhai, anticipating his own arrest, had made out a list of several persons who would act in his place during his absence one after another. The Working Committee had transferred all its powers to the President, and the President in his turn transferred them to his successors who, in their turn, could nominate their own successors with similar powers. In the Provinces also, wherever it was possible, the whole power of the organisation was delegated to one person and similarly these powers percolated to a series of individuals exercising the rights of a Congress Committee in Districts, Thanas, Talukas and even villages. It was these individuals who came to be popularly known as 'Dictators.'

One of the difficulties which faced the organisers of any Civil Disobedience campaign related to the laws which could be selected for disobedience. It is evident that any law and every law may not be disobeyed. The ordinances with their wide ramifications solved this difficulty for the Congress. In the different Provinces different items were selected, while there were certain items prescribed from time to time by the Acting President of the Congress. Thus, picketing of liquor shops and foreign cloth shops and of British goods was an item common to all Provinces. In the United Provinces on a pretty large scale, and in a portion of Bengal non-payment of rent was an important item. In places in Bihar and Bengal, payment of Chaukidari tax was withheld. In the Central Provinces and the Berar, Karnatak and some places in U. P., the Madras presidency and Bihar, Forest Laws were disobeyed. Salt Laws were defied in many places by manufacture, collection, or sale of illicit salt. Meetings and proceedings were of course prohibited and were held in spite of such prohibition. At an early stage of the struggle, a favourite item of the programme was the observance of what came to be known as special days. These were in connection with special events or individuals, or for special purposes, e. g. Gandhi Day, Motilal Day, Frontier Day, Martyrs Day, Flag Day and a number of other days.



As already stated, the Government had taken possession of Congress offices and Ashrams. Attempts were made in many places to get back symbolical possession of these places in Government hands, thus disobeying the Ordinance which made entry into those places a trespass. These attempts came to be known as 'raids'. Under the Ordinances the service of any press was not available to the Congress. This deficiency was made up by the issue of unauthorised bulletins leaflets, news-sheets, reports etc., which were typed, eyeletstyped, duplicated, or even printed, but without the names of the press or the printers as required by law, some under the names of non-existent Presses and persons. It is remarkable that in spite of Police vigilance these news-sheets and bulletins were issued regularly and continued to furnish information to the country, as a whole, of all that was happening. The service of the Post Office and the Telegraph was denied to the Congress, and it established its own system of carrying its post not only from place to place in a Province but also from the All-India Office to the Provinces. Sometimes the volunteers carrying these postal articles were detected and naturally arrested or otherwise dealt with. This system which had really been started towards the latter part of the movement of 1930 was almost perfected in 1932. The Government were unable to locate even the offices of the A. I. C. C. or the Provincial Committees, from whence not only the bulletins but also instructions for the carrying on of the movement emanated, and when once either an office or an individual conducting it was located and put out of action, another sprang up and carried on the work. Another item which created much enthusiasm among the people and caused not a little embarrassment to the Police, was the holding of a session of the Congress followed by a series of conference in the Provinces and districts all over the country. In some places an attempt was made to interfere with the regular working of the Railways by the volunteers pulling the alarm signal in Railway trains and bringing them to a stop. An attempt was even made to make the Railway working difficult by large number of people boarding trains without tickets, simply to cause loss to the managements, but these found no encouragement from responsible quarters and were stopped.

The Boycott took a most intensive form and special items were selected for concentrated work. Thus in some places separate weeks were devoted to intensive propaganda for boycott of foreign cloth, or British medicines, British Banks, Insurance Companies, foreign sugar, kerosine oil, and British goods generally.

It is not to be supposed that Government after arresting the leaders would become quiet and mild. All the powers referred to in the Ordinances were used. But there were certain forms of repression which even the Ordinances, drastic as they were, did not sanction or contemplate. Needless to say that arrests were made in large numbers but they were made with discrimination, the total number of convictions being anything not less than a lakh. It soon became apparent that, in spite of camp jails and temporary jails being opened, the numbers that offered themselves for arrest could not all be accommodated. It was therefore necessary to make a selection, and only those who were supposed to possess some organising capacity or were prominently associated with the congress organisation were ordinarily imprisoned. Nor was it an easy matter to deal with them in Prison. More than ninety-five per-cent of the persons convicted were placed in the 'C' Class. There was a very small sprinkling of congressmen placed in the 'B' class, while the 'A' class was maintained only in name in several places and very sparingly granted in others.

The conditions of prison life were also not such as to be easily tolerated by a class of persons well brought up and having their own ideas about them. All this very often brought them into conflict with prison authorities, which resulted in the imposition of various kinds of jail penalties sanctioned by the rules and not unoften in beatings and other kinds of torture which can easily be practised within prison walls where there is no fear of detection. One particularly atrocious case of assault and beating for refusal to submit to the humiliating condition of sitting in a particular posture led to the prosecution and conviction of a jailor and his assistant and some others in Nasik Jail, but lathi-charges on Civil Disobedience prisoners were not uncommon. The conditions of life in the temporary Jails, with their tin-sheds which gave protection neither against the heat of May and June nor the cold of December and January, with their over-crowding and consequent insanitary conditions, were quite intolerable. There were, no doubt, some jails where the treatment was tolerably fair but that was rather the exception than the rule. Some of the permanent jails also were no better. It was reported that the Health of the Political prisoners in many of the jails, particularly in camp jails was far from satisfactory. Dysentery was common in all the seasons, while the rains and cold weather brought pneumonia and serious lung trouble to not a few. Many died as prisoners. The conditions in the permanent jails in some places were not much better. The treatment depended

naturally on the character and temper of the immediate, jail officials, and these, with some notable exceptions here and there, were neither considerate nor even fair.

The Police had early taken to device of dispersing crowds and processions by lathi-charge. There was hardly an important place in any Province where the movement showed signs of life which did not experience these lathi-charges. In many places, the injuries caused were serious and the number of those injured large. It was a practice with the crowds to collect together to see what was happening where some Satyagrahis were marching in procession, holding a meeting, carrying on what is called a 'raid' or engaged in picketing, and when the lathi-charge was made, no discrimination was made between those who had assembled as, sight-seers and those who had gone with the set purpose of disobeying the law. It was not unoften that the sight-seers were the victims of these lathi-charges and Satyagrahis were arrested and otherwise dealt with. Satyagrahis, too, had their share of these assaults, not only in a crowd where they were mixed up with other people but within the quieter and less exciting environments of a Police lock-up or a prison cell. It was commonly reported that in many places unmentionable atrocities and tortures were perpetrated, the variety and the cruelty of which varied with the intelligence, resourcefulness and callousness of the particular officers concerned. Even women and boys and children were not spared. The Government had discovered that while the Satyagrahis were prepared for prison, beating and torture, and many of them even to be shot, there were many who would succumb if an attack was made on their property. Accordingly heavy fines were imposed on conviction. Sometimes they rose to five figures. Three and four figures were common enough. Where non-payment of Revenue; rent or taxes was resorted to, for realisation of such dues and taxes and for realisation of fines, the properties of not only the defaulters and the convicts but also the property of joint families and sometimes of relatives were attached and sold. This by itself would be nothing if, as a result of such attachment and sale, properties of much value were not sold off virtually for a song. Besides the legally correct form of distress and attachment, what really mattered even more was the extra-legal and the illegal harassment and loss amounting in not a few cases to wanton loot and waste. Not only were moveables like furniture, household utensils, Jewellery and even cattle and standing crop attached and sold and some times destroyed, but the very lands and homesteads were not spared. There are many in Gujrat, the U.P., and Karnatak

who are landless even to-day and whose suffering was entirely voluntary, in the sense that they refused to pay what they could easily have paid if sufferings were none-the-less imposed upon them, because, they need not have been deprived of all that they lost. The agriculturists of Gujrat who joined in the non-payment of Revenue and rent campaign went through sufferings which it is impossible to describe, but they did not bend. There were many places where extra police were posted as a punitive measure and their cost realised from the inhabitants. From four or five places only in Bihar where such extra police were posted in the Province, no less than four lakhs and seventy thousand was realised as punitive tax. The terror and havoc created by the posting of additional force was so great in parts of the district of Midnapur in Bengal that the bulk of the Hindu population of two Thanas in the District actually evacuated their homes and shifted to the neighbouring areas in the midst of indescribable suffering resulting in the death of women.

Besides such Punitive Tax, collective fines were also imposed on many localities and the inhabitants were made to pay them. In several places in the country, firing was resorted to and many persons killed and many more injured. In this respect the N.W.F.P. suffered the severest losses in killed and injured.

Thus the atrocities of the Government were progressively increasing since 1857 with the application of Newer, more drastic and more tyrannical methods for the suppression of the peoples' desires and efforts to be free. But it should not be ignored that once the battle of freedom is begun, it can never end unless it is won.

## PART II

### EVENTS LEADING TO QUIT INDIA MOVE

#### CHAPTER I

##### CONGRESS AND WAR

On September 1, 1939, Germany marched into Poland and two days later the British and French Governments declared war upon Germany. Under the British law the declaration of war by the United Kingdom was enough to drag India automatically into the war and make her a belligerent country and an enemy of Germany. It was left to the Viceroy of India simply to announce the decision which was made in London, the fact that India was at war, and this the Viceroy did with promptness.

No government and people outside the British, French and German empires entered the war on its outbreak. All free peoples of the world outside the three warring empires were neutral in varying degrees. Even within the British Empire, the Government and people of Ireland had chosen to remain neutral. The peoples of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, though they form part of the British Empire, were also not automatically dragged into the war and they took the decision to fight Germany in their own governments and parliaments.

The attitude of the Indian National Congress in regard to questions of war and peace was not unknown to the Government of the United Kingdom, when it assumed and declared India a belligerent country without reference to the Indian people. Through an unbroken chain of four successive annual sessions, the Congress had resolved on behalf of the Indian people not to take part in and to resist a war which Britain might force on India and which went contrary to the foreign policy which the Congress had sought to outline. The pillars on which this policy rested were as follows.

Firstly, India may not be declared a belligerent country nor any use of her resources, men and money made in a war without the consent of the Indian people.

Secondly, the decision on war can be made only by Free India.

Thirdly, the fascism of Hitler and others which suppressed the freedom of its own population and conquered and enslaved other peoples is to be looked upon with horror but the imperialism of Britain and others must be found to be equally at the root of the world's slavery, violence and wars. In fact, apart from what British imperialism does to the

populations subject to it and the standing model and incitement that it is to other well armed powers to outrival it, British foreign policy must also be held responsible for encouraging the forces of evil as in the Italo-Ethiopian, Spanish and China-Japan wars and, thus for hastening a world war. India therefore, can have nothing to do with a war whose object may in any way be the continuance either of imperialism or fascism. The World can be made secure against the crime of wars only if the imperialist and fascist systems are destroyed.

Fourthly, India offers her co-operation in the cause of real collective security of the peoples of the world and in that of freedom and democracy.

Fifthly, the increasing use of armaments and their rapidly mounting manufacture is a source of serious anxiety to the future of the world. In pursuance of this policy and the action notwithstanding of the Indian Government in despatching Indian troops overseas, the Congress Working Committee even before the outbreak of the present war had withdrawn Congress members of the Central Legislature from its sessions.

Events moved fast and confusingly till the Working Committee met and issued a manifesto on September 14. This manifesto examined the issues involved in the present war and outlined India's attitude towards them.

Firstly, it objected to the manner in which India had been declared a belligerent country and the powers and activities of the Provincial Governments limited under the various Ordinances. It saw in this action of the British Government a deliberate ignoring of the wishes of the Indian people.

Secondly, the manifesto made it clear that India could not associate herself in a war under compulsion and without her free consent which she could give only after she was assured her own freedom and considered the cause of the war worthy. "Co-operation must be between equals by mutual consent for a cause which both consider to be worthy", said the manifesto.

Thirdly, the Working Committee drew attention to the past of the British Government and its foreign policy which had ignored again and again high ideals and the sentiments of its own people. The war of 1914-18 which was declared to have been fought for the preservation of democracy, self-determination and the freedom of small nations had ended up in a treaty which had denied all these. Subsequently, the British Government betrayed democracy and peace in Manchuria, Abyssinia, Spain and Czechoslovakia.

Fourthly, the manifesto contemplated with anxiety the terrible state of the world to-day. It said, "Innumerable

innocent men, women and children have been bombed to death from the air in open cities, cold blooded massacres, torture and utmost humiliation have followed each other in quick succession during these years of horror. That horror grows and violence and threat of violence shadow the world, and unless checked and ended will destroy the precious inheritance of past ages." In condemning the latest aggression of the Nazi Government in Germany against Poland the manifesto reiterated the Congress disapproval of the ideology and practice of Fascism and Nazism, their glorification of war and violence, their sweeping away of well-established principles and recognised standards of civilised behaviour and their suppression of the human spirit.

Fifthly, the manifesto found the cause of the present war in "the social and political conflicts and contradictions which have grown alarmingly since the last Great War". These conflicts arise principally out of attempts to retain imperialist domination in any part of the world. To resolve these conflicts and establish a new equilibrium and world-order domination of one country by another has to cease and economic relations have to be reorganised for the common good of all. Imperialism and Fascism alike have to be ended.

Sixthly, the Working Committee invited "the British Government to declare in unequivocal terms what their *war aims* are in regard to democracy and imperialism and the new-order that is envisaged". Taking India to be the 'crux of the problem, the manifesto particularly questioned if these war aims include "the elimination of imperialism and the treatment of India as a free nation" and the right of the Indian people to frame "their own constitution through a Constituent Assembly without external interference and if immediate effect was to be given to these aims to the largest possible extents".

Seventhly, the manifesto asserted that, "a free democratic India will gladly associate herself with other free nations for mutual defence against aggression and for economic co-operation" and showed the willingness of the Working Committee to give their co-operation in the task of checking horror in Europe and China.

Eighthly, the Working Committee earnestly appealed "to the Indian people to end all internal conflict and controversy and in this grave hour of peril to keep in readiness and hold together as a united nation calm of purpose and determined to achieve the freedom of India within the larger freedom of the world."

The Committee also appointed a War Emergency Subcommittee with Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru as its Chairman.

On October 10, the All-India Congress Committee approved and endorsed the statement issued by the Working Committee and repeated the invitation to the British Government to state their war aims and peace aims. The All-India Congress Committee reiterated the objectives of the Congress and said, "the Congress has been guided throughout by its objective of achieving the independence of the Indian people and the establishment of a free democratic state in India wherein the rights and interest of all minorities are preserved and safeguarded. The means it has adopted in its struggles and activities have been peaceful and legitimate, and it has looked war and violence with horror and as opposed to progress and civilisation."

During the A.I.C.C. debate, the need and propriety of the Working Committee's invitation to the British Government to declare its war and peace aims was questioned. Was it not apparent to everybody what these aims were, what the past of British imperialism had been and its present structure and necessity to dominate and enslave the world, said the questioners. Answering this question at the end of the debate, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru referred to the curious situation of British imperialism in which it was on the one hand continuing to maintain its domination and exploitation over a large part of the world and, on the other, professing to wage war against aggression and for the defence of freedom and world peace. This contradiction between practice and profession was not apparent to many millions in the world. The Invitation of the Working Committee, therefore, forced the British Government either to come out in their true colours and shed their professions or to shed their imperialism and act up to their declarations. This pressure on the British Government to reveal the truth for all the world to see was an act of service to India and the entire freedom-loving world. The manifesto of the Working Committee had, therefore, been acclaimed even by people outside India as the "Charter of the oppressed".

Meanwhile, the British Government in London had attempted to answer the Congress through the Secretary of State for India that the demand made by the Congress was inopportune and that the British people were susceptible to honourable treatment. Honour! If the British Secretary meant that the Indian people were no longer prepared to do honour to his government and be obediently loyal to it, he was indeed right. If he meant gentlemanly action, it should not have been difficult to choose between the British Government which had flouted the insistent wishes of a whole people and which was continuing to act contrary to its professions and the Indian



Congress which had spoken in the name of the freedom and the peace of the world. It was imperialism and bad manners and the Secretary of State for India that had succeeded in irritating a whole people who are generally of a forgiving disposition.

The Viceroy of India started a procession of interviews with many people, some men important because the Indian people thought them so, while many more because the Government thought them so. Altogether the Viceroy interviewed over fifty people. On October 8, he gave the British Government's reply to the Congress manifesto.

Firstly, in regard to their war aims and peace aims, the Viceroy said, the British Government sought no advantages from the war and were impelled to stop aggression and secure the peace of the world. It was easy to see that the Viceroy had side-stepped the issues that were raised by the Congress and that alone will shape the future of the world for good or for bad. The Congress had asked if the British Government were prepared to forego the unjust advantages accrued to them through their domination over and exploitation of one-fourth of the world, and the answer came that they did not wish for any fresh advantages. The Congress had asked if the British Government were willing to make all war impossible by ending the causes of war, which lay in imperialism and fascism, but their reply refused to disclose as to how they intended to secure the peace of the world. They had presumably in mind the old method of defeating the enemy and erecting a precarious peace on that basis.

Secondly, in regard to their aims concerning India, the Viceroy said, the British Government were committed to the goal of dominion status and would be willing to confer with Indian representatives as to the nature of advance to be made at the end of the war. There was no mention in the Viceregal statement of the words 'Independent India', and it was clear that the British Government were as afraid of this term as they probably would be of a bomber overhead or as they should be of their own conscience. They did not like to forego the right, precious to them but oppressive to the Indian people or arbitrating over India's future and they were willing at the end of the war to call in Indian representatives for purposes of consultation. The British Government forgot that the Indian people had long got over the stage of conferring and being consulted; they wished to be masters in their own country and did not particularly like to be advisers to foreign rulers.

Thirdly, in regard to the nature of advance to be immediately attempted, the Viceroy was willing to call together

a consultative committee of Indian representatives for purposes of association in the war. It is needless to add that there lay the wide gulf of centuries between the consultative committee proposed by the Viceroy and the widest possible application here and now of democracy and self-government demanded by the Congress. Of course, the Viceroy did not let go the opportunity of insisting on differences in Indian opinion which he had come to know through the differing viewpoints which were placed before him by his over fifty interviewers.

The answer of India's spokesmen to the Viceregal statement was prompt, short and unmistakable. Aside from the gap of a few hours caused by telegraphic transmission, the reactions of Mahatma Gandhi became known to the country immediately after the Viceroy's statement. "The Congress will have to go into wilderness again" said Gandhiji and added: "The British declaration shows clearly that there is to be no democracy for India if Britain can prevent it. The long statement made by the Viceroy simply shows that the old policy of divide and rule is to continue".

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru said: "If this is the final answer of the British Government to the people of India, then, there is no common ground between the two and our path diverge completely". As President of the United Provinces Congress Committee, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru appealed to Congressmen of the province to "keep ready. And whatever happens do not forget that we may do nothing against our high principles and not in keeping with India's honour. Keep calm and cool and disciplined. Keep ready".

After an extraordinarily short session, the Working Committee decided in its resolution of October 22, that "it can not possibly give any support to Great Britain, for it would amount to an endorsement of the imperialist policy which the Congress has always sought to end. As a first step in this direction the Committee call upon the Congress ministers to tender resignations."

Further, the Committee called upon "all Congress committees and congressmen generally to be prepared for all developments and eventualities and to show restraint of word and deed" and not to resort to "any hasty action in the shape of civil disobedience, political strikes and the like". Congressmen were asked to remember that "a programme of resistance, commensurate with the magnitude of the issue before the country, requires perfect discipline within Congress ranks and the consolidation of the Congress organisation". Events were moving fast. Congressmen and the people generally felt that they were living in glorious times and that the time had come for them to shed their little lives and to sleep on

their haversacks. The scent of adventure for great ideals was in the air.

The Congress ministries resigned. In the seven provinces of the Congress ministers, the Governors were unable to form ministries that could command popular support and suspended the constitution. In the eighth province of a Congress-coalition Ministry, the Governor formed a new ministry. The phase that had lasted 27 months was over. The constitution was wrecked. At the first touch of reality when the British-enforced constitution and the loyalty of Congress ministries to their fundamental pledge of India's freedom were alike on test, the utter unworkability of the constitution was proved and the British Government had to wreck it with their own hands. The people of seven provinces as represented in their provincial assemblies also accepted resolutions on the lines of the Working Committee's manifesto on war.

Between the Working Committee's decision to non-co-operate with the British Government and the almost entire wrecking of the constitution to date, the Viceroy of India invited Mahatma Gandhi, President Rajendra Prasad and Mr. M. A. Jinnah, Muslim League President, to meet him. Subsequent to these meetings and exchange of some correspondence, the Viceroy suggested in a press statement on November 5, that "there remains today entire disagreement between the representatives of the major parties on fundamental issues" and, as a result of it, there was failure in negotiations, but that, undaunted by this failure, he proposed, "in due course to try again in consultation with the leaders of these great parties and the princes to see if even now there may still be the possibility of securing unity."

To Understand this talk of failure and unity, and fundamental disagreements, it is necessary to examine the correspondence that took place between the Congress President and the Viceroy. The Viceroy had asked the Congress and the Muslim League to get together and arrive at an agreement as to how they could send their representatives on the Central Government as members of his Executive Council and also work harmoniously in the Provinces. The Viceroy had also suggested that the privileges and obligations of the Congress and the League members of his Executive Council would be the same as those of the existing members of the Council. That was his entire proposal.

It is not difficult to see that this proposal was absurd as far as the Congress was concerned. The Congress had definitely decided not to play the role of advisers to foreign rulers and to help in the exploitation of Indian resources and

manpower in peace and much more so in war. The Congress wants to secure the peace of the world through the freedom of all peoples and had as such asked the British Government to agree to the right of the Indian people to frame their own constitution in a Constituent Assembly and to provide for an interim arrangement conceding maximum possible political power to Indian representatives. This was a high national objective and an equally international aim, but the Viceroy had again managed to keep singularly quiet, in regard to them.

Failure, then of negotiations between whom, fundamental disagreements between whom, and the lack of unity between whom? Obviously, between the Congress and the British Government and not between the Congress and the Muslim League. Is it suggested that the Muslims of India or any organisations even partly representing them including the Muslim League do not want the freedom of their country or the peace of the world? There is nothing on record to prove that this is so. The Viceroy has been guilty of looseness of thought or of practising intentionally or otherwise, it is not for us to say, the old policy of divide and rule in describing what was a fundamental disagreement between him and the Congress as one between the Congress and the Muslim League.

The reply of the Muslim League President to the Viceroy also made the position clear. In his letter of November 4, Mr. Jinnah stated that the Congress was not prepared to discuss any questions relating to the Centre or the Provinces "until the British Government had complied with their demand as embodied in the resolution of the All-India Congress Committee", in other words, until the British Government had decided to give up its occupation of India. Mr. Jinnah did not, in this connection or any other during the course of this letter, talk of any disagreement between him and the Congress. In his letter to the Viceroy President Rajendra Prasad had, therefore, pointed out with eminent justice and great dignity that, "it has pained to find the communal question being dragged in this connection. It has clouded the main issue. It has been repeatedly said on behalf of the Congress that it is our earnest desire to settle all points of communal controversy by agreement and we propose to continue our efforts to this end. But I would point out that this question does not in any respect come in the way of a declaration of Indian freedom (as suggested by the Congress)".

In its demand for India's freedom, the Congress does not seek power for itself or for any particular community in the country. The constitution of India will be framed by a

Constituent Assembly which "will be formed on the widest possible basis of franchise and by agreement in regard to communal representation." As such, the Congress fights for withdrawing political power from the British Government and for bestowing it upon the Indian people. This vital fact seems to be lost sight of by the British Government and certain other people. Any organisation in India anxious to achieve this ideal or that and to serve any one interest will, therefore, join with the Congress in the struggle for freedom and thus woo the electorate and the masses for its due share in the Governance of the Country.

The first step was taken when the Congress declared its non-co-operation with the British Government. Thereafter there were two possible policies either of which could have been adopted. The one that the Congress could adopt was to transform its co-operation with the Government into immediate civil resistance and thus work out its policy of resisting the use of Indian men and resources in an imperialist war and also defiantly maintain national dignity and the principle of freedom against the British challenge. The other which the Congress actually adopted was the policy of providing for an intermediate stage of preparation between the step of non-co-operation that it had already taken and that of civil disobedience when it become necessary. This stage of preparation was to be devoted to the removal of the more dangerous weakness in the national position. Arguments could be advanced to prove the greater desirability of the one or the other policy but by far the most effective argument that clinched the issue in favour of the temporary stage of preparation was that it was already decided upon by the Working Committee.

Thereafter the annual session of the Indian National Congress at Raigarh passed a resolution on its war policy approving the previous resolutions and actions on the war situation by the A. I. C. C. and the Working Committee. Firstly it declared, that the Congress can not in any way, directly or indirectly, be a party to the war which means continuance and perpetuation of this exploitation (i. e. exploitation of the people of India as well as of other Asiatic and African countries) and it emphatically declared that nothing short of complete independence can be accepted by the people of India. "Further about communal harmony it expressed, "no permanent solution is possible except through a Constituent Assembly, where the rights of all recognised minorities will be fully protected by agreement. "As regards the sovereignty of the people it made clear, sovereignty in India must rest with the people, whether in the States or the Provinces".

In this resolution while it was clearly mentioned that the

Congress withdrew the ministries in order to dissociate India from the war and to enforce the Congress determination to free India from foreign domination, it also laid stress on discipline and constructive programme.

It is almost about a year after this that the Congress started its symbolic Satyagrah in November, 1940. In short this was the attitude and policy of the Congress towards the last world-war from its very start.

## CHAPTER II

### GANDHIJI AND WAR

Gandhiji on the very out-break of the last great world war expressed, when he was invited by the Viceroy to meet him, his abhorrence against the violent warfare and its horrors. Subsequent to this meeting, Gandhiji issued a statement on September, 5. He said, "I am not therefore, just now thinking of India's deliverance. It will come, but what will it be worth if England or France fall or if they come out victorious over Germany ruined and humbled." It is obvious that the thought of a ruined and humbled Germany was as much a matter of sorrow to Gandhiji as that of a defeated England or France. In like manner Gandhiji's concern at the destruction of London and the Westminster Abbey arose out of what he himself called a "purely humanitarian standpoint." To those who had misread into his concern at destruction a preference for Britain, Gandhiji explained on September, 11: "I would not care to erect the freedom of my country on the remains of despoiled Germany. I should be as much moved by a contemplation of the possible destruction of Germany's monuments". It is clear, therefore, that Gandhiji's sympathies, in so far as destruction caused by war is concerned, are evenly distributed over all victims, be they British or Germans.

After seeing the Viceroy, Gandhiji expressed his sympathies with Britain and France as much as with Germany and they were in accord with the Congress policy and his principles of distaste of war, violence and armaments.

He appealed to all war-mongers of the world to desist from the course of destruction of human life and property which were the best creation of God and man.

He gave his personal moral support to the British Government and their cause. He also advised the Congress for its unconditional moral support to the British Government in its hour of trouble and trial. He was opposed to any embarrassment to the British Government in its war efforts.

Hence this scheme of satyagrah in 1941, was so formulated as not to interfere in the least with the war efforts of the Government of India. He chose only his best Satyagrahis to offer a mere symbolic Satyagrah and that too who believed in non-violence as a faith. His Satyagrahis offered Satyagrah after giving previous notice to the Government as regards time and place of their offering Satyagrah, which was nothing else but merely shouting his faith in non-violence and his opposition to all armed wars, violence and aid to such wars with men or money. But that being symbolic did not interfere in the least with the war efforts of the Government of India. Most of such satyagrahis were arrested even before they actually went to shout or shouted but merely on sending a notice of their intention to shout such slogans.

Gandhiji further clarifying the issue between India and Britain said in his message to a London paper on November 14, "If there is to be a fight between Britain and the Congress, the world should know what it is to be for, does Britain intend to recognise India as an independent nation or must India remain Britain's dependency". Attempts are made by spokesmen of the British Government to confuse the main issue by flinging the minorities' question in India's face and by bracketing the Europeans of India and the Princes with the other minorities. If European interests are to be preserved, "rights acquired by conquest remain intact", says Mahatmaj and adds in regard to the Princes, "to raise the question of Princes is still more untenable. They are part of the Paramount Power. It is painful to think that British statesmen do not so much mention the millions of people of the States".

It may be mentioned here that the many millions of states' peoples as against their 600 and odd princes have spoken through the All-India States Peoples' Conference endorsing the Congress attitude on War. The Frontier Province, which has the highest percentage of Muslims than in any part of India was being ruled by a Governor who wrecked the constitution because the people of the Province refused to associate themselves with British War Policies. Aside from the Congress, certain other organisations also of Muslims such as Jamiat-ul-Ulema, Arhars, sections of Momins and Shias and others, have adopted the Congress attitude on War.

We give below some extracts from a speech about Gandhiji on India, Britain and the present war by Mr. Louis Fisher, a well known American Journalist delivered by him in his own country :-

"Gandhi has a devotion to the truth and an uninhibited

tongue which makes him tell the whole story. It gets him into all kinds of difficulties he said to me for instance and he has said subsequently in writing: 'I would go to Japan and sign a treaty of peace with the Japanese' Now he immediately added in the conversation to me, 'I know the British will never let me go to Japan and I know that if I ever go to Japan, the Japanese would not sign a treaty of peace with me'. Then why talk about it? Because the idea had occurred to him and for Gandhi the fact that an idea is not practicable does not mean that he must not talk about it. However, this statement has enabled persons who have ulterior motives and wish to defame Gandhi—to say that Gandhi is pro-Japanese. Now there are many Americans and many Englishmen whose word as to who is pro-Japanese I would not accept because many of those Americans and Englishmen were themselves pro-Japanese and appeased the Japanese and sent Japan the scrap and oil which our boys are now getting back in uglier form. There is one man whose word I would take as to who is pro or anti-Japanese and that is Chiang-Kai-Shek and he is pro-Gandhi and pro-Indian independence and he has intervened (as I told you) with President Roosevelt and with Winston Churchill in recent months repeatedly, with a view to the moderation of British policy in India. Chiang-Kai-Shek knows that Gandhi is anti-Japanese, pro-chinese and anti-axis. And Gandhi has proved it. But it's simply Gandhi's manner of speech that exposes him to these false charges.

Gandhi did the same thing in the current political crisis. Against the background of India's internal misery and the mounting resentment and bitterness there occurred the British Military reverses in the Far East—Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore and Burma—British prestige in Asia dropped to zero. There was panic in India. The Indians were afraid that the British would run from India as they had so recently from Burma. There was no confidence among Indians in England's ability to defend India. The British Government in London realized that an emergency had arisen in India, but it was only after a very healthy prod from President Roosevelt that the British War Cabinet rushed one of its members Sir Stafford Cripps out to India to repair the damage. Now whatever the causes of Cripps' failure. (And in the light of his subsequent dismissal from the War Cabinet—He was taken into the War Cabinet when the Churchill Cabinet shook as the result of the fall of Singapore and the escape of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the two German pocket battleships under the nose of the R.A.F. and the British Navy through the English Channel, Churchill





CORRESPONDENCE:  
MR. JINNAH  
&  
SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE.



with it. It's learned in the exercise of freedom and independence.

I came away from India with the profound conviction that if there were the will, India could be united politically overnight and that of course would be only the first step towards ultimate social and economic union. I came away from India with the conviction that the obstacle to Indian independence does not lie in India. It lies in England. India is a very good thing. Many interests and companies and families in England have grown rich on India. But the problem is bigger than that. Neville Chamberlain was an appeaser, because he was afraid that if England became involved in a war his England (the England of caste and privilege and money and aristocracy) would die. But Churchill says, "No, England can fight this war and win it and remain the old England." And Churchill's England includes the emasculation of the Beveridge report and includes all kinds of reactionary measures.

The question therefore, is not whether India is ripe for freedom. The question is whether we are ripe for Indian freedom. If there were a new England emerging out of this war, if there were a new England to supplant the old England of Chamberlain and Churchill, it would not wish to hold India. That is really the issue."

Gandhiji was all along anxious to protect India from Japanese invasion. Hence realising the weakness of the British Indian Government, to save India from foreign and specially Japanese aggression, his anxiety grew much more for India's defence and at the same time he felt that there was not even genuine desire on the part of the Government to save India and hence reluctance for any sincere effort in the direction of gaining real co-operation and support of the Indians in its war efforts. The proof of this mentality Government gave convincingly from the Cripps' proposals and their ultimate fate. So Gandhiji's patriotism and burning desire to save his countrymen from utter ruin and destruction at the hands of the foreign invaders, made him really anxious to arouse genuine interest and support of the people of India in all sorts of attempts, non-violent and violent, for the protection of their mother-land. It is with this object and motive that he desired independence of India and felt compelled to think of launching his 'Quit India' movement.

Gandhiji can be extensively quoted in support of this contention. Gandhiji's own position about Cripps' proposals was that he saw Cripps at Delhi on 27th March and left Delhi on 4th April. There after in the issue of Harjan dated June 28, 1942 he wrote :-

"Sir Stafford knows that I was disinclined to proceed to New Delhi. Having gone there, I intended to return the same day that I reached there. But Maulana Saheb would not let me go. I wish I could have induced the Working Committee to take up its stand on pure non-violence. But it did not, and could not. With it, rightly, politics were all important and it could not having the conviction, allow its deliberations to be affected by the issue of non-violence, the deliberations therefore, of the Working Committee at New Delhi were carried on without any interference or guidance on my part".

Non-violence has been the first article of his faith and philosophy of life. He laid all possible emphasis on this as is clear from his various speeches and articles. Even the very resolution of the A. I. C. C. of Bombay laid the greatest possible emphasis on 'non-violence'. While sanctioning the movement it clearly stated, "the committee resolves to sanction a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible scale so that the country might utilise all the non-violent strength".

Gandhiji's position about the August Movement 1942, as has ever been the case with him, was quite definite and clear. He wanted to avoid any clash with the Government and if it was inevitable, he wanted to lead a non-violent movement strictly on his own set lines and after giving due time and notice to the Government. His movement was not going to be in any way secret or violent one. To him non-violence was dearer and higher than even the Independence of India.

The events and acts, which followed the arrest of Gandhiji and thousands of Congress leaders and workers on 9th August and after, were not premeditated and pre-planned but were as a result of sudden outburst of popular resentment on Government acts which were absolutely uncalled for, unreasonable and high-handed in the extreme. For which the entire responsibility is of the Government and not of Gandhiji.

Gandhiji's personal views about the movement and the Government action are very clearly and in short expressed by him in his letter to the Secretary to the Government of India, dated September, 23, 1942. An extract from which is given below :-

"The wholesale arrest of the Congress leaders seems to have made the people wild with rage to the point of losing self-control. I feel that the Government, not the Congress, were responsible for the destruction that has taken place. The only right course for the Government seems to me to be to release the Congress Leaders, withdraw all repressive measures and explore ways and means of conciliation. Surely, the

Congress, however, would be bound to consult other existing Muslim organisations which have co-operated with the Congress in the past. Further in the event of other group or minority interests being involved it will be necessary to consult representatives of such interests.

Letter from Mr. Bose to Mr. Jinnah.

Dated Bombay, May 15, 1938.

DEAR MR. JINNAH,

Last night I gave you a note explaining our position. You asked me what constructive proposals we had to make. I think the note is self-explanatory. Having made known the Congress reaction to your suggestion, according to us, it remains now to proceed to the next stage namely appointment of respective committees which will jointly settle the terms of understanding.

Yours sincerely,  
(*Sd.*) SUBHAS C. BOSE.

Letter from Mr. Jinnah to Mr. Bose.

Dated Bombay, 16 May, 1938.

DEAR MR. BOSE,

I acknowledge the receipt of a note you handed over to me on behalf of the Congress on the 14th, and also I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated

country which holds that, on grounds of expediency the Congress should have accepted the proposals must be admitted. But the obvious reply is that the Congress Working Committee tried its best to arrive at a compromise with Sir Stafford Cripps in full consciousness of the situation. The break came in spite of this. Nor was there any knowing that even if the Congress pocketed its pride in respect of many a point of vital principle in the hope of ultimate fulfilment, the Muslim League and the other bodies would have obliged. And by the consequent lack of "general" agreement Sir Stafford would still have faced discomfiture at the hands of those in England who saw the liquidation of Empire in his unimperialistic ideology. In the result everyone of note, both in India and England, except Mr. Churchill and Amery and those who enjoy and depend upon their patronage, finds himself placed in the most awkward position imaginable. It was a resounding triumph for someone.

The next step was to put the Congress out of the picture and to prepare for the defence of India both against Japan and itself. Again the old imperialist guard had nothing to lose. It was their normal programme. Although they did not quite anticipate it, the actual loss of thousands of Indian lives by shooting and the effect of floggings, imprisonment and collective fines on the masses of India did not and does not worry them. For propaganda purposes, however, they are anxious to place the blame on Congress leaders.

With nearly a hundred thousand men and women in jail there is today no spokesman available who may be competent to speak on behalf of the Congress. But as one who has long had the privilege of intimate contact with Congress Leaders, I take this liberty of recording here a little significant history which has an important bearing on the question. The All India Congress Committee at Bombay adopted its resolution on the general situation at about 8 P.M. on 8th August. I spoke on the long-distance telephone later that night to a friend in Bombay. He told me that everybody had gone to bed after a busy and animated session. When I asked about the next step he told me that just before retiring Gandhiji had, in the course of private discussion, announced his intention to make every effort to avoid a conflict and in any case to wait for three weeks at least, before advising action. At the very time that Gandhiji was thus unfolding in Bombay his plan of conciliation, the Viceroy's Council in New Delhi, at one of its extraordinary nightly sittings, was busy filling in the details on a decision arrived at some three weeks ago to put the Congress Working Committee under arrest as soon as the A. I. C. C. adopted its resolution. In sealing its earlier

decision the Government felt it no part of its duty to take into account the altered situation created by the numerous public statements made by responsible leaders in the preceding week. A long term policy had evidently been sanctioned and no thought of dangerous consequences could stand in the way of its execution. When the police party turned up in the early hours of the morning, Gandhiji was literally surprised. The grave disorder which spread immediately all over the country still continues in sporadic form, I for one was convinced from the very beginning, and I said so to foreign correspondents who cared to see me then, that the outbreak was not only spontaneous but would, on that very account, be serious. To speak of Congress responsibility for the violence and loss of life (caused by the Government's military measures of the severest type) adds grave insult to injury. The position becomes ridiculous when the accusation is smugly levelled at leaders who were securely put away behind prison walls before the game of violence and counter-violence had started, and are still being kept there hermetically sealed against all contact with the outside world. They have no means of reply except through private petitions for mercy. Justice stands betrayed and so does the cause of the Allies in India".

The Cripps proposals failed not because of the Congress and Gandhiji but because they were so designed and desired from their very inception by their authors in Britain.

Gandhiji's position is very clear as can be seen from the following statements :—

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Congress President, stated on April 11th, 42 at the Press Conference:—

"Mahatma Gandhi's views as regards participation in any war are well-known and it would be entirely untrue to suggest that the Working Committee's decisions have in any way been influenced by that view. In fact, Mahatma Gandhi made it perfectly clear to the Working Committee that they were free to come to any decision on the merits of the proposals. Mahatmaji did not really want to participate in the earlier sittings of the Working Committee, but he was persuaded by me to stay on from day to day."

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru about the same on June 17th at Bombay said :—

"The statement of Sir Stafford to the effect that the Congress Working Committee had apparently accepted the proposals and it was only after further consultations with Mahatma Gandhi that they were turned down is entirely incorrect. It is true that the newspapers were making guesses, sometimes stating that the Congress Working Com-



mittee was likely to accept the proposals, but Sir Stafford ought to know that these newspaper stories had no basis".

Lastly Shri C. Rajgopalacharia declared :—

"Gandhiji is in prison and cannot again contradict this baseless story that will go into Hansard. I was present from beginning to end during these talks, and I can say authoritatively that Mahatmaji who was absent from Delhi, during the later stages, was not responsible for anything that took place. In spite of Mahatmaji's adverse opinion expressed at the preliminary stage, the Working Committee entered into discussions with Sir Stafford and carried on according to their own policy and Mahatmaji did not interfere."

The Cripps proposals were unacceptable not only to the Congress but no other party in India was prepared to accept them as they stood. The Congress demand for really, "National Government" was not at all met with Cripps proposals hence it was but proper for the Congress to reject them. The purpose of sending the Cripps mission and the cause of its failure are now well known not only to India but to America as well, for placating whose opinion the British Government was anxious.

How the Cripps mission reacted on India and the Congress and what were its direct consequences are the subject matter of a press conference which Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru addressed on 4th April, 1942 at New Delhi. This also amply ventilates Panditji's crushing reply to those who stigmatise Panditji as pro-Japanese.

The relevant extracts of it are given below :—

"India is the crux of the War to-day," said the Pandit, "Every party knew that India can only function effectively if the Indian people are enabled to function effectively. Every country realizes this with the exception of New Delhi and Whitehall".

Summing up the position as it emerged after the Cripps negotiations, the Pandit said : "The average reaction in the mind of the Indian people will be irritation against the British Government. The issues before the Country are so grave that no responsible person can talk lightly about them or consider them in terms of bitter reactions. We cannot afford to be bitter. Bitterness clouds our minds and affects our judgment in a grave crisis. The fundamental factor is, not what the British Government has done to us or what we have done to them; but the peril to India and what we are going to do about it. So in spite of all that has happened, we are not to embarrass the British war effort in India or the efforts of our American friends in India". The problem before them was how without participating in the war effort,

and without embarrassing the Government in their war effort, they should organize their war effort in their own way for a free and Independent India. That was a question which the A.I.C.C. had to consider and decide at the next meeting.

"We are not going to surrender to any invader" said Pandit Jawaharlal. He could not tolerate the idea that he or anybody else should sit idle while the battle for India was being fought between two foreign armies. He could not tolerate any passive attitude but how far he could go in a particular situation depended on the circumstances. The background, however, was quite clear—just as they had refused to give in to British Government during the last 22 years, they were not going to surrender to any invader. They would have to resist invasion to the uttermost—by non-co-operation, by resistance, and by embarrassing the invaders in every possible way which a widely spread population could do.

The duty of every Congressman, of everyone in the Country, said Pandit Jawaharlal, was to organize self-protection and self-sufficiency. There was a fundamental difference between the approach of the Congress and that of British Government in this matter. The Congress wanted to rely upon the people, but the British Government did not even now want to trust the people. Ultimately, it was only the state which could defend the Country in an armed way. They could not, for instance, raise a citizen army without the State's help. But what the Congress had already begun was an intensive programme of self-sufficiency and self-protection in rural areas mainly with the object of securing regional self-sufficiency in food, etc., if transport arrangements happened to fail. These units could not resist an invading army, but form the background of any resistance which they or the State might organize; they could try to prevent disorder and panic and help production. They had to organize the people for self-reliance—for looking after themselves.

Who is responsible for failure of the Cripps' negotiations? In answer to this question, Pandit Nehru explained in detail the various stages of the negotiations. If he had been asked just before his last interview with Sir Stafford Cripps he would have said that the chances of coming to an agreement were about 75%. At that interview, however, the full picture which Sir Stafford suddenly and for the first time, put before them of the proposals was such that he could not agree to it. "A big change had occurred somewhere in the middle" said the Pandit. It was obvious, he added, that there was some trouble between Sir Stafford and others. "Others were not us" said the Pandit amidst laughter.

Pandit Nehru went on to say "while it was my extreme

desire to find a way out and make India function effectively for defence and make the war a popular effort—so great was my desire that some things I have stood for during the last quarter of a century, things which I could never have imagined for a moment I would give up, I now agree to give up—I am convinced personally that it is impossible for us to agree to the proposals as they eventually emerged from the British Government's mind. I am in complete and whole hearted agreement with the Congress resolution and the letters of the Congress President."

"So far as I know India, and I know it tolerably well, the major sentiment in India naturally is one of hostility to the British in India. You can not root out 150 years of past history and all that has happened in those years. It has sunk deep down into the Indian soul. Suppose we had come to an agreement and had to convert, to change that sentiment suddenly we could have done it if we could have given a sensation of freedom to the people of India. The fundamental factor to-day is distrust or dislike of the British Government. It is not pro-Japanese sentiment. It is anti-British sentiment. That may occasionally lead individuals to pro-Japanese expression of views. This is short sighted. It is a slave's sentiment, a slave's way of thinking; to imagine that to get rid of one person who is dominating us we can expect another person to help us and not dominate us later. Freemen ought not to think that way. It distresses me that any Indian should talk of the Japanese liberating India. The whole past history of Japan has been one of dominating others. Japan comes here either for Imperialist reasons straight out or to fight with the British Government. Anyhow, whatever the reason, if it comes here, it does not come here, to liberate."

"If an army comes here under the leadership of Subhas Bose what should be our reaction to it?" was the next question.

Before answering the question the Pandit referred to the differences between Mr. Bose and the Congress, and said "I do not frankly doubt the bonafides of Mr. Bose. I think he has come to the conclusion which I think is wrong, but nevertheless a conclusion which he thinks is for the good of India. We parted company with him many years ago. We have drifted further apart and to-day we are very far apart. It is not good enough for me, because of my past friendship, because I do not challenge his motives, not to realize that the way he has chosen is utterly wrong, a way which I not only cannot accept but must oppose it it takes shape, because any force that may come from outside, it really comes as a

dummy force under the Japanese control. In effect it helps the invader. It may help under the mistaken notion that the invader will play fair. It is a bad thing psychologically for the Indian masses to think in terms of being liberated by an outside agency".

"I think," he continued "it is the job and function of every Indian to be in India to-day, to face the dangers and risks, whatever might happen in India."

The Cripps proposals were found so vere unsatisfactory that no section of Political party and public opinion agreed with them. They were universally condemned by almost all important political parties and personalities: Whether it was Muslim league, or the Momin Conference, or the depressed classes or Dr. Ambedkar, or Sir T. B. Sapru, or Dr. M. R. Jaykar. Thus it becomes evident that Cripps came not to appease and win over the hearts of the Indian people but only to add insult to the injury already inflicted on India by dragging her into the war without her consultation and consent.

## CHAPTER IV

### BURMA AND BRITISH ATROCITIES

It is since the last Government of India Act 1935 that Burma was separated from India which was a part of India since its annexation by the Government of India in 1885 after the Burmese War. In Burma the new constitution was introduced in accordance with the Act of 1935. The popular Premier of Burma Mr. U. Saw, at the beginning of the present World War, to fully yoke the resources of the country for complete support and through execution of the war, suggested and demanded independence for his country. His patriotism goaded him even to visit England in this connection where he clamoured for independence of his country for its really effective and timely defence. But alas! his voice was simply ignored and he was made a captive there. Since then nothing is heard of him. But his countrymen still remember him and the history of his country has a honoured place for him.

Soon after came the invasion of Burma by Japan. The British were found too weak to defend her. The whole country was in no time flooded over by the Japanese armies and the British rule in Burma was thrown to the winds.

The British population, both Civilian and Military, in Burma used all possible and available best means to leave for India without delay but the plight of the Indians in Burma became horrible. They could be neither here nor

there. Their British masters betrayed them and the Burmans who were themselves in trouble could hardly afford to help them. From the invading Japanese armies in those troublous time nothing better and helpful could be expected. There was no way out for the poor Indians but to attempt escape to India. But this was not an easy job. All the best available roads and conveyances were under the use of the British, and the Indians were prohibited to use them. Hence they were left with no other option but to take to the worst hilly and waterless track through the fierce woods where, on the way, many of them were simply starved and parched to death. As they had no means of conveyance and transport so most of them left their belongings and beloved children and old persons behind. Thus men of money and family were reduced to beggary without a family and hearth and home. We, hereunder, give an account of the Burma campaign by a British Civilian. Even from it glean out the facts which can be very well imagined by the intelligent readers:

"Mr. T. L. Hughes, in an address to the Central Asian Society on November 3, on the Burma campaign, gave the result of a careful research into the various reports and charges dealing with the civil side of the campaign. Mr. Hughes resigned from the Indian Civil Service in 1939 and became the Political Secretary to the Burma Chamber of Commerce. During part of the Burma campaign he was the Chief Liaison Officer to General Alexander. He has been Secretary to Sir Dorman Smith, Governor of Burma, for a year.

Mr. Hughes bluntly stated that much arrant nonsense has been said and written by alleged eye-witnesses or first-hand observers whose information in some instances at least would seem to have been collected in the bar of Calcutta's leading hotel. The over-riding fact was that the situation in Burma could be linked to that which existed in Great Britain at the time of the fall of France. But Great Britain's hastily improvised defence measures were never tested by the reality of invasion and she was given time to face up to the new threat. Burma, on the other hand, was given no such breathing space. Japanese troops invaded Burma's soil on December 9, just two days after Pearl Harbour.

Mr. Hughes said he could not too strongly emphasize that Burma was lost because our pitifully inadequate military forces were overwhelmed and outmanoeuvred by a superior enemy force. But it should not be forgotten what was achieved by the Burma campaign; our military forces in Burma fought a stubborn rearguard action for five vital months, vital in so

much that the breathing space enabled India to prepare for the threat of invasion.

Such actions or omissions for which the civil administration was responsible had no influence whatsoever on the result of the campaign. Only additional troops, tanks, guns and aeroplanes could have turned the tide. If it could be maintained that the civil administration utterly broke down, utterly failed to co-operate with the military, then some portion of the odium for the loss of Burma could deservedly be attached to the civilians. But, Mr. Hughes denied that this was so. On the contrary, the administrative machine kept going until the end in spite of numerous missing cogs in the wheel.

#### EVACUATION OF REFUGEES

Evacuation of refugees was undoubtedly the biggest problem facing the civil officers. After the fall of Rangoon, our forces were by no means defeated, and General Alexander had not given up the hope of assuming an offensive. Had the civil officers ignored every issue save that of evacuation, it is not improbable that the provisioning of various evacuation routes with food and medical supplies would have made greater progress. But, what an edifying example they would have set to military forces and to essential workers and only with General Alexander's decision to withdraw to India did the realization come that our days in Burma were indeed numbered.

From statistics compiled at the various evacuation centres on the Indian frontier it would probably be a conservative estimate to put the total number of evacuees, who reached India, at 4,00,000. A supreme handicap in dealing with that pitiable mass of refugees was the uncertainty of the military situation. How many casualties there were during the evacuation could not be known. But, they seemed to be about 10,000 or  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of the total number of evacuees. Such a casualty list is surprisingly small although, of course, it did not include many who died in cholera epidemic at Prome and Mandalay or who died in India after their arrival. The tale of that terrible trek, when it is told, would be a tale of sheer guts of ordinary men and women in the face of a disaster entitling them to a place on the same civilian roll of honour as the people in Britain who, in the dark days of 1940, showed that the country still produced a race of men and women worthy of their heritage." Their tales of sufferings and miseries travelled fast and wide in India. From one corner to the other, whole

of India was moved at this miserable plight of her countrymen in Burma. The worst part of the whole tragedy was the treatment meted out to the Indians in Burma by the British Government of India and Burma.

The pathetic tales of the sufferings of the Indians in Burma were luridly narrated by the Indian evacuees and refugees from Burma. The very soul of India was stirred at the ghastly tragedy and the beastly inhuman treatment of the British towards the Indians and specially the invidious distinction they made between the Indians and the British. (It is for this reason that the Burma Evacuation Report was not published by the Government of India. But for its not publication, the reason assigned is, of course, quite different. In the session of the Central Assembly at New Delhi, on November 7, 1943, Dr. N. B. Khare, Indians Overseas Member in reply to the question of Sardar Mangal Singh said, "In the course of Mr. A. K. Chanda's work on the preparation of a consolidated report on the evacuation of Burma, it became apparent that it would be impossible to present a clear picture of the whole of operation without including matter that might be of great value to the enemy. The question has, therefore, been re-examined in the light of the existing military situation and after detailed consideration, the Government of India has decided not to publish any report on the subject for the present.") This was the rudest shock to the faith and feelings of the Indians in general. The feeling of resentment and frustration surcharged the hearts of the Indians. They were not only filled with hate and anger for the British but were also merged in anxiety and care for their own defence.

Every Indian could and did see a sad plight and sorry picture for himself and his country if there were an invasion of Japan on India. Specially the Indian people were very much terrified by the treacherous treatment of the British in Burma. Hence every Indian's heart was enflamed with burning desire to be free from the British control which was strangling the very life and liberty of the people and was a terrible obstacle in the way of India's defence against the Japanese attack. With the British rule in India, Indians could never be inspired to lay their lives for the defence of India which meant and correctly, the protection of her slavery and perpetuation of her subjection under the British authority. Hence logically and psychologically came the cry for India's independence and prepared the people for the very natural move of "Quit India" which was so opportunely suggested by Gandhiji the real pulse-feeler of the people of India.



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## PART III INDIA'S DEFENCE AND INDEPENDENCE

### CHAPTER I

#### ALLAHABAD MEETING OF THE CONGRESS WORKING COMMITTEE.

Since the fall and subsequent fate of Burma and specially of the Indians in Burma and thereafter the fiasco of Cripps Mission, Gandhiji began seriously considering about the defence of India. His mind's working was clearly expressed by him in his articles in the 'Harijan,' which were quite explicit and unambiguous. His main emphasis was on two points, firstly defence of India and not to fall in the hands of the aggressor and secondly to gain popular support for this and not depend entirely on the British Government in India whose weakness was manifested by its continuous failure in Malaya, Singapore, and Burma. The idea that Gandhiji or the Congress were pro-Japanese is false and fantastic. This we have also shown in one of our previous chapter and again we hereby support the same on the basis of various Congress resolutions and views of Gandhiji and Jawaharlalji as expressed by them. The Government of India, to vilify the Congress and Gandhiji, issued a communique through its Home Department, from New Delhi, on 5th August '42 just on the eve of the memorable Bombay Session of the A.I.C.C. In this they have published an unauthorised and unauthentic record of the Allahabad Meeting of the Congress Working Committee (held from April 27th to May 1, 42) which was recovered in a subsequent police search of the A. I. C. C's office. Gandhiji was not present at this meeting, but he sent, for the consideration of the Working Committee, a draft resolution. Miraben who brought the draft, explained how Gandhiji's mind was working. The Committee gave earnest and careful consideration to the draft. But as regards the authenticity of the notes of that meeting which were taken by the Assistant Secretary of the A.I.C.C. and published in this communique of the Government and also about the attitude of Gandhiji towards Japan etc., we give below the statement of Jawahar Lal Nehru from Bombay on August 5th, 1942 : —

"I have just seen for the first time the Government's communique issuing certain documents obtained during a police raid from the A. I. C. C. office. It is astonishing to what a pass the Government of India has been reduced when it has to adopt these discreditable and dishonourable tactics. Normally, such tactics require no answer. But as there is likely to be misapprehension, I wish to clear up some matters.



It is not our custom to keep detailed minutes of Working Committee's meetings. Only final decisions are recorded. On this occasion, the assistant secretary took brief notes unofficially apparently for his own record. These notes are very brief and disjointed and represent several days' prolonged debate during which I must have spoken on various occasions for two or three hours. Only a few sentences were taken down and torn from their context. They often give a wrong impression. None of us had a chance of seeing these notes or revising them. The record is very unsatisfactory and incomplete and hence often incorrect.

In our discussions, Mahatma Gandhi was not present. We had to consider every aspect of the question fully and to weigh the implications of words and phrases in the draft resolutions. If Gandhiji had been there, much of this discussion might have been avoided as he could have explained to us his attitude more fully.

Thus when the question of British withdrawal from India was considered, I pointed out that if the armed forces were suddenly withdrawn, the Japanese might well advance and invade the country without hindrance. The obvious difficulty was removed when Gandhiji later explained that British and other armed forces might remain to prevent aggression.

In regard to the statement that Gandhiji expected an Axis victory, an important qualification has been omitted. What he has repeatedly said and what I have referred to is his belief that unless Britain changes her whole policy in regard to India and her colonial possessions, she is heading for disaster. He has further stated that if a suitable change in this policy was made and the war really became one for freedom for all peoples, then victory would assuredly come to the United Nations.

The references to negotiations with Japan are also incorrect and entirely torn from their context. Gandhiji always sends notice to his adversary before coming into conflict. He would thus have called upon Japan not only to keep away from India, but to withdraw from China. In any event he was determined to resist every aggressor in India and he advised our people to do so even to the point of death. They were never to submit.

It is absurd to say that any of us envisaged any arrangements with Japan giving her right of passage and other things. What I said was that Japan would want this, but we could never agree. Our whole policy has all along been based on uttermost resistance to aggression."

We also reproduce here the statement of Gandhiji on this communicate with his answers to the questions put to him

**CORRESPONDENCE:**

**MR. JINNAH**

**&**

**PANDIT JAWAHARLAL NEHRU**



From Mr. Nehru to Mr. Jinnah.

Dated Lucknow, January 18, 1938.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I have read the statement you issued recently to the press with care. I am afraid we approach the question from differing viewpoints and I feel that your approach is not very helpful. But I entirely agree with you that an argument carried on through the medium of the press is not desirable. Indeed I had decided not to issue press statements on the subject, but after your Calcutta speech, in which you mentioned my name and issued some kind of a 'challenge' to me, I felt that a public statement was unavoidable. Hence my statement, in which I tried to avoid unnecessary controversy.

You know perhaps that for some months past I have been in correspondence with Nawab Ismail Khan on this subject and I have been anxious to find out what the points of difference and agreement were. I am afraid I do not know this yet and your last statement does not help. I would feel grateful to you if you could kindly throw some light on this and let me know what exactly are the points in dispute which require consideration. I think this will help us all and lead to an avoidance of needless controversy. We can then come to grips with the subject. As I have said in my

last statement, we are eager to do everything in our power to put an end to every misapprehension and to endeavour to solve every problem that comes in the way of our developing our public life along right lines and promoting the unity and progress of the Indian people.

I am leaving for Lahore today. From there I go to the Frontier Province and return to Allahabad in about ten days' time. Kindly address your reply to Allahabad.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU.

From Mr. Jinnah to Mr. Nehru.

Dated Bombay, January 25, 1938.

Dear Pandit Jawaharlal,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 18th January, 1938.

I must say that it is very difficult for me to understand it. I fail to see what you are driving at. It does not suggest any useful proposal of a concrete character, besides reapproaching me and informing me that "we approach the question from differing viewpoints," and you further say, "I feel that your approach is not very helpful." You further refer to my Calcutta speech and say, "in which you mentioned my

name and issued some kind of a 'challenge' to me, I felt that the public statement was unavoidable and hence my statement." But you do not even now give me the purport of my speech, and what was the 'challenge' which compelled you to say what you did in your statement which you considered unavoidable.

I know nothing about your being in correspondence with Nawab Ismail Khan referred to in your letter.

Finally I note your request that I should let you know "what exactly are the points in dispute which require consideration." I am glad that you agree with me that the arguments carried on through the medium of the press are not desirable. But do you now think that this matter can be discussed, much less solved, by and through correspondence? I am afraid that is equally undesirable.

I may state for your information that I received a letter from Mr. Gandhi, dated the 19th Oct., 1937, and I replied to him on the 5th November, '37, and I am still waiting to hear from him.

I reciprocate the sentiments expressed in the last but one paragraph of your letter at the end of it.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) M. A. JINNAH.

From Mr. Nehru to Mr. Jinnah.

Dated Wardha, February 4, 1938.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Your letter of the 25th January reached Allahabad on February 1st after I had left. It has been forwarded to me here and reached me yesterday.

I am sorry that my previous letter was difficult to understand. My purpose in writing it was, as I stated, to find out what our points of difference and agreement were. Presumably there are points of difference as you have repeatedly criticised the Congress policy and practice. If these points of difference are noted down and our attention drawn to them it would make their consideration easier. It is possible that some of them may be due to misapprehension and this misapprehension might be removed ; it is equally possible that some are more fundamental and then we could try to find a way out or, at any rate, know exactly how and where we stand. When there is a conflict of opinion, a clarification of the opposing opinions is an essential preliminary to their consideration.

I might mention some relatively minor matters which have apparently led to misapprehension. In one of your speeches you referred to being told by someone that a cheque for rupees five lakhs was recently

given to the Congress. I am not aware of this and presumably I ought to know. Indeed, to my knowledge, no one has given even a cheque for Rs. 5,000 to the Congress for a considerable time.

In the same, or possibly another, speech you referred to the non-co-operation days and stated that while the Aligarh University was forced to close down and many non-co-operated from it, not a single student non-co-operated from the Benares University. As a matter of fact a very large number of students did in fact non-co-operate from the Benares University. As a result of this a non-official university, the Kashi Vidya-pitha, was established in Benares, as also the Gandhi Ashram. Both of these still exist. In the same way the Jamia Millia came into existence in Aligarh and this now flourishes in Delhi.

You have referred in your speeches to the Congress imposing Hindi-Hindustani and trying to crush Urdu. I presume you were misinformed for I am not aware of any attempt on the part of the Congress to injure Urdu. Some time back I wrote an essay on "The Question of Language" which represents, I believe, the Congress viewpoint. It was approved by Mr. Gandhi and by many people unconnected with the Congress and interested in the advancement of Urdu.



including Moulvi Abdul Huque, Secretary, Anjuman-e-Taraqqi-e-Urdu of Hyderabad. I do not know if you have come across this essay. In any event I am asking my office in Allahabad to send you a copy. If you disagree with the argument or conclusions of this essay, I shall be grateful to have your criticisms.

I might mention that the Congress Ministry in Madras is endeavouring to introduce the study of Hindustani in the State schools in the province. They are having primers and text-books prepared especially for the purpose by the Jamia Millia. These primers, etc., are to be in two scripts—Devanagiri and Urdu—but in identical language, the students having the option of script.

I mention these instances to show how misapprehensions arise. But the real questions at issue are more important and it is in regard to these that clarification is necessary. I presume you are acquainted with the Congress resolutions and statements on minority and fundamental rights and regarding communal questions. If you so wish it, I can have these sent to you. Many of these were collected together in a comprehensive resolution passed by the Working Committee in Calcutta towards the end of October 1937. About the Communal Award the Congress position has been repeatedly made clear.

The Congress policy as laid down in these resolutions may be incomplete or wrong. If so we shall gladly consider suggestions to complete it or rectify it. Personally I do not see what more can be done by the Congress regarding religious or cultural matters. As for political (communal) questions, the Communal Award, unsatisfactory as it is, holds the field for the present and till such time as it may be altered by mutual agreement of the parties concerned.

In considering wider political questions, the Congress has adhered to certain principles and policies for a number of years, though minor variations have taken place from time to time. Our present policy in the legislatures and outside was defined by a comprehensive resolution passed by the Working Committee at Wardha last year. I was very glad to find from Nawab Ismail Khan and Chowdhury Khaliquzzaman that the U.P. Muslim League, or the U.P. Muslim League Parliamentary Board, accepted this programme. This included our objective of independence, our demand for a constituent assembly, our general attitude to the Constitution Act, and the Federation, and our methods of work inside and outside the legislature. It referred also to our agrarian and labour programmes. Thus there appeared to be a very large measure of agreement

between us not only in regard to fundamentals, but even regarding many details.

In view of this agreement it distressed and surprised me to find that there was so much conflict. I have tried, therefore, to find out what this conflict is about. I do not see how I can make any proposal, concrete or vague, when I do not know what the points in issue are. It is true that in reading your speeches I have come across various statements to the effect that the Congress is trying to establish Hindu raj. I am unaware of how this is being done or who is doing it. If any Congress Ministries or the Congress organisation have made mistakes, these should be pointed out to us.

A report of your Calcutta speech appeared in the newspapers at the time and is no doubt available to you and for me to give you a purport of it seemed hardly necessary. In this you state that you are fighting the Congress, that you are fighting the Congress leadership which is misleading the Hindus. Further you have said that you want to bring the Congress High Command to its senses. May I suggest that those who are privileged to advise or lead the Congress have no desire to fight any body except British Imperialism? In any event, if we mislead or misbehave we have a right to enquire from our critics where and how we have done so.

Further in your Calcutta speech you said : " I have long long ago. months ago now. thrown out a challenge to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and I throw out a challenge now,—let him come and sit with us and let us formulate a constructive programme which will give immediate relief to the poor." It was to this 'challenge' that I referred in my last letter. I do not remember on which previous occasion you had issued a similar challenge to me.

It is always helpful to discuss matters and problems face to face and, as I have said previously, we are always glad to do so. A short while ago you met Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, one of our most respected leaders, than who there is no one better fitted to explain the Congress view-point in regard to the minorities problem or any other matter. Whenever necessity arises every one of us will willingly welcome a talk. But even such a talk is likely to be vague and infructuous if some clarification of ideas does not take place previously. Correspondence helps in this process and sometimes is even preferable as it is more precise than talk. I trust therefore that you will help in clarifying the position by telling us where we differ and how you would like this difference to end. You have also criticised the Congress in vigorous language, as you were no doubt entitled to do. But are we not entitled to ask

you to substantiate those criticisms in private at least, if not in public ?

I have inquired from Mr. Gandhi about your letter to him dated the 5th November, 1937. He received it in Calcutta when he was lying ill there and he felt that it needed no answer. Your letter had been in answer to his and the matter seemed to end there for the time being. He was good enough to show me his letter and yours and it seemed to me that no particular reply was called for. I understand that he wrote you yesterday.

I hope to be in Allahabad by the 9th February.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU.

From Mr. Jinnah to Mr. Nehru.

Dated New Delhi, February 17, 1938.

Dear Pandit Jawaharlal,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 4th February. You have now flung at me more complaints and grievances of trifling character. Evidently you rely on that section of the press which is bent on misrepresenting and vilifying me, but I am glad that you say I mention these instances to show how misapprehension arises : 'but the real question at issue is more important and it is in regard to this that clarification is necessary.'

Therefore I don't think any useful purpose will be served to carry on correspondence with regard to the various matters mentioned in your letter. ' You will please not introduce matters which you may have discussed with Nawab Ismail Khan or Chaudhry Khali-quzzaman or any body else. These again will lead to references and cross references and the matter will never end.

As regards my Calcutta speech, the word 'challenge' is obviously due to the imagination of the reporter for the very context shows clearly that it was an invitation. However, the discussion of all these matters in correspondence will lead us nowhere. I do not believe in the doctrine which you lay down 'but are we not entitled to ask you to substantiate all these criticisms in private at least, if not in public': I for my part make no such distinction. I am prepared to substantiate anything that I have said publicly, provided it is correctly reported. The crux of your letter on the real vital point of the Hindu-Muslim unity is a repetition of what you said in your previous letter, namely, that you want me to note down 'the points of difference' and discuss them through and by means of correspondence—a method, which I made it clear in my last letter, is highly undesirable and most inappropriate. I welcome your suggestion when you say 'whenever

necessity arises every one of us would willingly welcome a talk.' If you think that necessity has arisen and any one of you is willing, I shall be glad to see you and equally welcome a talk. The thing is that you prefer talking at each other whereas I prefer talking to each other. Surely you know and you ought to know what are the fundamental points in dispute.

I have received a letter from Mr. Gandhi and I have replied to him, a copy of which I am enclosing herewith.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) M. A. JINNAH.

From Mr. Nehru to Mr. Jinnah.

Dated Bombay, February 25, 1938.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Your letter of the 17th February reached me at Haripura. I had no intention of flinging any complaints and grievances at you. In my attempt to find out what your complaints were I read your speeches as reported in the newspapers (usually by a news agency) and noted down some of the points on which you had laid stress. I am glad to know that you have been misrepresented but you have not pointed out where the misrepresentation comes in nor, so far as I know, have you issued any

statement to the press correcting the misrepresentation. May I suggest that it will be worth while to correct these errors so that the public might not be misled. A clear and authoritative statement from you will help us also in understanding what you stand for and what you object to.

I note that you do not wish me to introduce in our correspondence any matters which we may have discussed with Nawab Ismail Khan or Chowdhry Khali-quazzaman. I did not know that they represented any different view-point from yours. I thought it necessary to draw your attention to the repeated attempts I have been making to find out what the political and communal policy of the Muslim League is and wherein it differs from that of the Congress. You will remember saying last year that the Muslim League had an entirely different policy even on political matters from that of the Congress. Since then the League has changed its objective and its economic outlook and has thus approached nearer to the Congress. I am anxious to find out what the real meaning of these changes is. Without this clarification it is difficult for us to understand the present position.

You say that you do not believe in the doctrine that I lay down, namely : " but are we not entitled to ask you to substantiate all these criticisms in private



at least, if not in public." Further you say that for your part you make no such distinction and are prepared to substantiate anything that you have said publicly, provided it is correctly reported. If you will read my sentence again you will no doubt observe that I have nowhere laid down any such doctrine as you imagine. I would indeed welcome a public treatment by you of the criticisms made by you. But if you yourself were unwilling to write to the press on the subject, as you indicated in your letter, I put it to you that we are at least entitled to request you to substantiate the criticism in private.

If you have made no criticisms of the Congress, and the press reports are entirely wrong, then of course no question of substantiation arises. All that need be done is to contradict the press reports. But if criticisms have been made, as presumably they have been, then I would request you to justify them publicly or privately as you might choose. Personally I would prefer the former method.

I am afraid I must confess that I do not yet know what the fundamental points of dispute are. It is for this reason that I have been requesting you to clarify them. So far I have not received any help in this direction. Of course we shall willingly meet you whenever opportunity arises. Our President, Subhas

Chandra Bose, or Maulana Abul Kalam Azad or I or any other member of the Working Committee can meet you at a suitable opportunity.

But when we meet what are we to discuss? Responsible people with organisations behind them can hardly discuss anything in the air. Some clarification of the issues, some clear statement of what is wanted and what is objected to, is always desirable, otherwise we may not come to grips with the subject. You will remember the argument about what transpired at Delhi in 1935 between you and Babu Rajendra Prasad. There has even been a difference of opinion about the facts. It would be unfortunate if we repeated this performance and then argued about it later.

It is thus highly desirable for us to define the issues first. This is also necessary as we have always to consult many colleagues in regard to any matter affecting Congress policy. There is surely nothing undesirable or inappropriate about this defining of issues by correspondence. It is the usual method adopted between individuals and organisations. May I therefore beg of you to enlighten me?

Yours sincerely,

(*Sd.*) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU.

From Mr. Jinnah to Mr. Nehru.

Dated New Delhi, 3rd March, 1938.

Dear Pandit Jawaharlal,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 25th February. I regret to find the same spirit running through of making insinuations and innuendoes and raising all sorts of matters of trifling character which are not germane to our present subject with which you started, namely, how to find the basis of approach to the most vital and prominent question of Hindu-Muslim unity. You wind up your letter by insisting upon the course that I should formulate the points in dispute and submit to you for your consideration and then carry on correspondence with you. This method, I have already stated in my considered opinion, is undesirable and inappropriate. The method you insist upon may be appropriate between two litigants and that is followed by solicitors on behalf of their clients, but national issues cannot be settled like that.

When you say 'that I am afraid I must confess that I do not know what fundamental points in dispute are' I am only amazed at your ignorance. This matter has been tackled since 1925 right upto 1935 by the most prominent leaders in the country and so far no solution has been found. I would beg of you to study

it and do not take up a selfcomplacent attitude and if you are in earnest I don't think you will find much difficulty in realizing what the main points in dispute are, because they have been constantly mentioned both in the press and public platform even very recently.

Yours sincerely,

(*Sd.*) M. A. JINNAH.

From Mr. Nehru to Mr. Jinnah.

Dated Allahabad. March 8. 1938.

Dear Mr. Jinnah.

Thank you for your letter of March 3rd. I am afraid our letters to each other repeat themselves. I go one requesting you to tell us what exactly are the points in dispute which have to be discussed and you go on insisting that this should not be done by correspondence. At the same time you have pointed out that the main points in dispute have been constantly, and very recently, discussed in the press and public platform. I have carefully followed press statements and your public speeches. In my effort to discover these points of dispute I enumerated some of the criticisms which you were reported to have made in public speeches. In your reply you stated that you were misreported, but you did not say what the correct report

should have been. Further you said that these were minor and trifling matters, but again you did not point out what the major matters were. You will perceive my difficulty. I hope I am not making any insinuations or innuendoes, as you suggest in your last letter. Certainly it is not my intention to do so, nor to raise trifling matters which are not germane to the present subject. But what are these matters which are germane? It may be that I am dense or not sufficiently acquainted with the intricacies of the problem. If so I deserve to be enlightened. If you will refer me to any recent statement made in the press or platform which will help me in understanding, I shall be grateful.

It is not my desire, may I repeat, to carry on a controversy by correspondence, but only to find out what the main points of discussion and dispute are. It is surely usual for national issues to be formulated and clarified in this way to facilitate discussion. Both in national and international matters we are frequently adopting this course.

You are perfectly right in saying that this matter has been tackled since 1925 repeatedly. Do you not think that this very history warns us not to approach it in a vague manner without clear ideas as to what we object to and what we want? Apart from this, much has happened during these past few years which has

each and everything. The police was empowered to apply them as they pleased. The Congress was declared unlawful. All its offices were taken over forcible possession by the police. All its property was forfeited. Even those institutions which were indirectly supposed to be connected with the Congress were captured such as Khadi Bhandars and Ashrams which were merely commercial, or industrial or educational concerns. Non-violence was put to so serious a test that its pursuance itself became a violence. The Government with all their previous experiences of Gandhiji's movements became more daring for perpetrating barbarities. They planned very dextrously to kidnap leaders and workers before actually they could rise from their beds on the morning of the 9th Aug., 1942. The first sight to the Congressman was the police at the early hours of the 9th August morning. After the arrests, the police with the help of the military and arms started the work of simply crushing the people as in a frenzy. The sanctity of human life was no more. There was a wanton dance of police goondaism and excesses. But all that the police and military did was uniform, organised and under the direct control of the entire British Bureaucratic machinery in India.

The people were all unorganised, undisciplined and without any leadership. They were actually a mass of crowd and gathered together in a very natural and innocent manner everywhere in the cities and towns as they heard of the general arrest of their beloved leaders. Their mentality was truly fitting to their character and nature that is of an unorganised crowd which is excessively emotional, impulsive, fickle, inconsistent, irresolute, extreme in action, displaying only the coarser emotions and the less refined sentiments, careless in deliberation, hasty in judgment, incapable of any but the crudest reasoning; easily swayed and led and lacking in self-consciousness and confidence. Such crowds gathered everywhere still they exhibited extraordinary sense of discipline and non-violence. It was all due to Gandhiji and the cause he represented, till men, as they were, could be excited to resist and resist till death. What actually the people did can be very correctly compared with the pricking of nails or teeth by a pigmy faced with imminent end of his life in the cruel grip of a giant. But the Government got the desired chance of firing, and fired indiscriminately on the people in the cities and villages, without any regard for age or sex. When the people retorted by pursuing their peaceful demonstrations they were faced with still greater severity and strength. Thus well-planned and very well organised violence of the Government was practised on the unarmed and non-violent people of

As regards the Communal Award the position of the Congress has been clarified. If it is your desire to discuss this matter, I should like to know.

As regards religious and cultural guarantees, the Congress has given as full assurances and guarantees as is possible. If however any other guarantees are considered necessary, they should be mentioned. About one of the questions which you have referred to in your speeches, the Language question I have written to you previously and sent you my brochure. I trust that you agreed with its main conclusions.

Are we going to discuss these matters or some others which I have not mentioned above? Then again the background of all such discussions must necessarily be a certain political and economic one—our struggle for independence, our anti imperialism, our methods of direct action whenever necessary, our anti war policy, our attempt to remove the exploitation of the masses, agrarian and labour problems, and the like. I take it that with the re-orientation of the Muslim League's policy there will not be any great difference regarding this anti imperialist background.

You will forgive me for repeating myself in these letters and for saying the same things over and over again. I do so because I am keenly desirous of your

appreciating my viewpoint, which I believe is also the viewpoint of my colleagues in the Congress. I have no desire to take up your time and to spend my time in writing long letters. But my mind demands clarity before it can function effectively or think in terms of any action. Vagueness or an avoidance of real issues cannot lead to satisfactory results. It does seem strange to me that in spite of my repeated requests I am not told what issues have to be discussed.

I understand that Gandhiji has already written to you expressing his readiness to have a talk with you. I am not now the Congress President and thus have not the same representative capacity, but if I can be of any help in this matter my services are at the disposal of the Congress and I shall gladly meet you and discuss these matters with you.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU.

From Mr. Jinnah to Mr. Nehru.

Dated New Delhi, 17th March, 1938.

Dear Pandit Jawaharlal,

I have received your letter of the 8th of March, 1938. Your first letter of the 18th of January, conveyed to me that you desire to know the points in dispute for



the purpose of promoting Hindu-Muslim unity. When in reply I said that the subject-matter cannot be solved through correspondence and it was equally undesirable as discussing matters in the press, you in your reply of the 4th of February, formulated a catalogue of grievances with regard to my supposed criticism of the Congress and utterances which are hardly relevant to the question for our immediate consideration. You went on persisting on the same line and you are still of opinion that those matters, although not germane to the present subject, should be further discussed, which I do not propose to do as I have already explained to you in my previous letter.

The question with which we started, as I understood, is of safeguarding the rights and the interests of the Mussalmans with regard to their religion, culture, language, personal laws and political rights in the national life, the government and the administration of the country. Various suggestions have been made which will satisfy the Mussalmans and create a sense of security and confidence in the majority community. I am surprised when you say in your letter under reply, "But what are these matters which are germane. It may be that I am dense or not sufficiently acquainted with the intricacies of the problem. If so, I deserve to be enlightened. If you will refer me to any recent statement made

in the press or platform which will help me in understanding, I shall be grateful." Perhaps you have heard of the Fourteen Points.

Next, as you say, "Apart from this much has happened during these past few years which has altered the position." Yes, I agree with you, and various suggestions have appeared in the newspapers recently. For instance, if you will refer to the *Statesman*, dated the 12th of February, 1938, there appears an article under the heading "Through Muslim Eyes" (copy enclosed for your convenience). Next, an article in the *New Times*, dated the 1st of March, 1938, dealing with your pronouncement recently made, I believe, at Haripura sessions of the Congress, where you are reported to have said :

"I have examined this so-called communal question through the telescope, and if there is nothing what can you see."

This article in the *New Times* appeared on the 1st of March, 1938, making numerous suggestions (copy enclosed for your convenience). Further you must have seen Mr. Aney's interview where he warned the Congress mentioning some of the points which the Muslim League would demand.

Now, this is enough to show to you that various suggestions that have been made, or are likely to be

made, or are expected to be made, will have to be analysed and ultimately I consider it is the duty of every true nationalist, to whichever party or community he may belong to make it his business and examine the situation and bring about a pact between the Mussalmans and the Hindus and create a real united front ; and it should be as much your anxiety and duty as it is mine, irrespective of the question of the party or the community to which we belong. But if you desire that I should collect all these suggestions and submit to you as a petitioner for you and your colleagues to consider, I am afraid I can't do it nor can I do it for the purpose of carrying on further correspondence with regard to those various points with you. But if you still insist upon that, as you seem to do so when you say in your letter, "My mind demands clarity before it can function effectively or think in terms of any action. Vagueness or an avoidance of real issues could not lead to satisfactory results. It does seem strange to me that in spite of my repeated requests I am not told what issues have to be discussed." This is hardly a correct description or a fair representation ; but in that case I would request you to ask the Congress officially to communicate with me to that effect, and I shall place the matter before the Council of the All-India Muslim League ; as you yourself say that you are "not the Congress President and

thus have not the same representative capacity but if I can of any help in this matter my services are at the disposal of the Congress and I shall gladly meet you and discuss these matters with you." As to meeting you and discussing matters with you, I need hardly say that I shall be pleased to do so.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) M. A. JINNAH.

Extract from the *Statesman*, New Delhi Edition.

Dated the 12th February, 1938.

## THROUGH MUSLIM EYES

BY AIN-EL-MULK

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's Bombay statement of January 2 on the Hindu-Moslem question has produced hopeful reactions and the stage has been set for a talk between the leaders of what, for the sake of convenience, may be described as Hindu India and Moslem India. Whether the Jinnah-Jawaharlal talks will produce in 1938 better results than the Jinnah-Prasad talks did in 1935 is yet to be seen. Too much optimism would not, however, be justified. The Pandit, by way of annotating his Bombay statement while addressing the U. P. delegates for Haripura at Lucknow, at the end of January,

emphatically asserted that in no case would Congress "give up its principles." That was not a hopeful statement because any acceptable formula or pact that may be evolved by the leaders of the Congress and the League would, one may guess, involve the acquiescence of the Congress in separate electorates (at least for a certain period), coalition ministries, recognition of the League as the one authoritative and representative organization of Indian Moslems, modification of its attitude on the question of Hindi and its script scrapping of Bande Mataram altogether, and possibly a redesigning of the tri-colour flag or at least agreeing to give the flag of the League an equal importance. It is possible that with a little statesmanship on both sides agreement can be reached on all these points without any infringement of the principles of either, but the greatest obstacle to a *satisfactory* solution would still remain,—in the shape of the communalists of the Mahasabha, and the irreconcilables of Bengal, all of whom are not of the Mahasabha alone. The right of the Congress to speak in the name of Hindus has been openly challenged and even the Jinnah-Prasad formula which did not satisfy the Moslems—and nothing on the lines of which is now likely to satisfy them—has been vehemently denounced by the Bengal Provincial Conference held at Vishnupur recently passed an extremely communal resolution, and

that the latest utterances of the Congress President-elect on the communal situation generally and the Jinnah-Prasad formula in particular show some restraint. The only thing for Moslems to do in the circumstances is to wait and hope for the best, without relaxing their efforts to add daily to the strength of the League, for it will not do to forget that it is the growing power and representative character of the Muslim League which has compelled Congress leaders to recognize the necessity for an understanding with the Moslem community.

Extract from the *New Times*, Lahore.

Dated the 1st March, 1938.

## THE COMMUNAL QUESTION

In its last session at Haripura, the Indian National Congress passed a resolution for assuring minorities of their religious and cultural rights. The resolution was moved by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and was carried. The speech which Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru made on this occasion was as bad as any speech could be. If the resolution has to be judged in the light of that speech, then it comes to this that the resolution has been passed not in any spirit of seriousness, but merely as a meaningless assurance to satisfy the foolish minorities who are clamouring "for the satisfaction of the communal prob-

lem." Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru proceeded on the basis that there was really no communal question. We should like to reproduce the trenchant manner in which he put forward the proposition. He said : " I have examined the *so called communal question* through the telescope and, if there is nothing, what can you see." It appears to us that it is the height of dishonesty to move a resolution with these premises. If there is no minority question, why proceed to pass a resolution ? Why not state that there is no minority question. This is not the first time that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has expressed his complete inability to understand or see the communal question. When replying to a statement of Mr. Jinnah, he reiterated his conviction that in spite of his best endeavour to understand what Mr. Jinnah wanted, he could not get at what he wanted. He seems to think that with the Communal Award which the Congress has opposed, the seats in the Legislature have become assured and now nothing remains to be done. He repeats the offensive statement that the Communal Award is merely a problem created by the middle or upper classes for the sake of a few seats in the Legislature or appointments in Government service or for Ministerial positions. We should like to tell Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru that he has completely misunderstood the position of the Muslim minority and it is a matter of intense pain

of August, 1942, and thereafter the work of arrests continued from day to day on an increasing scale till the number of arrests reached over a lakh by the end of September '42. All Congress and allied organisations were declared unlawful. Their offices and property were forfeited and forcibly taken possession of. All public meetings and processions were prohibited. Strongest restrictions were placed on the publication of news and views in the newspapers. Over 90 nationalist newspapers ceased publications and others were publishing news and views only authorised by the Government. Mr. S. A. Brelvi, in his speech as the Chairman of the 3rd Session of All India Newspapers Editors' Conference at Madras, summarised this as below :—

"The Press in India was confronted with a great crisis when the Government sought to control, muzzle and humiliate it in a manner familiarized to us by the Nazis and the Fascists.

"A number of newspapers has been suppressed or had suspended publication as a result of the new restrictions or the manner in which they were applied. The most harmful use made of these restrictions was to deny publicity to statements and reports supporting the Indian demand for freedom and legitimate political activity.

"Government suppressed all news regarding Prof. Bhansali's fast and imposed draconian restrictions on the publication of news and comments about Gandhiji's fast. Bhansali was neither a detenu nor a prisoner. As a free citizen he was entitled to undertake a fast.

"The most obnoxious feature of the executive high-handedness was that the pains and penalties of the Defence of India Rules were requisitioned to prevent the Press even from informing the public that it had been gagged."

Curfew Orders were promulgated in the cities and were observed very cruelly. All attempts of the people, however, peaceful and non-violent, to take out processions and hold public meetings were strongly and brutally foiled by the police and the military. The use of tear-gas, lathi-charges and firings, was resorted to freely and indiscriminately. The very first day on 9th August firing was done at Bombay, Ahmedabad and Poona. Thereafter the business of firing became the order of the day. Most of the big cities, towns, and even villages had a taste of firing done indiscriminately and wantonly. All these suffocating restrictions and depriving of the people of all their legitimate and peaceful civic rights besides exciting and provoking treatment of the individual Government Officials, particularly of police and the military, could not be tolerated by the people lying down. All this acted and



reacted on the people very strongly. Their first action was the direct outcome of the general and whole-sale arrests which was nothing else but observance of peaceful Hartals and attempt to take out peaceful processions and to hold mass public meetings. But they were not allowed even to do this and were violently and forcibly compelled to desist from taking out processions and holding meetings. In the attempts of dispersing the non-violent and peaceful crowds of the innocent people, who came out to express their feelings on the arrests of their leaders, the police and military used their utmost force of violence by resorting to the use of tear-gas, free-lathi-charges and firing. At this the people felt compelled and provoked to persist in their attempts with greater resistance. Acts of violence on the part of the people were the result of the provocation and excitement caused to them by the Government. The subsequent incidents shaping like the general movement in the country were the "natural and spontaneous outbursts" of the people on the doings of the Government. This contention is proved by the facts which are even accepted rather published by the Government itself. The inference drawn by the Government from the facts and happenings that this contention is "countered" is absolutely wrong and does not stand to reason and facts.

While the Government took the offensive as against the contemplated movement by the Congress and Gandhiji following the dictum and policy that "the most effective defence is to take the offensive first." The people were left without leaders and any definite programme and instructions hence they did what struck them feasible and possible at the spur of the moment. They were excited and provoked and thus were driven to such acts which they would have never even contemplated to do in the ordinary circumstances. The students were undoubtedly most excited and most active. The clash started from the cities and then it proceeded to the towns and villages. The conditions and circumstances, as were created by the sudden offensive of the Government, were being similar, the reaction was also similar throughout the country. The people's objects of attack were the police stations, Rly. stations and other Government Offices besides cutting of Telegraph Wires, burning of letter-boxes and tempering with the permanent Roads and ways and Railway tracks. But all this was done in a sort of excitement on a country-wide scale, of course in some parts it was done more widely and intensely than in the others. But all this was done in a most disorganised and crude form. It lacked training and even expert advice or help. The damage done to the Government property

under above heads was almost nominal as compared to size and extent of the Country and the excitement in the people. This shows and clearly proves that there were absolutely no preparations, no pre-planning and no pre-arrangements. All what was done was at the spur of the moment and by the mobs either consisting of the villagers or the students. No doubt as the people as a whole were tired of the British rule and its policy in India so they desired to paralyse the administration but certainly they had absolutely no preparation for it and had no equipment, implements, instruments and armament. They ran a different race in a hap-hazard manner as they were provoked to do so by the Government and its revolt-exciting and blood-boiling policy. It was all done in a blind manner with a sheer force of number, excitement and sentiment but certainly not under any well-guided leadership, plan, or policy. It was no movement, no strategy, no warfare and no organised action of any sort, violent or non-violent. It was merely the resultant of a "Spontaneous outburst" of the suppressed people on a highly exciting provocation and shock given by the Government through their policy and conduct. The responsibility for all this primarily, directly and largely rests on the Government of India.

We quote below the facts and figures supplied by the Government themselves about their alleged losses by the people in the whole of India and throughout the uprising or so called disturbances :—

#### Losses of the Government

##### A—PROPERTY

##### I—Railways

1. Rolling Stock	Rs. 18 lakhs.
2. Track	9 "
3. Station buildings	8½ "
4. Ancilliary Equipment	6½ "
	<hr/>
	Rs. 42 lakhs.

The maximum destruction was done to the E.I.R. and B. & N.W.R., the replacement and reconstruction of the former will cost over Rs. 12 lakhs and of the latter over Rs. 14 lakhs. By the end of December 1942, 318 Stations were attacked, many were burnt and others were wholly or partially destroyed. There were 59 derailments, involving many passenger trains, out of all, 3 were bad cases in which 27 persons were killed and 112 injured. Of course all of them were Indians. Besides there were late trains

or no trains at all uptill November when normal traffic was resumed.

### II—Post Offices

895 post offices raided, 57 completely destroyed and 252 seriously damaged.

(a) Loss of Cash etc. about	Rs. 2 lakhs.
(b) Loss of furniture etc.	1 "
	<hr/> Rs. 3 lakhs.

### III—Treasury

Treasury looted at Ram Tell (C.P.) Rs. 3½ lakhs. Thus we take in round figures. The actual losses of the Government in their own words were of about Rs. 50 lakhs maximum.

### LIFE

- I. 53 Government servants were killed.
- II. As regards injuries sustained by the Government servants, no definite figure is mentioned by the Government. Besides the above figures following are the salient facts as reported by the Government about the activities of the people during this uprising, revolt or disturbance, call it as you please:—

### I—GENERAL

"A crowd varying from 500 to 10,000 marched upon a police station or a post office or a railway station attacking officials, destroying records and in many cases setting buildings on fire. In quelling riots hundreds of policemen suffered injuries from brick-bats and bottles.

### IN BIHAR

"A passenger train was stopped at Fatvah by a crowd in which two Air force officers happened to be travelling. The crowd promised to spare their life if they surrendered their arms. The officers agreed only to be brutally hacked to death. Their bodies were paraded through the town, and later thrown into a river."

"In Monghyr district, villagers surrounded a plane which had crashed in a river, offered to row the survivors to the bank if they surrendered their arms. The victims trusted the crowd, who having reduced them to defencelessness, pounced upon them; two survivors who jumped into the river were beaten to death with lathis.

Attempts in Bihar cost Police Officers their lives at Katra,

Minapur, Singhai, Rupali and Sarath, and similarly the lives of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sitamari, and his party.

On August 16, an armed mob of 4,000—about a thousand of whom marched in regular formation—attacked the Minapore police station, seriously wounding a Sub-Inspector and injuring several constables on duty. The Sub-Inspector was beaten and disarmed, tied to a pole and thrown into a fire which was already consuming the station. The tortured officer crawled out of the fire, but was beaten with lathis, thrown back into the flames and pinned in the fire with poles and lathis."

"A Similar horrible outrage took place at Rupali police station. A mob of 10,000 to 12,000 attacked a station and stoned the police staff, including a junior Sub-Inspector and the constables on duty. Kerosene oil was poured on the police station and the policemen were consigned to the flames."

"An armed mob looted the Silk Institute."

"In district Monghyr, five persons accused of theft were produced before a panchayat court which promptly delivered judgment. The fingers of their right hands were cut off; three men lost an eye each and some were branded with hot irons. In Gaya district, two burglars tried by a self-constituted court were condemned to death and killed on the spot."

"A pujari of a temple in Bihpur in Bhagalpur district, suspected of being a police spy, was done to death on November 30."

"Six hundred prisoners mutinied in Bhagalpur jail on September 4th. A deputy superintendent, the carding master and a warder lost their lives in this affair and their bodies were burnt. Extensive damage was also done to the jail factory, which was set on fire."

Mr. Jaglal Chaudhury, who had been a Congress Minister from 1937 to 1939, and who was one of Mr. Gandhi's trusted men, personally instigated the burning of a police station in the Saran district and during the attack urged the crowd to tie up the Sub-Inspector in a sack and throw him into the river. This same Minister made plans to resist troops with spears, lighted torches and boiling oil. He has been tried and sentenced to ten years imprisonment, the sentence being reviewed and upheld by a Judge of the Patna High Court."

"There was an attack on the police station of Minapur in Muzaffarpur district on August 16th by an armed mob of four or five thousand men. They looted and burnt the police station, assaulted the officers and constables and burnt the Sub-Inspector alive. There is no doubt whatever that these acts were perpetrated in the name of the Congress.

Leading members of the mob were shouting Congress slogans and carrying Congress flags. The main accused, who was responsible for holding the Inspector down in the fire (and who has been sentenced to death) was seen hoisting a Congress flag on the roof of the thana; this was an exhibit in the case. At the conclusion of the judgment in discussing the interpretation of section 121 of the Indian Penal Code (waging war against the King-Emperor) the Judge observed:

"It is a matter of common knowledge that the object of the recent disturbances and risings throughout the country was to paralyse the administration and to compel the Government to submit to the demands of the Indian National Congress.

#### ORISSA

"In Balasora district a body of armed police who had gone to make some arrests there found themselves confronted by a mob of four or five thousand persons, who had been mobilised by the sounding of conch-shells from village to village as the police party approached. They disobeyed an order to disperse, and the police had to open fire, ultimately causing 25 or 26 deaths and about 50 injuries."

"A mob of 1,000 killed a forest guard of Jeypore State and injured 15 other servants and a magistrate."

#### CENTRAL PROVINCES

"On August 16, a mob attacked the police station at Ashti, demanding the surrender of the thana. The police were compelled to open fire in self-defence, but were overpowered when their small stock of ammunition gave out. A Sub-Inspector was stoned to death, and one head constable and three constables were murdered. Half-dead constables were burnt alive with kerosene. Only one head constable and one constable escaped. The same day at Chimur, a mob of thousands stormed the rest-house killing the sub-divisional magistrate and leaving the naib-tehsildar nearly dead. The rest-house and furniture were then set on fire. Later, in an encounter with the police, a Sub-Inspector and a constable were wounded and carried away, and a constable and an Inspector were overpowered and beaten to death. The mob then returned to the rest-house armed with police muskets and bayonets. The naib-tehsildar, who was still alive, was done to death with a bayonet, and his and the sub-divisional magistrate's bodies were thrown into the rest-house and burnt to ashes."

"Hooligans sacked a C. I. D. Inspector's bungalow at Nagpur."

"Fifteen miles from Nagpur on the Bhandara Road, a

As far as I can make out from your letter and the enclosures you have sent, you wish to discuss the following matters :

1. The Fourteen Points formulated by the Muslim League in 1929.
2. The Congress should withdraw all opposition to the Communal Award and should not describe it as a negation of nationalism.
3. The share of the Muslims in the State services should be definitely fixed in the Constitution by statutory enactment.
4. Muslim Personal Law and culture should be guaranteed by Statute.
5. The Congress should take in hand the agitation in connection with the Shahidganj Mosque and should use its moral pressure to enable the Muslims to gain possession of the mosque.
6. The Muslims' right to call Azan and perform religious ceremonies should not be fettered in any way.
7. Muslims should have freedom to perform cow-slaughter.
8. Muslim majorities in the Provinces, where such majorities exist at present, must not be affected by any territorial redistribution or adjustments.

- 9 The Bande Mataiam song should be given up
- 10 Muslims want Urdu to be the national language of India and they desire to have statutory guarantees that the use of Urdu shall not be curtailed or damaged
- 11 Muslim representation in the local bodies should be governed by the principles underlying the Communal Award, that is separate electorates and population strength
- 12 The tricolour flag should be changed or, alternatively, the flag of the Muslim League should be given equal importance
- 13 Recognition of the Muslim League as the one authoritative and representative organization of Indian Muslims
- 14 Coalition ministries

It is further stated that the formula evolved by you and Babu Rajendra Prasad in 1935 does not satisfy the Muslims now and nothing on those lines will satisfy them

It is added that the list given above is not a complete list and that it can be augmented by the addition of further 'demands'. Not knowing these possible and unlimited additions I can say nothing about them. But I should like to deal with the various matters specifically

mentioned and to indicate what the Congress attitude has been in regard to them.

But before considering them, the political and economic background of the free India we are working for has to be kept in mind, for ultimately that is the controlling factor. Some of these matters do not arise in considering an independent India or take a particular shape or have little importance. We can discuss them in terms of Indian independence or in terms of the British dominance of India continuing. The Congress naturally thinks in terms of independence, though it adjusts itself occasionally to the pressure of transitional and temporary phases. It is thus not interested in amendments to the present constitution, but aims at its removal and its substitution by a constitution framed by the people through a Constituent Assembly.

Another matter has assumed an urgent and vital significance and this is the exceedingly critical international situation and the possibility of war. This must concern India greatly and affect her struggle for freedom. This must therefore be considered the governing factor of the situation and almost everything else becomes of secondary importance, for all our efforts and petty arguments will be of little avail if the very foundation is upset. The Congress has clearly and repeatedly laid down its policy in the event of such a



crisis and stated that it will be no party to imperialist war. The Congress will very gladly and willingly co-operate with the Muslim League and all other organizations and individuals in the furtherance of this policy.

I have carefully looked through the various matters to which you have drawn attention in your letter and its enclosures and I find that there is nothing in them which refers to or touches the economic demands of the masses or affects the all important questions of poverty and unemployment. For all of us in India these are the vital issues and unless some solution is found for them, we function in vain. The question of State services, howsoever important and worthy of consideration it might be, affects a very small number of people. The peasantry, industrial workers, artisans and petty shop keepers form the vast majority of the population and they are not improved in any way by any of the demands listed above. Their interests should be paramount.

Many of the 'demands' involve changes of the constitution which we are not in a position to bring about. Even if some such changes are desirable in themselves, it is not our policy to press for minor constitutional changes. We want to do away completely with the present constitution and replace it by another for a free India.

In the same way the desire for statutory guarantees involves constitutional changes which we cannot give effect to. All we can do is to state that in a future constitution for a free India we want certain guarantees to be incorporated. We have done this in regard to religious, cultural, linguistic and other rights of minorities in the Karachi resolution on Fundamental Rights. We would like these fundamental rights to be made a part of the constitution.

I now deal with the various matters listed above.

1. The Fourteen Points, I had thought, were somewhat out of date. Many of their provisions have been given effect to by the Communal Award and in other ways, some others are entirely acceptable to the Congress ; yet others require constitutional changes which, as I have mentioned above, are beyond our present competence. Apart from the matters covered by the Communal Award and those involving a change in the constitution, one or two matters remain which give rise to differences of opinion and which are still likely to lead to considerable argument.

2. The Congress has clearly stated its attitude towards the Communal Award, and it comes to this that it seeks alterations only on the basis of mutual consent of the parties concerned. I do not understand how any

one can take objection to this attitude and policy. If we are asked to describe the Award as not being anti-national, that would be patently false. Even apart from what it gives to various groups, its whole basis and structure are anti-national and come in the way of the development of national unity. As you know it gives an overwhelming and wholly undeserving weightage to the European elements in certain parts of India. If we think in terms of an independent India, we cannot possibly fit in this Award with it. It is true that under stress of circumstances we have sometimes to accept as a temporary measure some thing that is on the face of it anti-national. It is also true that in the matters governed by the Communal Award we can only find a satisfactory and abiding solution by the consent and good-will of the parties concerned. That is the Congress policy.

3. The fixing of the Muslims' share in the State services by statutory enactment necessarily involves the fixing of the shares of other groups and communities similarly. This would mean a rigid and compartmental State structure which will impede progress and development. At the same time it is generally admitted that State appointments should be fairly and adequately distributed and no community should have cause to complain. It is far better to do this by convention and

agreement. The Congress is fully alive to this issue and desires to meet the wishes of various groups in the fullest measure so as to give to all minority communities, as stated in No. 11 of the Fourteen Points, "an adequate share in all the services of the State and in local self-governing bodies having due regard to the requirements of efficiency." The State today is becoming more and more technical and demands expert knowledge in its various departments. It is right that, if a community is backward in this technical and expert knowledge, special efforts should be made to give it this education to bring it up to a higher level.

I understand that at the Unity Conference held at Allahabad in 1933 or thereabouts, a mutually satisfactory solution of this question of State services was arrived at.

4. As regards protection of culture the Congress has declared its willingness to embody this in the fundamental laws of the constitution. It has also declared that it does not wish to interfere in any way with the personal law of any community.

5. I am considerably surprised at the suggestions that the Congress should take in hand the agitation in connection with the Shahidgunj mosque. That is a matter to be decided either legally or by mutual agree-

ment. The Congress prefers in all such matters the way of mutual agreement and its services can always be utilised for this purpose where there is no opening for them and a desire to this effect on the part of the parties concerned. I am glad that the Premier of the Punjab has suggested that this is the only satisfactory way to a solution of the problem.

6. The right to perform religious ceremonies should certainly be guaranteed to all communities. The Congress resolution about this is quite clear. I know nothing about the particular incident relating to a Punjab village which has been referred to. No doubt many instances can be gathered together from various parts of India where petty interferences take place with Hindu, Muslim or Sikh ceremonies. These have to be tactfully dealt with wherever they arise. But the principle is quite clear and should be agreed to.

7. As regards cow-slaughter there has been a great deal of entirely false and unfounded propaganda against the Congress suggesting that the Congress was going to stop it forcibly by legislation. The Congress does not wish to undertake any legislative action in this matter to restrict the established rights of the Muslims.

8. The question of territorial distribution has not arisen in any way. If any when it arises it must be

dealt with on the basis of mutual agreement of the parties concerned.

9. Regarding the Bande Mataram song the Working Committee issued a long statement in October last to which I would invite your attention. First of all, it has to be remembered that no formal national anthem has been adopted by the Congress at any time. It is true, however, that the Bande Mataram song has been intimately associated with Indian nationalism for more than thirty years and numerous associations of sentiment and sacrifice have gathered round it. Popular songs are not made to order, nor can they be successfully imposed. They grow out of public sentiment. During all these thirty or more years the Bande Mataram song was never considered as having any religious significance and was treated as a national song in praise of India. Nor, to my knowledge, was any objection taken to it except on political grounds by the Government. When however some objections were raised, the Working Committee carefully considered the matter and ultimately decided to recommend that certain stanzas, which contained certain allegorical references, might not be used on national platforms or occasions. The two stanzas that have been recommended by the Working Committee for use as a national song have not a word or a phrase which can offend anybody from any

point of view and I am surprised that any one can object to them. They may appeal to some more than to others. Some may prefer another national song. But to compel large numbers of people to give up what they have long valued and grown attached to is to cause needless hurt to them and injure the national movement itself. It would be improper for a national organisation to do this.

10. About Urdu and Hindi I have previously written to you and have also sent you my pamphlet on "The question of language" The Congress has declared in favour of guarantees for languages and culture. I want to encourage all the great provincial languages of India and at the same time to make Hindustani, as written both in *nagari* and Urdu scripts, the national language. Both scripts should be officially recognised and the choice should be left to the people concerned. In fact this policy is being pursued by the Congress Ministries.

11. The Congress has long been of opinion that joint electorates are preferable to separate electorates from the point of view of national unity and harmonious co operation between the different communities. But joint electorates, in order to have real value, must not be imposed on unwilling groups. Hence the Congress is

quite clear that their introduction should depend on their acceptance by the people concerned. This is the policy that is being pursued by the Congress Ministries in regard to Local bodies. Recently in a bill dealing with local bodies introduced in the Bombay Assembly, separate electorates were maintained but an option was given to the people concerned to adopt a joint electorate, if they so chose. This principle seems to be in exact accordance with No. 5 of the Fourteen Points, which lays down that "Representation of communal groups shall continue to be by means of separate electorate as at present, provided that it shall be open to any community, at any time, to abandon its separate electorate in favour of joint electorate." It surprises me that the Muslim League group in the Bombay Assembly should have opposed the Bill with its optional clause although this carried out the very policy of the Muslim League.

May I also point out that in the resolution passed by the Muslim League in 1929, at the time it adopted the Fourteen Points, it was stated that "the Mussalmans will not consent to joint electorates unless Sind is actually constituted into a separate province and reforms in fact are introduced in the N.W.F. Province and Baluchistan on the same footing as in other provinces." Since then Sind has been separated and the N.W.F. Province has been placed on a level with other pro-



vinces. So far as Baluchistan is concerned the Congress is committed to a levelling up of this area in the same way.

12. The national tri-colour flag was adopted originally in 1929 by the Congress after full and careful consultation with eminent Muslim, Sikh and other leaders. Obviously a country and national movement must have a national flag representing the nation and all communities in it. No communal flag can represent the nation. If we did not possess a national flag now we would have to evolve one. The present National Flag had its colours originally selected in order to represent the various communities, but we did not like to lay stress on this communal aspect of colours. Artistically I think the combination of orange, white and green has resulted in a flag which is probably the most beautiful of all national flags. For these many years our flag has been used and it has spread to the remotest village and brought hope and courage and a sense of all India unity to our masses. It has been associated with great sacrifices on the part of our people, including Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, and many have suffered lathi blows and imprisonment and even death in defending it from insult or injury. Thus a powerful sentiment has grown up in its favour. On innumerable occasions Maulana Mohamed Ali, Maulana Shankar

Ali and many leaders of the Muslim League today have associated themselves with this flag and emphasised its virtues and significance as a symbol of Indian unity. It has spread outside the Congress ranks and been generally recognised as the flag of the nation. It is difficult to understand how any one can reasonably object to it now.

Communal flags cannot obviously take its place for that can only mean a host of flags of various communities being used together and thus emphasising our disunity and separateness. Communal flags might be used for religious functions but they have no place at any national functions or over any public building meant for various communities.

May I add that during the past few months, on several occasions, the National Flag has been insulted by some members of volunteers of the Muslim League. This has pained us greatly but we have deliberately avoided anything in the nature of conflict in order not to add to communal bitterness. We have also issued strict orders, and they have been obeyed, that no interference should take place with the Muslim League Flag, even though it might be inappropriately displayed.

13. I do not understand what is meant by our recognition of the Muslim League as the one and only

ment. Its responsibility was solely of the Government and not of the people. It was all an organised attempt to crush the people and crush them so badly that they may not be able to raise their heads erect or even their voice, however feeble it may be, against the British administration in India.

The flux of all the ordinances, the wide and strict application of the D. I. Rules, the simultaneous execution of arrest-warrants against thousands of Congressmen which were prepared and signed much before the message of the "Quit India" resolution by the A. I. C. C., at Bombay, and above all, the elaborate police and military arrangements to carry out all this, at a stroke like a swift-shock of electricity or a feat of Magic-show could not be done without full and previous preparations. The Congress actually gave out no programme or plan of its intended movement. There were no open or secret instructions for carrying out the movement. It was to be developed and devised according to the needs and circumstances and more correctly was to be revealed to Gandhiji at the proper time. But the Government was not depending on future revelations nor was waiting for the future development of the situation. They had a well-decided and carefully chalked out and worked-out plan on which they started their attack on the Congress.

Here, we quote below, from a speech of Mr. K. C. Neogy in Central Assembly, in September, 1942, demanding an enquiry into allegations of "excesses committed by the police and the military:—

"I have asked for a Committee of enquiry and I understand that the Government are in no mood to concede this demand. I must say that I was not quite unprepared for this attitude because already we have communiques issued by the Governments of the Central Provinces and of the United Provinces firmly taking their stand on the point and stating that in the case of the Central Provinces Government they have no intention of holding a judicial or any other enquiry into the measures which have so far been taken to restore order and that any such measure would only tend to affect the morale of the forces employed to counter the disturbances. I have already given to the House an idea of the technique which they adopt to counter these disturbances. The Central Provinces Government have gone one better. They have refused permission to the High Court Bar Association to hold a non-official enquiry in regard to the police excesses which they wanted to hold.

In the case of the United Provinces Government, they say that "The morale of the police is high,"—of course, it is high as you have already seen from the various instances to which

I have drawn attention of the House—the Inspector General of Police has given them the watchword 'Guard the people'. We know how they have been guarding the people, incidentally enriching themselves and burning down the property belonging to people. In order to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding the United Provinces communique says that the United Provinces Government wishes to make it quite clear that no public enquiry will be held into the incidents arising from the disturbances.

The only conclusion to which one can come to from these communiques is that the acts to which I have drawn attention have been deliberately done, and the same policy has been pursued everywhere with the full knowledge and concurrence of these provincial administrations. If anything, these declarations made by the two Provincial Governments are a direct encouragement to the police and the military to continue these outrages, these acts of vandalism which the police and the military have been perpetrating on innocent people. If anything, this is likely to aggravate the situation beyond measure. I have no desire at all to say anything, or ask the Government to do anything, which will in any way weaken their hands in regard to any legitimate use of force which may be required for the purpose of meeting the situation. But I should like to warn the Government that they have already allowed the situation to get out of their hands, and it is high time that they sought to control their unruly hordes which were let loose on innocent people."

We may also quote below an extract from the speech of Mr. N. M. Joshi in support of Mr. Neogy's motion:—

"I cannot absolve the Government of India from their responsibility for the violence that has taken place in the country on account of the wrong policy which they followed in arresting the leaders of the Congress. It has appeared from the speeches of the representatives of Government that nothing has happened between the resolution passed by the All-India Congress Committee at Bombay and the violence that has taken place. The Government should have known that the arrest of the leaders of the Congress had intervened between the resolution of the All-India Congress Committee and the violence. I thought that the Members of the Government of India are honest. They would themselves admit that the arrest of the Congress leaders, at least to some extent, led to the violent protests by the people.

The point to be considered is this, that we want an inquiry into these excesses. The Government of India themselves will not say that there was no likelihood of excesses. The

Honourable Home Member said in his speech the other day that if there were any cases of excesses or injustice, they should be brought to the notice of the Provincial Governments or of the military authorities who, in the opinion of the Government of India, would do justice. We do not think that either the Provincial Government or the military authorities or even the Government of India would do justice. The Provincial Governments themselves announced beforehand that there would be no public enquiry, and by making that announcement they gave direct encouragement to some of the excesses committed by the police and the military. I would also say this, that the Government of India by giving full freedom to provincial Governments and to local authorities themselves encouraged the commission of some of the excesses which have been described and which have taken place in all parts of the country on many occasions.

I feel, therefore, that the Government of India should accept this challenge by the Assembly for the finding out of the truth. If the officers of the Government of India had done nothing wrong, the committee will declare them not guilty; but if they have done wrong, the committee will find them guilty. I do not know whether the police or military officers will be punished or not; but I am afraid that the highest authorities responsible for the commission of these excesses by the police and military, namely the Provincial Governments of India now escape the consequences of even the decision of the Committees against them.

The Government opposition to any enquiry into the allegations of the military and police excesses itself is a positive and strong proof of the Government responsibility for the general repression in the country.

Rai Bahadur Sri Narain Mehta in his speech on 23rd September, in the Council of State said :—

"It is neither a students' movement nor a Congress movement, nor even a Fifth Column attempt to sabotage India's war effort. It is the desperate gesture of a nation before whom you have dangled the offer of political freedom, a nation exasperated beyond the limits of human patience, a nation that has seen the anomaly of having to protect a freedom that it does not enjoy".

Mr. Neogy, in his speech of the 17th Sept. in the Central Assembly said :—

"The recent disturbances are to be ascribed to many complex factors, all of which are not directly political in character and in ignoring the seething discontent prevailing for a long time in the country, the Government were unwittingly helping to set the stage for the violent outbursts which we

have witnessed. The general economic distress which is associated with British rule in India has been rapidly increasing of late. The people, a large proportion of whom normally in chronic state of semi-starvation, are now faced with a shortage of food due to various causes some of which are connected with the War. Other commodities which are required to meet their frugal needs are getting scarcer, and the prices of all articles are steadily soaring higher and higher. Medical help, inadequate in the best of times, is already beyond the means of the vast majority of the people. While the very physical existence of the people is thus threatened, the thoughtless and heartless actions of a callous bureaucracy, while carrying out measures of evacuation involving thousands of poor and ignorant people, have not certainly helped to create a feeling of loyalty to the Government. Complaints on this score have been heard for months past."

"While the popular feeling has thus been deeply embittered, the influx of Indian evacuees from Burma carrying tales of heartless treatment and racial humiliation on an unprecedented scale, has set the whole country ringing with denunciation of the present Government, I have just received a printed message from our Honourable colleague, Shaikh Rafiuddin Ahmed Siddique, of Chittagong, whose ill-health prevents his attendance here to-day, in the course of which he states that "the Government are doing absolutely nothing for the Indian evacuees who have no hearth and home, no food and no clothes. These poor people are wandering in Chittagong with their children and wives just like nomad tribes and begging from door to door. Many of them are still daily coming to Chittagong on foot from Burma. Their pitiable plight, if you could be shown, must have moved you to pity and tears. The differential treatment meted out to the Indian evacuees and the apathy of the Government towards their cause are highly deplorable.

"It is against this background of mass discontent and disaffection that the decision taken by the All-India Congress Committee in sheer desperation, and the untoward repercussions that followed the arrest of Congress leaders, can be properly examined.

"During those anxious days when hooliganism was rampant in the Imperial City, fearful accounts trickles through despite censorship, not merely with reference to the position in Delhi but also in the provinces, and there could be no doubt in the mind of any impartial observer that the spiritual successors of O' Dwyer and Dyer, who rule the roost at New Delhi, had initiated a reign of terror."

or notice issued by a secretary of a Muslim League. This contained a list of the so-called misdeeds of the U.P. Government. I read this with amazement for there was not an item of truth in most of the charges. I suppose they were garnered from the Urdu press. Through the press and the platform such charges have been repeated on numerous occasions and communal passions have thus been roused and bitterness created. This has grieved me and I have sought by writing to you and to Nawab Ismail Khan to find a way of checking this deplorable deterioration of our public life, as well as a surer basis for co-operation. That problem still faces us and I hope we shall solve it.

I have mentioned earlier in this letter the critical international situation and the terrible sense of impending catastrophe that hangs over the world. My mind is obsessed with this and I want India to realise it and be ready for all consequences, good or ill, that may flow from it. In this period of world crisis all of us, to whatever party or group we might belong and whatever our differences might be, have the primary duty of holding together to protect our people from perils that might encompass them. Our differences and arguments seem trivial when the future of the world and of India hangs in the balance. It is in the hope that all of us will succeed in building up this larger unity in our country

that I have written to you and others repeatedly and at length.

There is one small matter I should like to mention. The report of any speech at Haripura, as given in your letter and the newspaper article, is not correct.

We have been corresponding for some time and many vague rumours float about as to what we have been saying to each other. Anxious inquiries come to me and I have no doubt that similar inquiries are addressed to you also. I think that we might take the public into our confidence now for this is a public matter on which many are interested. I suggest therefore that our correspondence might be released to the press. I presume you will have no objection.

Yours sincerely,  
(*Sd.*) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU.

From Mr. Jinnah to Mr. Nehru.

Bombay,  
Dated, April 12, 1938.

Dear Pandit Jawaharlal,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 6th April, 1938. I am extremely obliged to you for informing me that you propose to return to Allahabad and shall probably be there for the greater part of April and suggesting



that, if it would be convenient for me to come there, we could meet, or, if it suits me better to go to Lucknow, you will try to go there. I am afraid that it is not possible for me owing to my other engagements, but I shall be in Bombay about the end of April and if it is convenient to you, I shall be very glad to meet you.

As to the rest of your letter, it has been to me a most painful reading. It seems to me that you cannot even accurately interpret my letter, as you very honestly say that "your mind is obsessed with the International situation and the terrible sense of impending catastrophe that hangs over the world", so you are thinking in terms entirely divorced from realities which face us in India. I can only express my great regret at your turning and twisting what I wrote to you and putting entirely a wrong complexion upon the position I have placed before you at your request. You have formulated certain points in your letter which you father upon me to begin with as my proposals. I sent you extracts from the press which had recently appeared simply because I believed you when you repeatedly asserted and appealed to me that you would be grateful if I would refer you to any recent statements made in the press or platform which would help you in understanding matters. Those are some of the matters which are undoubtedly agitating Muslim India, but the question

how to meet them and to what extent and by what means and methods, is the business, as I have said before, of every true nationalist to solve. Whether constitutional changes are necessary, whether we should do it by agreement or conventions and so forth, are matters, I thought, were for discussion, but I am extremely sorry to find that you have in your letter already pronounced your judgment and given your decisions on a good many of them with a preamble which negatives any suggestion of discussion which may lead to a settlement, as you start by saying "I was so much surprised to see this list as I have no idea that you wanted to discuss many of these matters with us ; some of these are wholly covered by previous decisions of the Congress, some others are hardly capable of discussion," and then you proceed to your conclusions having formulated the points according to your own notions. Your tone and language again display the same arrogance and militant spirit as if the Congress is the sovereign power and, as an indication, you extend your patronage by saying that " obviously the Muslim League is an important communal organisation and we deal with it as such, as we have to deal with all organisations and individuals that come within our ken. We do not determine the measure of importance or distinction they possess " and then you mention various other organisations. Here I may add that in my opinion, as

I have publicly stated so often, that unless the Congress recognises the Muslim League on a footing of complete equality and is prepared as such to negotiate for a Hindu Muslim settlement, we shall have to wait and depend upon our inherent strength which will "determine the measure of importance or distinction it possesses" Having regard to your mentality it is really difficult for me to make you understand the position any further. Of course, as I have said before, I do not propose to discuss the various matters, referred to by you, by means of and through correspondence, as, in my opinion, that is not the way to tackle this matter.

With regard to your reference to certain falsehoods that have appeared about the Congress in the Urdu press, which, you say, have astounded you, and with regard to the circular letter referred to about the misdeeds of the U P Government, I can express no opinion without investigation, but I can give you number of falsehoods that have appeared in the Congress press and in statements of Congressmen with regard to the All India Muslim League, some of the leaders and those who are connected with it. Similarly I can give instances of reports appearing in the Congress press and speeches of Congressmen which are daily deliberately misrepresenting and vilifying the Muslim composition

of the Bengal, Sind, Punjab, and Assam Governments with a view to break those Governments, but that is not the subject matter of our correspondence and besides no useful purpose will be served in doing so.

With regard to your request that our correspondence should be released to the press, I have no objection provided the correspondence between me and Mr. Gandhi is also published simultaneously, as we both have referred to him and his correspondence with me in ours. You will please therefore obtain the permission of Mr. Gandhi to that effect or, if you wish, I will write to him, informing him that you desire to release the correspondence between us to the press and I am willing to agree to it provided he agrees that the correspondence between him and myself is also released.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) M. A. JINNAH.

From Mr. Nehru to Mr. Jinnah.

Allahabad,  
Dated, April 16, 1938.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Your letter of April 12th has just reached me.

I am exceedingly sorry that anything that I have written to you should have caused you pain. It seems to

be true that we approach public problem from different standpoints and inevitably I try to place my viewpoint before you and seek to gain your appreciation of it. To say anything that might pain you would defeat my own purpose, even apart from its impropriety. At the same time I owe it to you and to myself to endeavour to place frankly before you how my mind works and what my views are on the subject matter under discussion. Our viewpoints might differ, but I do believe that the margin of difference can be lessened by a frank approach on either side. I have sought to make this approach in all sincerity and with every desire on my part not to say anything that might come in the way.

In my last letter I dealt with the various points mentioned in the extracts you had sent me as I presumed that, as you had drawn my attention to them, they might to a large extent represent what you had in mind. As you know I have been trying to get at these points of difference and when I saw something concrete I wanted to give my reaction to it. I tried to state what the Congress opinion has been in regard to them. There is no finality in day to day politics, although certain principles are supposed to govern policies. It is for the Congress, if it so chooses, to vary any policy. All I can do is to state what the past and present policy is.

I regret that you think that I write in an arrogant and militant spirit and as if I considered the Congress as the sovereign power. I am painfully conscious of the fact that the Congress is not a sovereign power and that it is circumscribed in a hundred ways and further that it may have to go through the wilderness many a time again before it achieves its objective. You have referred to my obsession with the international situation and the sense of impending catastrophe that possesses me. If I feel that way, as I do, I can hardly grow complacent or imagine that the Congress is sovereign. But when I discuss Congress policies, as a Congressman I can only repeat what these are and not bring in my own particular view on the subject, if these happen to be at variance with Congress resolutions.

You point out to me that the Congress press has contained numerous falsehoods in regard to the Muslim League and some of its leaders, as well as the provincial governments of Bengal, Punjab, Sind and Assam. I entirely agree with you that falsehoods, misrepresentations and insinuations are to be deprecated and countered wherever they might occur, in the Urdu, Hindi or English press, or whatever the political complexion of the newspaper. There is no such thing as the Congress press over which the Congress has control, but it is true that many newspapers generally

be true that we approach public problem from different standpoints and inevitably I try to place my viewpoint before you and seek to gain your appreciation of it. To say anything that might pain you would defeat my own purpose, even apart from its impropriety. At the same time I owe it to you and to myself to endeavour to place frankly before you how my mind works and what my views are on the subject matter under discussion. Our viewpoints might differ, but I do believe that the margin of difference can be lessened by a frank approach on either side. I have sought to make this approach in all sincerity and with every desire on my part not to say anything that might come in the way.

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support the Congress. But whether we can influence them or not, we certainly want to stop all such false and misleading statements and to express our disapproval of them. In this matter I can only beg to you to point out specific instances so that we might take necessary action.

I note that you say about the publication of our correspondence. I have not got with me copies of your correspondence with Mahatma Gandhi. I am therefore writing to him to seek his permission as suggested by you.

I am afraid it will hardly be possible for me to visit Bombay in April or May. Early in June I intend sailing for Europe. In case I go to Bombay earlier I shall inform you so that we might have the opportunity of meeting. I understand that you will be meeting Mahatma Gandhi in the near future.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU.

Press statement issued by Mr. M. A. Jinnah, President of the All-India Muslim League while releasing the correspondence between him and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.

Mount Pleasant Road,  
Malabar Hill, Bombay.

January 7, 1940.

I regret to find that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, during his recent tour in the Punjab and elsewhere, has thought fit to attack me in a manner unworthy of any responsible leader. He accuses me of being bent upon the preservation of British domination over India which I can only characterise as not only unwarranted, but mean. The reasons for his refusing to continue his talks with me, as given by him, far from correct, are misleading and unfair.

I would not further comment upon his reckless and irresponsible pronouncements, but I shall rest content with releasing the correspondence between us on the subject. This will show the true reasons for his refusing to proceed further in the matter, and I leave it to the public to judge the impossible attitude that is being taken up by him and the Congress.

From Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to Mr. M. A. Jinnah.

Anand Bhawan,  
Allahabad, December 1, 1939.

My dear Jinnah,

When we met last in Delhi, it was agreed that we

should meet again to discuss various aspects of the communal problem. You told me that on your return to Bombay you would write to me suggesting some date for such a meeting. I have been looking forward to your letter since then. I hope that whenever it is convenient for you to fix date you will kindly let me know.

Sir Stafford Cripps is coming to India soon and is likely to spend two or three weeks in this country. He is on his way to China. I do not yet exactly know when he will reach here, but probably he will come in about a week's time. During his brief stay in India he would like to meet you if that is possible. I do not know his programme at all, nor do I know what cities he intends visiting. But I take it that he will go to Bombay. Could you kindly let me know if you are likely to be in Bombay about the third week of this month or later? This information might help him to arrange his programme. He is coming by air and will land in Allahabad.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU.

From Mr. M. A. Jinnah to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. ,

Mount Pleasant Road,  
Malabar Hill,  
Bombay,  
4th December 1939.

My dear Jawahar,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 1st December, and thank you for it. As at present advised I hope to be in Bombay for the next two or three weeks, and if it is convenient to you I shall be very glad to see you and fix up any date that may suit you. Please, therefore, let me know what date and time will suit you.

As regards Sir Stafford Cripps, I received a letter from him, and I have already replied to him c/o your address as directed by him, and as I have already stated I shall be here in Bombay and as he is arriving at Allahabad on the 8th, as I understand from his letter, I shall be very glad to see him when he is in Bombay. On hearing from him I shall fix up also the date and time that may suit him.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) M. A. JINNAH.

From Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to Mr M A  
Jinnah

Anand Bhawan,  
Allahabad, December 9, 1939

My Dear Jinnah,

Two days ago I sent you a letter informing you that I intended going to Bombay soon and hoped to meet you there. Yesterday morning I read in the newspapers your statement fixing December 22nd as a day of deliverance and thanksgiving as a mark of relief that the Congress Governments have at last ceased to function. I have read this statement very carefully more than once and have given twenty four hours thought to the matter. It is not for me, in this letter, to enter into any controversy about facts or impressions or conclusions. You know my views about these, formed, I hope, in all earnestness and with all desire to find the truth. It may be that I am mistaken, but I have sought more light and that light has not come.

But what has oppressed me terribly since yesterday is the realisation that our sense of values and objectives in life and politics differs so very greatly. I had hoped, after our conversations, that this was not so great, but now the gulf appears to be wider than ever. Under these circumstances, I wonder what purpose will be

served by our discussing with each other the problems that confront us. There must be some common ground for discussion, some common objective aimed at, for that discussion to yield fruit. I think. I owe it to you as well as to myself to put this difficulty before you.

You were good enough to show me in Delhi a letter you had received from Bijnor. I enquired into the matter and am informed that the version of facts given to you is not correct and is wholly misleading. If you would care to have an explanation of what happened, I could obtain it for you from Bijnor. For this purpose, I would like to have a copy of the letter you showed me in Delhi.

Yours sincerely,  
(*Sd.*) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU.

From Mr. M. A. Jinnah to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.

Mount Pleasant Road,  
Malabar Hill,  
Bombay,  
13th December 1939.

Dear Jawaharlal,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 19th December. I did not know where to address my reply to you

as your movements were reported in the press to be uncertain. The latest announcement is that you are arriving in Bombay on the 14th of December and I am therefore sending this letter to your Bombay address. I quite agree with you that "there must be some common ground for discussion, some common objective aimed at for that discussion to yield fruit", that is the very reason why I made it clear in our conversations at Delhi in October last to Mr. Gandhi and yourself. First, that so long as the Congress is not prepared to treat the Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Mussalmans of India, it was not possible to carry on talks regarding the Hindu-Muslim settlement as that was the basis laid down by the working committee of the All India Muslim League, and second, that we cannot endorse the Congress demand for the declaration as laid down in the resolution of the Working Committee confirmed by the All India Congress Committee of 10th October 1939, apart from the nebulous and impracticable character of it, till we reach an agreement with regard to the minority problem. The Muslim League was also not satisfied with the declaration made by the Viceroy. If happily we could settle the Hindu Muslim question, then we would be in a position to evolve an agreed formula for a demand of declaration by His Majesty's Government that would satisfy us, neither the first nor the second suggestion of

mine was acceptable to Mr. Gandhi or to yourself at Delhi, but you were good enough to express your wish that you would like to meet me again and I said that I would be always glad to see you. In reply to your letter of the 1st December expressing your wish to see me in Bombay, I informed you that I shall be in Bombay till the 3rd week of December and I shall be glad to see you, and I can only say that if you desire to discuss the matter further I am at your disposal.

As regards your reference to the Bijnor incident I am sure that you will agree with me that it requires a thorough judicial examination and enquiry before any conclusion can be arrived at, and it is hardly worth our while to deal with one instance, for in my judgment the whole working of the constitution and our charges against the Congress Government must be thoroughly examined by a Royal Commission.

Yours sincerely,

(*Sd.*) M. A. JINNAH.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, c/o Mr. Hathi Singh,  
Sakina Mansion,  
Carmichael Road,  
BOMBAY.



From Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to Mr. M. A. Jinnah.

Sakina Mansion,  
Carmichael Road,  
Bombay.

December 14, 1939

My dear Jinnah,

Thank you for your letter of the 13th December which was delivered to me in the forenoon today on my arrival here. I sent you my last letter from Allahabad after reading and giving full thought to your statement about the celebration of "a day of deliverance and thanksgiving" by the Muslims. This statement had distressed me greatly as it made me realise that the gulf that separated us in our approach to public problems was very great. In view of this fundamental difference, I wondered what common ground there was for discussion and I put my difficulty before you. That difficulty remains.

In your letter you have emphasized two other preliminary conditions before any common ground for discussion can arise. The first is that the Congress must treat the Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Mussalmans of India. The Congress has always considered the League as a very

important and influential organisation of the Muslims and it is because of this that we have been eager to settle any differences that may exist between us. But presumably what you suggest is something more and involves some kind of repudiation by us or dissociation from other Muslims who are not in the League, who have been and are our closest colleagues. There are, as you know, a large number of Muslims in the Congress, who have been and are our closest colleagues. There are Muslim organisations like the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, the All-India Shia Conference, the Majlis-e-Ahrar, the All-India Momin Conference, etc., apart from trade unions and peasant unions which have many Muslims as their members. As a general rule, many of these organisations and individuals have adopted the same political platform as we have done in the Congress. We cannot possibly dissociate ourselves from them or disown them in any way.

You have rightly pointed out on many occasions that the Congress does not represent every body in India. Of course not. It does not represent those who disagree with it, whether they are Muslims or Hindus. In the ultimate analysis it represents its members and sympathisers. So also the Muslim League, as any other organisation, represents its own members and sympathisers. But there is this vital difference that while

the Congress constitutionally has its membership open to all who subscribe to its objective and methods, the Muslim League is only open to Muslims. Thus the Congress constitutionally has a national basis and it cannot give that up without putting an end to its existence. There are many Hindus, as you know, in the Hindu Mahasabha who oppose the idea of The Congress representing the Hindus as such. Then there are the Sikhs and others who claim that they should be heard when communal matters are considered.

I am afraid therefore that if your desire is that we should consider the League as the sole organisation representing the Muslims to the exclusion of all others, we are wholly unable to accede to it. It would be equally at variance with facts if we made a similar claim for the Congress, in spite of the vastness of the Congress organisation. But I would venture to say that such questions do not arise when two organisations deal with each other and consider problems of mutual interest.

Your second point is that the Muslim League cannot endorse the Congress demand for a declaration from the British Government. I regret to learn this for this means that, apart from communal questions, we differ entirely on purely political grounds. The Congress demand is essentially for a declaration of war aims

and more especially for a declaration of Indian independence and the right of the Indian people to frame their own constitution without *external interference*. If the Muslim League does not agree to this, this means that our political objectives are wholly dissimilar. The Congress demand is not new. It is inherent in article one of the Congress and all our policy for many years *past has been based on it*. It is inconceivable to me *how the Congress can give it up or even vary it*. *Personally I would be entirely opposed to any attempt at variation*. But this is not a personal matter. There is a resolution of the All-India Congress Committee, endorsed by a thousand meetings *all over India, and I am powerless to ignore it*.

It thus seems that politically we have no common ground and that our objectives are different. That in itself makes discussion difficult and fruitless. What led me to write my last letter to you also remains the prospect of a celebration of a day of deliverance by the Muslims as suggested by you. That raises very vital and far-reaching issues, in which I need not go now, but which must influence all of us. That approach to the communal problem cannot be reconciled with an attempt to solve it.

I feel therefore that it will serve little purpose for us to meet at this stage and under these conditions with

this background I should like to assure you however that we are always prepared to have free and frank discussions of the communal or other problems as between the Congress and the League

I note what you say about the Bijnor incident It has been our misfortune that charges are made in a one sided way and they are never inquired into or disposed of You will appreciate that it is very easy to make complaints and very unsafe to rely upon them without due inquiry.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd ) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

M A Jinnah Esq ,  
Mount Pleasant Road,  
Malabar Hill,  
BOMBAY

Letter from Mr M A Jinnah to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

Mount Pleasant Road,  
Malabar Hill,  
December 15, 1939  
Bombay,

Dear Jawaharlal,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 14th December 1939 and I am sorry to say that you have not appreciated my position with regard to the second point I

did not say that Muslim League cannot endorse the Congress demand for a declaration from British Government. What I have said was that we cannot endorse the Congress demand for the declaration *as laid down in the resolution of the working committee and confirmed by the All-India Congress Committee of the 10th October 1939 for the reasons I have already specified in my letter.*

If this resolution of the Congress cannot be modified in any way and as you say that personally you would be entirely opposed to any attempt at variation of it and as you make it clear that you are wholly unable to treat with the Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Mussalmans of India, may I know in these circumstances what do you expect or wish me to do.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) M. A. JINNAH.

Letter from Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to Mr. M. A. Jinnah.

Bombay, December 16, 1939.

My Dear Jinnah,

Thank you for your letter of December 15th.

I realise the difference you have pointed out. Of course the Muslim League cannot oppose the idea of

any declaration. What the Congress had asked for was an enunciation of war aims and a recognition of India's independence and the right of her people to frame their constitution, a right that must necessarily be inherent in independence. All these are basic principles which flow from our objective of independence, and as the Muslim League has the same declared objective, there should be no difference of opinion about them. In the application of these principles many important matters will no doubt have to be considered. But so far as the basic demands are concerned, they are of the very essence of Indian nationalism. To give them up or to vary them materially is to knock down our case for independence.

In regard to the war also the Congress has repeatedly declared its policy during the last eleven years. The present declaration is a logical outcome of that policy. I have personally had some share in shaping this policy and I have attached importance to it. You will appreciate that it is exceedingly difficult, apart from the question of desirability, to vary such long-established and fundamental policies. These policies are political in their essence and, I would venture to say, are the only policies which flow from a demand for Indian freedom. Details may be considered and discussed, their application should be worked out

in mutual co-operation and, in particular, the interests of various groups and minorities should be considered carefully and protected. But to challenge the very basis of that declaration is to demonstrate that there is a great difference in political outlook and policies. This, as such, has nothing to do with the Hindu-Muslim problem. It is because of this that I feel that there is little in common in our political objectives.

May I say again that no one on our behalf, so far as I know, challenges or minimises the authority, influence and importance of the Muslim League. It is for this reason that we have been eager to discuss matters with it and to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the problems that confront us. Unfortunately we never seem to reach even the proper discussion of these problems as various hurdles and obstructions, in the shape of conditions precedent, come in our way. These conditions precedent, as I have ventured to point out to you, have *far-reaching significance*. I do not know why they should be allowed to obstruct all progress or prevent us from considering these problems. It should not be difficult to remove these hurdles and come to grips with the subject itself. But as these hurdles continue and others are added to them, I am compelled to think that the real difficulty is the difference in political outlook and objectives.



At the present moment, the decision to have an all India demonstration on December 22nd has added a psychological barrier which effectively prevents mutual approach and discussion. I regret this exceedingly and have earnestly wished that you would see your way to remove this barrier which is leading and can only lead to ill-will. I still hope that you may be able to do so.

I do wish to assure you that for my part I do not want to leave any stone unturned which can lead to mutual understanding and settlement. But you will not have me, as I do not want to have you, leave integrity of mind and purpose in pursuit of anything. Nothing worthwhile can be gained that way. I have deep political convictions and I have laboured in accordance with them these many years. I cannot leave them at any time, much less now when the world is in the throes of a terrific crisis.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU.

M. A. Jinnah Esq.,  
Mount Pleasant Road,  
Malabar Hill,  
Bombay.

**CORRESPONDENCE:**

**MR. JINNAH**

**&**

**SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE**



Correspondence between Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose, the then President of the Congress and Mr. M. A. Jinnah, the President of the All-India Muslim League.

Copy of the note handed over by Mr. Bose to Mr. Jinnah.

1938

In the course of the talks between the Congress President and Mr. M. A. Jinnah, President of the All India Muslim League, Mr. Jinnah suggested that any agreement that might be arrived at should be based on a clear understanding of the position of the Congress and that of the Muslim League. He proposed that the conversation should proceed on the following basis :—

“The All-India Muslim League as the authoritative and the representative organisation of the Indian Muslims, and the Congress as the authoritative organisation of the solid body of Hindu opinion, have hereby agreed to the following terms by way of a pact between the two major communities and as a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question.”

After further consideration a somewhat different wording was suggested by him as follows :—

“The Congress and the All India Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organisation of

the Mussalmans of India have hereby agreed to the following terms of a Hindu-Muslim settlement by way of a pact "

The second statement, though shorter, apparently embodies the same idea which is given in the first, that is, that the Congress should represent the Hindus and the Muslim League the Mussalmans.

The Congress cannot possibly consider itself or function as if it represented one community only, even though that might be the majority community in India. Its doors must inevitably be open to all communities and it must welcome all Indians who agree with its general policy and methods. It cannot accept the position of representing one community and thus itself becoming a communal organisation. At the same time the Congress is perfectly willing to confer and co operate with other organisations which represent minority interests

.

It is obvious that the Mussalmans of India, though a minority in the whole country, form a very considerable part of the population and their wishes and desires must be considered in any scheme affecting India. It is also true that the All India Muslim League is an organisation representing a large body of Muslim

opinion which must carry weight. It is for this reason that the Congress has endeavoured to understand the view-point of the League and to come to an understanding with it. The Congress, however, would be bound to consult other existing Muslim organisations which have co-operated with the Congress in the past. Further in the event of other group or minority interests being involved it will be necessary to consult representatives of such interests.

Letter from Mr. Bose to Mr. Jinnah.

Bombay, May 15, 1938.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Last night I gave you a note explaining our position. You asked me what constructive proposals we had to make. I think the note is self-explanatory. Having made known the Congress reaction to your suggestion, according to us, it remains now to proceed to the next stage namely appointment of respective committees which will jointly settle the terms of understanding.

Yours sincerely,  
(*Sd.*) SUBHAS C. BOSE.

Letter from Mr. Jinnah to Mr. Bose.

Bombay, 16th May, 1938.

Dear Mr. Bose,

I acknowledge the receipt of a note you handed over to me on behalf of the Congress on the 14th, and also I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 15th of May, 1938. The matter will be placed before the Executive Council and the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League at a meeting to be called in the first week of June, and I will communicate to you the decision as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) M. A. JINNAH.

Letter from Mr. M. A. Jinnah to Mr. Bose.

Bombay, 5th June, 1938.

Dear Mr. Bose,

I am enclosing herewith unanimous opinion of the Executive Council of the All India Muslim League as promised by me in my letter dated the 16th of May with reference to the note given to me by you on behalf of the Congress and your letter of the 15th of May 1938.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) M. A. JINNAH.

*Resolution No. 1—*

The Executive Council of the All India Muslim League has considered the note handed over by the President Mr. S. Bose on behalf of the Congress to Mr. Jinnah the President of the All-India Muslim League on the 14th May and his letter of the 15th May 1938 and find that it is not possible for the All-India Muslim League to treat or negotiate with the Congress the question of Hindu-Muslim settlement except on the basis that the Muslim League is the authoritative and representative organisation of the Mussalmans of India.

*Resolution No. 2—*

The Council have also considered the letter of Mr. Gandhi dated the 22nd May 1938 and are of opinion that it is not desirable to include any Muslim in the personnel of the proposed Committee that may be appointed by the Congress.

*Resolution No. 3—*

The Executive Council wish to make it clear that it is the declared policy of the All India Muslim League that all other minorities should have their rights and interest safe-guarded so as to create a sense of security amongst them and win their confidence and the All India Muslim League will consult the representatives of such minorities and any other interest as may be involved, when necessary.



Letter from Subhas Chandra Bose to Mr M A Jinnah

Wardha, 25th July, 1938

Dear Mr Jinnah,

The Working Committee has given all the attention it was possible for it to give to the resolutions of the Muslim League you were good enough to enclose with your letter of the 5th June 1938. The first resolution of the League Council defines the status of the League. If it means that, before we proceed to set up a machinery for considering the terms of settlement of the communal question, the Congress should recognise the status as defined in that resolution, there is an obvious difficulty. Though the resolution does not use the adjective 'only', the language of the resolution means that the adjective is understood. Already the Working Committee has received warnings against recognising the exclusive status of the League. There are Muslim organisations which have been functioning independently of the Muslim League. Some of them are staunch supporters of the Congress. Moreover, there are individual Muslims who are Congressmen, some of whom exercise no inconsiderable influence in the country. Then there is the Frontier Province which is overwhelmingly Muslim and which is solidly with the Congress. You will see that in the face of these known facts it is not

only impossible, but improper for the Congress to make the admission which the first resolution of the League Council apparently desires the Congress to make. It is suggested that the status of organisations does not accrue to them by any defining of it. It comes through the service to which a particular organisation has dedicated itself. The Working Committee therefore hopes that the League Council will not ask the Congress to do the impossible. Is it not enough that the Congress is not only willing but eager to establish the friendliest relations with the League and to come to an honourable understanding over the much vexed Hindu-Muslim question ?

At this stage it may perhaps be as well to state the Congress claim. Though it is admitted that the largest number of persons to be found on the numerous Congress registers are Hindus, the Congress has a fairly large number of Muslims and members of other communities professing different faiths. It has been an unbroken tradition with the Congress to represent all communities, all races, and all classes to whom India is their home. From its inception it has often had distinguished Muslims as Presidents and as General Secretaries who enjoyed the confidence of the Congress and of the country. The Congress tradition is that though a Congressman does not cease to belong to the

Faith in which he is born and bred up, no one comes to the Congress by virtue of his faith ; he is in and of the Congress by virtue of his endorsement of the political principles and policy of the Congress. The Congress therefore is in no sense a communal organisation. In fact it has always fought the communal spirit because it is detrimental to the growth of pure and undefiled nationalism. But whilst the Congress makes this claim, and has sought, with more or less success, to live up to the claim, the Working Committee asks for no recognition from the League Council. The Committee would be glad if your Council would come to an understanding with the Congress in order that we might achieve national solidarity and whole-heartedly work for realising our common destiny.

As to the second resolution of the Council, I am afraid that it is not possible for the Working Committee to conform to the desire expressed therein.

The third resolution, the Working Committee is unable to understand. So far as the Working Committee is aware, the Muslim League is purely a communal organisation, in the sense that it seeks to serve Muslim interests and its membership too is open only to Muslims. The Working Committee also has all along understood that so far as the League is concerned, it desires, and rightly, a settlement with the Congress on the Hindu-

Muslim question and not on questions affecting all minorities. So far as the Congress is concerned, if the other minorities have a grievance against the Congress, it is always ready to deal with them as it is its bounden duty to do, being by its very constitution and organisation representative of all India without distinction of caste or creed.

In view of the foregoing I hope that it will be possible for us to take up the next stage in our negotiations for reaching settlement.

It is suggested that as the previous correspondence has already been published, it would be wise to take the public into confidence and publish the subsequent correspondence between us. If you are agreeable these documents will be immediately released for publication.

Yours sincerely,

(*Sd.*) SUBHAS C. BOSE.

Letter from Mr. M. A. Jinnah to Mr. S. Bose.

Dated 2nd August, 1938.

Dear Mr. Bose,

I placed your letter dated the 25th of July 1938 before the meeting of the Executive Council of the All India Muslim League.

The Executive Council gave its earnest attention

and careful consideration to the arguments which were argued in your letter for persuading it not to claim the status it has done in its resolution No 1 already communicated to you I am desired to state that in defining the status the Council was not actuated by any motive of securing an admission, but had merely stated an accepted fact

The Council is fully convinced that the Muslim League is the only authoritative and representative political organisation of the Mussalmans of India This position was accepted when the Congress League Pact was arrived at in 1916 at Lucknow and ever since, till 1935 when Jinnah Rajendra Prashad conversation took place, it has not been questioned The All India Muslim League, therefore, does not require any admission or recognition from the Congress and not did the resolution of the Executive Council passed at Bombay But in view of the fact that the position—in fact the very existence—of the League had been questioned by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the President of the Congress, in one of his statements wherein he asserted that there were only two parties in the country viz the British Government and the Congress, it was considered necessary by the Executive Council to inform the Congress of the basis on which the negotiations between the two organisations could proceed

Besides, the very fact that the Congress approached the Muslim League to enter into negotiations for a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question it presupposed the authoritative and representative character of the League and as such its right to come to an agreement on behalf of the Mussalmans of India.

The Council are aware of the fact that there is a Congress coalition government in N.W.F.P. and also that there are some Muslims in the Congress organisation in other provinces. But the Council is of opinion that these Muslims in the Congress do not and cannot represent the Mussalmans of India, for the simple reason that their number is very insignificant and that as members of the Congress they have disabled themselves from representing or speaking on behalf of the Muslim community. Were it not so, the whole claim of the Congress alleged in your letter regarding its national character would fall to the ground.

As regards "the other Muslim organisations" to which reference has been made in your letter, but whom you have not even named, the Council considers that it would have been more proper if no reference had been made to them. If they collectively or individually had been in a position to speak on behalf of the Mussalmans of India, the negotiations with the Muslim League for a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question would not

have been initiated by the President of the Congress and Mr. Gandhi. However, so far as the Muslim League is concerned it is not aware that any Muslim political organisation has ever made a claim that it can speak or negotiate on behalf of the Muslims of India. It is, therefore, very much to be regretted that you should have referred to "other Muslim organisations" in this connection.

The Council is equally anxious to bring about a settlement of "the much vexed Hindu-Muslim question" and thus hasten the realization of the common goal, but it is painful to find that subtle arguments are being introduced to cloud the issue and retard the progress of the negotiations.

In view of the facts stated above the Council still hopes that the representative character of the Muslim League will not be questioned and that the Congress will proceed to appoint a committee on that basis.

With reference to the second resolution the Council wishes to point out that it considered undesirable the inclusion of Mussalmans in the Committee that might be appointed by the Congress because it would meet to solve and settle the Hindu-Muslim question and so in the very nature of the issues involved they would not command the confidence of either Hindu or the Mus-

salmons and their position indeed would be most embarrassing. The Council, therefore, request you to consider the question in the light of the above observations.

With reference to the third resolution it was the memorandum of the Congress referred to in your letter dated the 15th of May 1938 in which mention of other minorities was made and the Muslim League expressed its willingness to consult them, if and when it was necessary in consonance with its declared policy.

As regards your desire for the release of the correspondence, including this letter, for publication the Council has no objection to your doing so.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) M. A. JINNAH.

Letter from Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose to Mr. M. A. Jinnah.

Calcutta, 2nd October, 1938.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Your letter of the 2nd August, 1938 has been placed before the Working Committee. After due deliberation it has resolved to reply as follows :—

“Though there are inaccuracies in your letter no purpose will be served by dwelling on them. The



substance of your letter seems to be that the League does not expect the Congress, whether implicitly or explicitly, to acknowledge its status as the authoritative Muslim organisation of India. If this view is accepted by the League, I am authorised to state that the Working Committee will confer with the Committee that may be appointed by the League to draw up the terms of settlement.

“The Working Committee will be represented by at least five of its members at the sitting of the Conference.”

“As the previous correspondence has already been released for publication, I am taking the liberty of issuing this to the Press.”

Yours sincerely,  
(*Sd.*) SUBHAS C. BOSE.

Letter from Mr. M. A. Jinnah to Mr. Bose.

Little Gibbs Road, Malabar Hill,  
Bombay, 10th October, 1938.

Dear Mr. Bose,

I am in receipt of your letter dated the 2nd of October which was placed before the Executive Council.

I am authorised to state in reply as follows :—

The Executive Council of the All India Muslim League regret very much that the Working Committee of the Congress should have entirely misread my letter dated the 2nd of August 1938 which is quite clear and does not require any elucidation or further interpretation. The Muslim League are still ready to proceed with the negotiations for settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question on the basis defined by my letter referred to above and would appoint its representatives to meet the Committee that may be appointed by the Congress on the footing indicated by us in our three resolutions of the 5th of June 1938 already communicated to you.

As all the Correspondence so far in this connection has been published I am issuing this to the Press.

Yours sincerely,  
(*Sd.*) M. A. JINNAH.



CORRESPONDENCE:

MR. JINNAH

&

SIR TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU



enjoying powers without being required to give account to any other authority. You have expressed your annoyance from time to time that Ministers are not more active in rousing public opinion in respect of matters relating to war or the general political situation. You will not allow Ministers to function and administer according to their own light and judgment. You and some of your officers will commit Government to policies and acts which Ministers do not approve of; and afterwards you expect them to stand up as obedient persons, fully justifying the results of your mistaken policy. The brunt of the attack falls on Ministers. The Legislature is even procluded from criticising or commenting on your conduct. You in your turn do not hesitate to take advantage of, and sometimes, even go beyond the spirit of, the provisions of the Government of India Act and the Instrument of Instructions, thus reducing ministerial administration to a mockery.

"But the most difficult situation has been created with regard to the manner of suppression of the political movement. I have told you repeatedly that, while it is the duty of any Government to see that acts of lawlessness are not committed or that disturbances are not created specially during this grave emergency, Government must not in any manner provoke a crisis or encourage or make it possible for officers to commit excesses or to inflict injury on innocent people. Where persons deliberately commit offences, they must face the consequences of the law. But in spite of our best efforts, indiscriminate arrests have been made, innocent persons assaulted and shot down, and oppression has been carried on in some parts in a manner hardly creditable to any civilized Government. The fact that some British prisoners of war under German control were put under fetters roused the loud and angry protests of the British Government and its supporters. Can you not express even a fraction of that moral indignation for similar and even worse outrage committed on Indians by the agents of the British Government itself? You have persistently refused to have allegations enquired into and have also helped in the suppression of publication of accurate news.

"The Congress movement in Midnapore took a very serious turn, and none can say anything in respect of any legitimate measures taken to deal with the persons guilty of serious offences against law. But in Midnapore repression has been carried on in a manner which resembles the activities of Germans in occupied territories as advertised by the British agencies. Hundreds of houses have been

statement of the so-called Standing Committee of the Sapru Conference, I shall, if necessary, deal with them later when I have had sufficient time to examine them carefully.

Letter from Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru to Mr. Jinnah.

Allahabad,

Dated, 6th February 1941.

My dear Jinnah,

Since we met last in Bombay a few months ago, I have several times thought of writing to you, but I have never been able, up to this moment, to make up my mind. Even now when I have decided to write to you, I am writing this letter with considerable hesitation, as, if I cannot make things better than they are at present, I certainly do not, in all conscience, want to make them worse. But I believe that since 1916 when we came together in the old India Legislative Council, you have known my views on the Hindu-Mahomedan question, and I am, therefore, venturing to hope that you will not misunderstand my point of view.

Although, I have not been taking active part in politics of the country for the last few years, the old interest still survives, and I follow fairly closely the trend of events. The trend of recent events has only tended to confirm me in my belief that the supreme

necessity of the hour is a settlement between the Hindus and the Muslims, or to put it in party politics, between the Congress and the Hindu Sabha and the Muslim League. It is my misfortune that owing to some very strong convictions, I have found it impossible to join either of the first two and for obvious reasons I could not be a member of the League of which you are the President, and yet I feel that so long as the three big organised bodies of public opinion in India remain in their present state of relationship to each other, the future of this country cannot be by any means bright. It is not my purpose to discuss in this letter which of these three parties is to blame. I think that a discussion of this character can never lead to any good ; indeed, I think, instead of doing good, it may do positive harm. You will remember that even in August last when we met at Bombay, I told you that if the Congress and the Hindu Sabha would not, or were not prepared to call a conference for the purpose of settling differences, there was no reason why you, as the President of a great and influential League, should not take the step forward. Since then I have been giving this matter my constant attention, and at last I have made up my mind to make a personal appeal to you. I do not, however, pretend to sail under false colours. I represent neither the one party nor the other. I can neither offer nor accept terms. I can only appeal to you in my individual capa-



city—in the capacity of one who strongly and genuinely holds that the Muslims are an integral part of India and that their willing co operation with other communities, must necessarily condition the nature, extent and speed of the progress of the country. I am deliberately avoiding all reference to the controversial issues that divide the one from the other, as it is not for me to settle them, but for you and leaders of other parties, who can influence opinion and speak for others to raise these issues and to come to a settlement in regard to them. As a realist, I feel that not only you but Mr Gandhi and the leaders of the Hindu Sabha, particularly Dr Savarkar, are men on whom the primary responsibility for a settlement of those issues lies. Neither speeches on public platforms, nor statements and interviews given by leaders, can really help the situation. I think conversations, or if I may use a hackneyed phrase, heart to heart conversations may possibly lead to some satisfactory results. In any case even if they do not, we shall have the satisfaction of knowing that everything has been done which could be done, to bring about a better state of feeling and understanding. I am, therefore, venturing to suggest on my own account, without committing any other person, or any other party, to my views or suggestions that (1) you should agree first to meet Mr Gandhi, and then the process of private talks could be extended to others. (2) If you and other

leaders then think, that it would serve the best interest of the country, to invite a joint conference, then you all could take the necessary stage. I can assure you of my personal support and co-operation in this matter. If your reply to my suggestion is that you will be prepared to see Mr. Gandhi and talk over matters with him, I shall write to him and press it on him that he must see you in Bombay or any other place that may suit your convenience. I hope very strongly that he will be quite willing to see you in Bombay or any other convenient place and discuss things with you. I think you two should meet first, for if the country is dear to him, I believe, it is no less dear to you. You may be at present identified with the Muslim League. I have no kind of prejudice against the League or any one connected with it, and so far as you are concerned, I still prefer to look upon you as I used to in days gone by when other people also looked up to you, for guidance and advocacy of the cause of India, irrespective of caste, colour or creed.

If you are willing to see Mr. Gandhi and to discuss things I hope you will permit me to take him into confidence about what you write to me.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU.

Letter from Mr. M. A. Jinnah to Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru.

Bombay,

Dated, 10th February, 1941.

My dear Sapru,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 6th instant and thank you for it. I have given to it my closest consideration coming as it does from you.

The main purpose on which you have concentrated is directed towards trying to induce me to agree to see Mr. Gandhi. I am sorry to find that you are under the impression that I am reluctant and opposed to seeing Mr. Gandhi or any other Hindu leader on behalf of the Hindu community, for you say in your letter that I should agree first to see Mr. Gandhi. Then you proceed to say further, "if your reply to my suggestion is that you will be prepared to see Mr. Gandhi and talk over matters with him I shall write to him and press it upon him that he must see you at Bombay or any other place that may suit your convenience." Please remove this erroneous impression from your mind. I have always been ready and willing to see Mr. Gandhi or any other Hindu leader on behalf of Hindu community and do all I can to help the solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem.

As regards other matters in your letter I cannot do better than to send you a press cutting giving full text of my speech that I made in the course of the debate in the Assembly on the Supplementary Finance Bill last November, as I fear that your attention, if at all, could have been drawn only to the A. P. summary that appeared in most of the papers at the time.

This will give you some idea of the position and the point of the Muslim League.

I thank you for your personal references to me which I need not say I appreciate very much.

Yours sincerely,  
(*Sd.*) M. A. JINNAH.

Letter from Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru to Mr. Jinnah.  
Allahabad, 19th February, 1941.

My dear Jinnah,

Thank you ever so much for your kind letter of the 10th February. I regret to say that I have been having high fever for the last five or six days and am therefore unable to attend to any political correspondence. As soon as I get better I shall write to you again about the matter about which I wrote to you on the 6th February. I appreciate very much the promptness with which you have so kindly replied to me.

yours sincerely,  
(*Sd.*) TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU.



**CORRESPONDENCE:**  
**MR. JINNAH**  
**&**  
**SIR ROGER LUMLEY**



Letter from Sir Roger Lumley to Mr. M. A. Jinnah.

(Confidential)

Government House,  
Ganeshkhind, July 20, 1941.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

His Excellency the Viceroy has asked me to let you know his intentions on the matters which follow. I had hoped that I would be able to see you myself in order that I might convey this message to you personally, as was his desire : but unfortunately, now that I am in a position to give you the message, I am not entirely fit, and I am therefore writing to convey it to you by this letter, which I am sending down to Bombay by special messenger.

The Viceroy has continued to have very much in mind the whole situation in regard to the war effort and the association of non-official opinion with the prosecution of the war. The obstacles, however, to any settlement on the basis of the complete offer of August last, which emerged so clearly during the discussions last autumn, still exist, to his very great regret, as the last few months and the reactions to the Secretary of State's statement in the House of Commons on April 22 have made clear.

In these circumstances, it is equally clear that he cannot look for that degree of support from the major



parties, for the proposals embodied in the August offer, which he desires. Nevertheless, the burden of the conduct of the war on the Central Government has greatly increased, and, for administrative reasons, it is essential to proceed with some increase in the membership of the Viceroy's Council within the terms of the August offer. The Viceroy, accordingly, is anxious that you should know that he is now, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, creating five new portfolios.

These new portfolios and the names of the gentlemen by whom they have been accepted are as follows: Supply—Sir Homi Mody, Information—Sir Akbar Hydari, Civil Defence—Mr Raghavendra Rao, Indians Overseas—Mr Aney, Labour—Sir Firoz Khan Noon.

The Viceroy would also like you to know that he proposes to fill the vacancies arising in the portfolio of Law when Sir Zafrulla Khan goes to the Federal Court, and in the portfolio of education when Sir Ganga Shankar Bajpai takes up a mission overseas by the appointment of Sir Sultan Ahmed and Mr Sarkar.

In addition, the Viceroy does not feel that, because of the difficulty in securing the support of the major political parties, it is possible to delay further the more active association of non-official Indian opinion with the prosecution of the war.

He is accordingly establishing with the approval of His Majesty's Government, a National Defence Council. This Council will consist of some 30 members, nine of whom will be drawn from Indian States.

The Viceroy regards it as essential that the Great Muslim community should be represented on that Council by persons of the highest prominence and capacity. He has accordingly invited the Premier of Assam, Bengal, the Punjab and Sind to serve as members of it, and he has extended invitations also to certain other prominent Muslims, such as Sir Mahomed Usman.

He has considered whether he should invite you to let him have any suggestions as to possible personnel for this Council, but being aware, as he is, of your general attitude, he has concluded that it would be preferable not to embarrass you by inviting you to make suggestions.

It is intended that an announcement about these changes will be made on the morning of Tuesday, July 22, and the Viceroy is anxious that you should have through me this advance information of what is proposed. I would have much preferred to have given you this message orally, but this letter contains the substance of it.

I hope that you have now fully recovered from your recent illness

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd ) ROGER LUMLEY

Letter from Mr M A Jinnah to Sir Roger Lumley  
Dear Sir Roger,

I am in receipt of your letter of July 20, 1941, which embodies the message of His Excellency the Viceroy I deeply regret the decision taken by him with the approval of His Majesty's Government I appreciate when he says that he does not wish to make suggestions, knowing, as he does, not only my general attitude but that of the All India Muslim League

Further I cannot approve of his having invited the Muslim League Premiers or any other Muslim Leaguer under the scheme of the expansion of the Viceroy's Council as well as what is now called the National Defence Council, because it is obvious that it would embarrass the Muslim League organisation And I do hope and trust that His Excellency will avoid such a contingency

Besides, it is hardly fair or proper that they should be approached by His Excellency over the head of the President and the Executive of the All India Muslim

League, knowing full well the position and the attitude that the All-India Muslim League has adopted.

It is stated in his message that the Viceroy regards it as essential that the great Muslim community should be represented by persons of the highest prominence and capacity. Would it be creditable for any individual prominent or capable Muslim belonging to an organisation to accept the invitation contrary to the position and the attitude taken up by that organisation, and would it do any credit to Government if they succeed in alluring him and create a breach in the organisation, in the hope that he may throw up his allegiance to the party to which he belongs in order to accept the invitation of His Excellency.

I maintain that the great Muslim community is represented authoritatively only by the All-India Muslim League organisation. Persistence in this course will not improve matters, but on the contrary it will lead to bitterness on the part of the Muslim League, which up to the present moment, fortunately, does not exist, however emphatically we have disapproved of the policy which has been pursued by His Majesty's Government and the Viceroy.

Before I conclude I am extremely sorry to hear that you are not well and I hope that you will soon recover from your illness.

Thanking you for your kind inquiries, I am now much better.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd ) M A JINNAH

Letter from Sir Roger Lumley to Mr M A Jinnah  
Ganeshkhind, July 22

Dear Mr Jinnah,

Thank you for your letter of July 21, the contents of which I have passed on to the Viceroy I am glad to hear you have recovered Thanks for your kind inquiry, I am much better\_

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd ) ROGER LUMLEY

CORRESPONDENCE:

MR. JINNAH

&

FAZLUL HAQUE



Letter from Mr. Fazlul Huque to Mr. Jinnah.

8th December, 1940.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

You must have read in the papers my statements on the necessity of a final attempt to solve the communal problem of India. I do not wish to do anything without your consent and I am therefore writing these few lines to request you to call a meeting of the Working Committee or of the Council of the All-India Muslim League as early as possible. In all my statements, I have said nothing beyond the fact that the League might call the conference. Some day or other these communal differences will be made up, but I do not see any reason why the Muslim League should not take the wind out of the sails of other organisations and secure to itself the credit of having done the greatest possible service to India and her people. Let us discuss and if we fail, the blame will not be ours. As regards the subjects to be discussed I will send you my note later on.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) FAZLUL HUQUE.

Letter from Mr. Jinnah to Mr. Fazlul Huque.

11th December, 1940.

Dear Mr. Fazlul Haque,

Apart from the wisdom of this move on your part, I regret to say that you should have adopted this course



without reference to me. From your statement, it follows that you are forcing the Muslim League that they should take the initiative, because in your second statement you are definitely appealing to the members of the Council of the All-India Muslim League to support you and state that they should call upon me to summon an emergency meeting of the Council or the Working Committee of the League. This, whatever may have been your intentions, clearly conveys that I am not willing to come to a settlement for this unfortunate deadlock, for which the Congress alone is responsible.

I know you are very busy as the head of the Bengal Government. Perhaps you have not followed what has taken place at the various stages of negotiations upto the present moment. I would therefore request you to read carefully at least the resolutions of the Working Committee and the Council of the All-India Muslim League and my recent speech in the Central Assembly in connection with the supplementary Finance Bill. This speech of mine is fully reported in many newspapers.

You have already in the public press declared your opinion as if the Muslim League was to be goaded by somebody to come to a settlement and decided that we should consider the proposals which you are going to formulate for the purpose. I am glad that you are going to send me those proposals and I am awaiting

them before I can express any further opinion on the matter with regard to calling the meeting of the Working Committee or the Council. As suggested to you apart from the wisdom of your having issued these statements and having appealed to the members of the Council in the Press I think your move will convey the impression in the political quarters in India and in England that the Mussalmans are divided as it has already been so interpreted in many quarters.

Yours sincerely,  
(*Sd.*) M. A. JINNAH.

Letter from Mr. Fazlul Huque to Mr. Jinnah.

14th December, 1940.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I am very sorry that owing to prevailing facts and circumstances my move has already been misunderstood. I made it clear in my statements that I did not wish to dictate to you anything, but only to express the desire that there should be an effort for peace. In doing so, I never meant to insinuate that any one was to blame although I did perfectly know where the offence really lies. But, it would not be politic for me to say anything indicating that I am already a party-man. At the same time, I feel so strongly that there should be one more peace effort and for that reason I could not resist the temptation of making a suggestion. I never meant that

I should take the lead or I should dictate but I was really asking you to take the lead and as the head of the premier political organisation of India, to call everybody else to meet you in order that they may be able to put their case before you and you may be in a position to discuss problems with them across the table and come to a decision. My object really was to put you in the position of the dictator of India. I am sorry if I have been misunderstood by you and my other friends. If you still think that my move has in any way been unwise, you can tell me accordingly. It is far from my intention to bring about a disruption in the Muslim League. I hope you will write to me both freely and frankly so that I may be able to repair any wrong that I may have unwittingly inflicted on the reputation of the League.

My only desire has been for peace because I feel that unless there is unity among all communities on the principle of give and take, there will be no constitutional advance and no prospect of a better India than we know at the present moment.

The present Government of India Act is absolutely rubbish. It gives us responsibility but no power. It gives all the power to the Governor and the Governor-General-in-Council but all the responsibilities to the Ministers.

You can therefore, easily understand how much we feel our position under the present constitution and how much we are longing for a better state of things. I feel that the only obstacle in the way is the present impasse. I therefore think that this should be removed anyhow but not by any surrender of our principles or of the position that we now hold. That will be for you to decide but do please try to bring about a solution which will enable India to march forward. If you think that it is the Pakistan scheme and nothing else why not send for these people and explain to them what you mean? People are not able to appreciate or understand the thing fully. This will be removed if you have free talks with the leaders. It is not for me to suggest ways and means but I have indicated to you my heart's desire and I hope you will appreciate it.

Yours sincerely,  
(*Sd.*) FAZLUL HUQUE.

Letter from Mr. Jinnah to Mr. Fazlul Huque.

4th January, 1941.

Dear Mr. Fazlul Huque,

I really do not know what I can say with regard to this matter. I think you have seen what the Press has been writing about this move. You have recently issued a statement from Poona saying that you are mis-

understood. Well, I cannot blame the people because I said from the very beginning that it was a very unwise move. I am quite sure that you did not intend to bring about a disruption in Muslim League. I quite appreciate your desire for peace and settlement and nobody desires them more than I do. But, the question is how they should be brought about. When the other party has declared a war and is holding a pistol at your head, what do you propose that I should do? What do you think is the aim and the object of the Congress in launching civil disobedience? Is it not obvious that they want to bend the British Government to surrender or yield to their demands? At whose cost? Over our head and at our cost.

An old and experienced politician like you and a veteran fighter that you are, what do you expect me to do in these circumstances?

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd) M. A. JINNAH.

Letter from Mr. Huque to Mr. Jinnah.

7th January, 1941.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I have received your letter. I quite understand your view-point but certainly something will have to be done. However, I am doing nothing at the present moment and I am allowing things to simmer. As a matter of fact,

I am watching developments. If there is anything particular, I shall let you know.

Yours sincerely,  
(*Sd.*) FAZLUL HUQUE.

Telegram from Mr. Jinnah to Mr. Fazlul Huque, dated 21st January 1941.

My attention drawn to a summary press report of our correspondence regarding your move Hindu-Muslim settlement. Report incorrectly represented. Its source am informed Calcutta. Propose release complete correspondence.

Telegram from Mr. Fazlul Huque to Mr. Jinnah, dated 22nd January, 1941.

Surprised your telegram. I know absolutely nothing. Will you kindly await my letter, just writing ?

Letter from Mr. Fazlul Huque to Mr. Jinnah.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I have already sent you a wire yesterday about incorrect reports in the Press regarding our Hindu-Muslim unity move. As I have already wired to you, I know nothing about these mis-statements in the Press nor have I yet seen them. You say that they emanated from Calcutta. I made enquiries but I cannot lay my hand on any one who may be guilty. I can have no

objection to your publishing the whole correspondence, but I would ask you to consider if that will not worsen matters. It would be much better if you made a fresh statement pointing out the inaccuracies and stating what the real facts are. I feel more and more convinced that this unity move is bound to be a fiasco as Communities do not show the slightest inclination to be friendly. In these circumstances, no useful purpose will be served by our publication of the correspondence that passed between us at a time when I was full of hope. I am still anxious to work for a compromise when the parties are unaccommodating other. Hope you will consider my point of view before you decide anything.

Yours sincerely,  
(*Sd.*) FAZLUL HUQUE.

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Letter from Mr. Fazlul Huque to Mr. Jinnah.

New Delhi,  
November 13, 1942.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

You have known me for over 30 years and you can easily realise I have been longing to meet you and to assure you my attachment to you and the Muslim League.

It is an irony of fate that this rift should have taken place between you and me after close co-operation for the long span of over quarter of a century. However, I request you to allow the dead-past bury its dead and throw a veil over all that has happened during the past few months and remove the ban on me and my supporters and facilitate our entry in the League fold. I can assure you that I will abide by the discipline of the party and the instructions of the President of the Muslim League.

As for the Progressive Muslim League, up to now it exists on paper only and it ceases to exist automatically with my entry and the entry of my supporters into the League.

I need hardly emphasise the fact that in the interests of Islam and Muslim solidarity I am prepared to make any sacrifices and to subordinate my personal interests and inclinations to the supreme demand of Muslim Nation. I am extremely anxious that the breach in the Muslim community should be made up and efforts should be made that no Muslim may remain outside the folds of the League.

I understand you will be leaving Delhi tonight, but I would appreciate it very much if you would give me a few minutes' time to talk to you personally and to explain everything frankly.



Under Providence I leave the interest of Bengal Muslims in your hands.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) A. K. FAZLUL HAQUE.

Letter from Mr. Fazlul Huque to Mr. Jinnah.

Dated February 5, 1943.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I am determined to solve the Bengal tangle and to put an end to the meaningless strife which is having the most undesirable consequences on the prospects of the Muslim community in Bengal.

Through the mercy of Providence I have an assured position in the Bengal Legislative Assembly and can carry on for an indefinite period till the end of the war and one year after.

But I am going to sacrifice all that I now possess for the sake of my country and of the solidarity of my community.

The step that I am taking will also show that I have not been able to blame for the unfortunate events that have taken place in Bengal during the last 15 months and that I have been more sinned against than sinning. I do not, however, wish to rake up the unpleasant past, but to concentrate on the future.

I gathered from the last words you told me in the course of my last interview with you that in case I liquidate the Progressive Party and resign from my office as Premier you would lift the ban which has been put on me.

I have thought carefully over the situation and with a view to facilitate my coming back to the League, I am ready to tender my resignation which will mean the automatic dissolution of the Progressive Coalition Party.

May I now get a line from you to tell me that I have understood you alright, and that the ban put on me will be lifted as soon as I tender resignation of my office as Premier? If so, I will take my step I have indicated and I hope you will render the barest possible justice by taking me back to the League as soon as your conditions are satisfied.

If I come back to the League, it will be a matter of party politics in Bengal for Muslim members and Muslim leaders to determine as to who should be the chief and what should be the composition of the Bengal Cabinet?

So long as we do not contravene the rules and principles you have laid down, I hope, you will not impose your decision on the steps we may take in Bengal

for securing the best possible administration in the country.

With deep regards,

I am,

Sincerely yours,

(Sd.) A. K. FAZLUL HUQUE.

Letter from Mr. Jinnah to Mr. Fazlul Huque.

Dated February 10, 1943.

Dear Mr. Huque,

I am in receipt of your letter of February 5. In the course of the interview that you had with me in consequence of your letter of November 13, 1942, I maintained that our decision was entirely due to your wrong conduct and action that you took and that you have already done a very great harm to the Muslim cause, of which you are better aware than anybody else.

I re-assured you that I have no personal feeling in the matter nor was I, or am I influenced by any outside agency or any particular individual.

I took the decision of expelling you from the Muslim League because your conduct and action was a gross breach of discipline and fundamental principles and policy of the All-India Muslim League organisation. Therefore, you expressed regret and assured me that

you were repentant and also expressed your willingness to abide by whatever proposal I would consider fair.

You told me that all that you wanted was that the ban should be lifted and that you were ready and willing to remain as an ordinary member of the League and serve the organisation in any capacity that the League may assign to you.

In your letter of Nov. 13, 1942, also before I gave you an interview you stated "I can assure you that I will abide by the discipline of the party and the instructions of the President of the Muslim League."

Thereupon I made the following suggestions to you subject to the final sanction of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League.

(1) That you should express your regret for what you have done. If you have now come to the conclusion that you should be re-admitted as a member, it is due to the organisation from you, whose membership you value so much, that you should show repentance on your part. Otherwise if members were expelled and allowed to be re-admitted, as if nothing had happened, it would not only be inconsistent with self-respect of the organisation but would be destructive of the elementary principles of discipline.

The first point, therefore that I suggested in my last interview with you, was that you should express your regret for what you have done.

(2) That you should liquidate the Progressive Coalition Party or completely dissociate yourself from it and resign from your office as Premier. After that, I told you, I was prepared to see that the ban should be lifted and that you and other Muslims, who were expelled, should be eligible for membership of the Muslim League and also to Muslim League Party in the Bengal Assembly. Thereafter, the Muslim League party in the Bengal Assembly will take such decisions as may be necessary from time to time with regard to matters arising in connection with and relating to the Legislature and the administration of the Government of Bengal in consonance with the fundamental principles and the policy of the All India Muslim League, subject of course, to one overriding provision which is embodied in the Resolution No 2 of the Working Committee dated Oct 22, 1939 and confirmed by Resolution No 1 of the Council of the All India Muslim League dated Feb 25, 1940, which runs as follows :—

“The Working Committee hereby empower the President to advise, guide and issue instructions to Muslim League parties in the various Provincial Legislatures in the event of some sudden emergency arising.

“The Muslim League parties shall give effect to or carry out such instructions as may be given by the President.”

At this interview of the 13th Nov. 1912, you agreed to carry out these conditions within a fortnight. But I heard nothing further from you till now.

Before I close I must say that I cannot appreciate the tone, the language and sentiments expressed by you in the first paragraph of your letter, because although you conclude it by saying “I do not, however, wish to rake up the unpleasant past, but to concentrate on the future” you have already indulged to a considerable extent in raking up the past.

I must also repudiate and cannot agree with you what you say in this paragraph, as it is contrary to real facts. I am obliged to say this because if you really wanted to bury the unpleasant past and intended to concentrate on the future you should not have started with such a preamble as is contained in this paragraph of your letter.

Nor do I understand the last paragraph of your letter, specially when you say “I hope you will not impose your decision on the steps that we take in Bengal for securing the best possible administration for all

communities in the country." Perhaps it is a mistake and I suppose you mean Bengal.

Nor do I understand what is the meaning of your suggestion that I should not impose my decision on the steps that you may take in Bengal.

However, it seems to me that the last paragraph of your letter need not be discussed further, in view of what I have already explained and stated above, namely the conditions to be complied with, in order to facilitate your being re-admitted to the Muslim League organisation.

I shall move in the matter as soon as the above conditions are satisfied by you.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) M. A. JINNAH.

CORRESPONDENCE:  
MR. JINNAH  
&  
NAWAB OF CHATTARI





Letter from Nawab of Chattari to Mr. Jinnah.

Dated 20th July, 1941.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

As I have accepted a salaried appointment in an Indian State I write this to tender my resignation from the membership of the Council of the All-India Muslim League. It is needless for me to say that your good wishes and blessings would always be a source of great strength to me and I am sure that they would not be denied.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,  
(*Sd.*) AHMED SAID.

Letter from Mr. Jinnah to Nawab of Chattari,

Dated, July 30, 1941.

Dear Nawab Sahib,

I received your letter dated July the 20th from Chattari in the afternoon of the 24th of July 1941. On examining the envelope I find that it was posted and registered at Delhi on the 22nd of July.

I beg to inform you that it was decided before the receipt of your letter to take disciplinary action against you as indicated by my statement issued on the 21st

as you were a member of the Muslim League for having joined the so-called National Defence Council. I regret, therefore, that apart from the technicality that your letter should have been addressed to the Secretary, I am unable to accept your resignation pending the result of the disciplinary action that has to be taken against you. However, I am forwarding your letter to the Secretary of the All-India Muslim League.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) M. A. JINNAH.

**CORRESPONDENCE:**

**MR. JINNAH**

**&**

**MAULANA AZAD**



## TELEGRAM

Bombay, 12th July 1940.

From Maulana Azad to Mr. Jinnah :—

“Confidential. Your July 9 statement : The Congress Delhi resolution definitely means by National Government a composite Cabinet not limited to any single party. But is it the position of the League that she cannot agree to any provisional arrangement not based on the two-nation scheme ? If so, please clarify by wire.”

Mr. Jinnah's reply :—

“Your telegram cannot reciprocate confidence. I refuse to discuss with you, by correspondence or otherwise, as you have completely forfeited the confidence of Muslim India. Can't you realise you are made a Muslim 'show-boy' Congress President to give it colour that it is national and deceive foreign countries. You represent neither Muslims nor Hindus. The Congress is a Hindu body. If you have self-respect resign at once. You have done your worst against the League so far. You know you have hopelessly failed. Give it up.”



**CORRESPONDENCE:**  
**MR. JINNAH**  
**&**  
**ALLAMA MASHRIQI**





Telegram from Allama Mashriqi to Mr. Jinnah :—

5th May, 1942.

“My telegram dated 28th April unreplied. Can you state minimum conditions for united demand for National Government? Do you approve active co-operation of Khaksars with Rajagopalachariar?”

Mr. Jinnah's reply to Allama Mashriqi's telegram :

11th May, 1942.

“Your telegram 5th May. My appeal to Khaksars is to join and support whole-heartedly League policy at this critical juncture. Not possible discuss terms united demand as requested by means correspondence. —Jinnah.”



**CORRESPONDENCE:**

**MR. JINNAH**

**&**

**MR. C. RAJAGOPALACHARI**



Telegram from Mr. Rajagopalachari to Mr. Jinnah :—

2nd February, 1943.

“In pursuance of a general desire to consider the situation arising out of Gandhiji's fast, we earnestly request you to join the Conference here on Feb. 18, Thursday afternoon, which Kunzru, Ghaznavi, Srinivasan, Joshi, Kazmi, Banerjee, Chaudhary, Sant Singh and selves convening.”

Mr. Jinnah's reply :—

Bombay, Feb. 15, 1943.

In a letter to Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, replying to his invitation to attend the conference, Mr. Jinnah says, “The situation arising out of Mr. Gandhi's fast is really a matter for the Hindu leaders to consider and advise him accordingly.”

Mr. Jinnah adds, “I regret I am unable to associate myself with the proposed conference at Delhi on the 18th of February, 1943 for it is apparent from the recent correspondence between the Viceroy, the Government of India and Mr. Gandhi, that has been published in the Press, that there is no change on the part of Mr. Gandhi in the attitude and stand taken by him last August ‘vis-a-vis’ the Muslim League except the

reiteration of his oft-repeated political demand having for its sanction a threat to resort to "mass civil disobedience." Now he has undertaken this dangerous fast with a view to enforce that demand which if conceded or agreed to under such coercive method, it is obvious, will destroy the Muslim demand and involve complete sacrifice of the vital and paramount interests of Muslim India.

"Moreover, great political issues and complex political problems of this subcontinent involving the destinies of millions cannot be settled or solved by means and methods of fasting adopted by Mr. Gandhi.

"I do however, hope that your efforts may lead to the path of reason and peace and then there would come an opportunity for friendly negotiations which might, I trust, result in a settlement satisfactory not only to the two major nations—Hindus and Muslims—but to all other interests and minorities concerned."

**CORRESPONDENCE:**

**MR. JINNAH**

**&**

**SHEIKH ABDUL MAJID**





After resigning from the Muslim League, Sheikh Abdul Majid wrote a letter dated 25th Oct. 1943 informing Mr. Jinnah about his resignation.

Mr. Jinnah's reply :—

Dated, 4th Nov. 1943.

Dear Sheikh Abdul Majid,

“I am in receipt of your letter of October 25, 1943, informing me that you have resigned from the Muslim League organisation. What do you expect me to do after you have taken your decision without apprising me of your complaints against the Ministry of placing them before the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League which would have been the correct procedure for you to adopt before you took this fatal step.

*In these circumstances I note that you have resigned from the Muslim League organisation.”*

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) M. A. JINNAH.



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Yours sincerely,  
(Sd.) M. A. JINNAH.